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"[A]lthou qh 'we are under a Constitution, the Constitution is what the judges
say it is."'
"There is a duty [of care] if the court says there' 2is a duty; the law [of negligence], like the Constitution, is what we make it.

INTRODUCTION

In Lochner's Legacy, Cass Sunstein noted that scholars have tended to
build their positive and normative theories of constitutional law around a
few judicial decisions that are taken to reflect fundamental and progressive
transformations of the field.3 In particular, he argued that much of modem
constitutional theory might be described as an attempt to identify the moral
4 rid constitutional
in the story of how West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
law of
Lochner v. New York and the doctrine of economic substantive due proc6
ess.
Modem tort theories, particularly modem theories of negligence, have
likewise been built around narratives of progress that attribute special significance to certain transformative cases. One of the most important moments in these narratives is the tale of the "assault upon the citadel of priv-

1 EDWIN S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 64 (1941) [hereinafter
CONSTITTONAL REVOLUTION] (quoting CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, ADDRESSES 139 (1908)).
2 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953), reprinted in
VILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 191,213 (1953).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLtM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987).
4 300 U.S. 379, 398-99 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law against a Due Process
Clause challenge).
5 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (striking down a law setting the maximum hours worked by bakery employees as violative of the Due Process Clause).
6 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 873-74; see also James E. Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REV. 211, 211-12 (1993) (noting that the "specter" of
Lochner continues to haunt constitutional theory).
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ity." 7 In this story, the part of Lochner is played by Winterbottom v.
Wright,8 the decision that gave birth to the restrictive liability rule that a
manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries caused by its negligentlymade products absent privity between it and the plaintiff. The part of West
9
Coast Hotel, in turn, is played by MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in
which then-Judge Cardozo, "wielding a mighty axe, burst10over the ramparts,
exception."
and buried the general [privity] rule under the
The parallel between constitutional and tort scholarship is more striking
than this, however. It is not just that tort scholars, like constitutional scholars, have constructed theories of negligence around interpretations of transformative cases. Rather, many of our most prominent tort scholars have in
fact drawn the same moral from their analysis of MacPhersonthat the first
generation of post-Lochner scholars drew from cases like West Coast Hotel.
Indeed, according to the still-predominant scholarly view, MacPherson's
overruling of Winterbottom represents the exposure and rejection of the
same jurisprudential mistakes that many constitutional scholars writing in
the period 1890-1960 attributed to Lochner.
According to the latter group--represented by judges and scholars including, for example, Learned Hand and Edwin Corwin-the critical premise of Lochner and other substantive due process decisions consisted of a
claim by the courts that regulatory legislation posed a set of justiciable
questions that could be resolved by applying a concept of constitutional
rights. 1 Thus, the courts relied on an ostensibly legal and moral conceptthe right to economic liberty-to explain why the Constitution entitled, and
indeed obligated the judiciary, to block legislative efforts to protect workers
from the perceived risks and costs of industrialization, including economic
exploitation. This reliance was Lochner's mistake. Legal scholarsHolmes, in particular-had shown that when judges talked of rights, they
did not actually invoke a distinctive kind of concept, but instead were
disguising, through rhetoric, their own legislative or policy decisions about

7 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.). See generally William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict Liabilityto the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1102 (1960) (discussing the demise of privity as a limit on tort liability).
s 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842) (denying a cause of action where privity was lacking
between the defendant and the injured plaintiff).
9 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that the defendant manufacturer owed a duty of
care to the ultimate purchaser despite the absence of privity).
10Prosser, supranote 7, at 1100.
" See infra text accompanying notes 175-204 (describing Holmes's and Corwin's cri-

tiques of rights).
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which rules would promote the public good. 12 West Coast Hotel, on this
view, marked the judiciary's belated concession that its prior interference
with economic legislation could not be justified by a claim that it possessed
a special competence to enforce rights, but instead amounted to the imposition of its own outdated policy views on a populace that did not share
13
them.
The story tort scholars have told, and continue to tell, about the transition from Winterbottom to MacPherson bears a remarkable resemblance to
the story just told about Lochner and West Coast Hotel. According to these
scholars-who range from Leon Green and William Prosser to Richard Posner and Robert Rabin-the Winterbottom court, like the Lochner Court,
claimed that the doctrine of privity was entailed by an autonomous and judicially-identifiable legal and moral concept-in this case, the concept of
duty. 14 Thus, just as the Lochner Court held that the notion of rights contained in the doctrine of substantive due process constrained its decision, the
Winterbottom court concluded that the concept of duty contained in negligence doctrine obliged it to rule that manufacturers could not be held liable
for many of the injuries that they caused. 15 Similarly, these tort scholars
maintain that the mistake of Winterbottom was exactly the mistake of
Lochner. "Duty," no less than "right," is nothing more than a conclusory
label for judicial assessments of prudent policy.1 6 Finally, just as West
Coast Hotel marked the judicial renunciation of rights, MacPhersonmarked
the judicial renunciation of duty. Thus, according to most mainstream tort
scholars, the moral of MacPherson is that the contours of negligence typically are, and ought to be, determined by judicial assessments of the public
policy implications of permitting or prohibiting liability.17
The troubling aspect of the parallel just described is that tort scholars
have not yet reconsidered the foregoing account even as many, if not most,
12See infra text accompanying notes 205-07 (noting Holmes's and Corwin's claims that
judicial invocation of fights serve as a mask for legislative judgments).
13 See inf!ra text accompanying notes 205-07.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 95-106 (discussing scholarly critiques of duty).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 48-63 (describing Winterbottom's analysis of duty
in the context of nineteenth and early-twentieth century negligence law); see also infra text
accompanying notes 95-106 (discussing scholarly critiques of the concept of duty).
16See infra text accompanying notes 107-18 (describing Prosser's argument that no-duty
decisions consist ofjudges declining to impose liability for policy reasons).
17 This is the dominant moral, but not the only one, that tort scholars have drawn from
decisions like MacPherson. Others have argued that the "exposure" of duty as a legal pseudoconcept provides an argument that other actors-legislatures, agencies, or juries-be handed
responsibility for making negligence law. See infra text accompanying notes 120-24 (comparing Prosser's view that legislatures and administrators are capable of crafting negligence
law with Judge Andrews's view that juries should be given this responsibility).
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contemporary constitutional scholars have abandoned the parallel account of
Lochner and its overturning. Even in its heyday, Holmesian skepticism
about rights was never fully endorsed by the courts. Moreover, in the last
twenty-five years, the rights-skeptical critique of Lochner has encountered a
vast array of criticism from scholars who have little else in common, and
who have widely divergent attitudes toward the particular doctrine of substantive due process, including Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork,
Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, and Laurence Tribe.18 The problem with
the account, each has pointed out, is that West Coast Hotel cannot be understood as rejecting rights-based thinking in constitutional law. As demonstrated by court decisions dating from the time of West Coast Hotel to the
19
present, rights-based thinking is essential to constitutional law. Rather, the
problem with Lochner was its unwarranted assumption that certain libertarian conceptions of property and contract rights fixed the proper understanding of rights under the Constitution. Armed with this insight, modem constitutional theorists of all stripes, have revitalized rights-based thinking in a
manner that attempts to account for the judiciary's special role in our constitutional system, yet renders constitutional law capable of accommodating
social change.2 °
Unfortunately, no such reassessment has occurred within the world of
tort scholarship. On the contrary, mainstream tort theory has remained
deeply Holmesian and deeply antagonistic towards notions of duty. Indeed,
21
with the rise to academic dominance of law and economics, and the recent
22 tort law is today more than ever
flurry of legislative efforts at tort reform,
1S See infra text accompanying notes 238-52 (surveying various theories of rights that

endorse rights-based reasoning in constitutional law). We stress the range of scholars who
have criticized Lochner in order to emphasize that one can accept our parallel argument for
the revival of duty analysis in negligence without having to endorse the controversial doctrine
of substantive due process, or even the idea of unenumerated rights. See infra text accompanying notes 419-21 (arguing that a relational conception of duty in tort law does not face textual or separation-of-powers objections).
19See infra text accompanying notes 228-36 (noting the difficulty rights-skeptics face in
accounting for Supreme Court jurisprudence in the areas of free speech, privacy, and equal

protection).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 253-59 (discussing scholars who advocate rightsbased thinking and their critiques of Lochner).
21 See Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 57 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (noting that economic analysis of tort law has prevailed in the academy). There have been numerous influential applications of economic analysis to tort law. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT

LAW (1987).
22 See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, FederalProductLiability Reform in 1997:
History and PublicPolicy Support Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REV. 595, 607-23 (1997)
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regarded as raising policy problems that ought not be analyzed in terms of
duty-based thinking. Even corrective justice theorists, who have presented
powerful and insightful critiques of conventional scholarly accounts of tort
law, have focused principally on the duty of repair, and thus have not directly challenged Holmesian skepticism about duty as it relates to the primary conduct of natural and corporate citizens. 23 In short, while rights have
been disassociated from Lochner and have regained respect in 24
constitutional
discourse, duty still carries the stigma of Winterbottom in torts.
One might be tempted to conclude that the absence of any such reexamination by tort scholars indicates that in tort law, unlike constitutional
law, neither the judiciary nor the academy has any reason to question Holmesian skepticism and the concomitant notion that the contours of negligence ought to be determined by judicial assessments of public policy.
Certainly it is fair to say that the scholarly critique of duty and the model of
negligence developed around it-particularly as articulated in Prosser's
treatise-have been enormously influential. Indeed, the critique was a major force behind the negligence "revolution" effected by the California Supreme Court in decisions such as Dillon v. Legg2 5 and Rowland v. Christian.26 Nonetheless, the supposition that the "Holmes-Prosser" (or
"instrumentalist") model of negligence has proved unproblematic turns out
to be quite implausible.

(discussing recent attempts to reform federal products liability law); Philip Shuchman, It Isn't
that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just that the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 485, 488-94 (1997) (discussing recent federal and prior state tort reform
efforts).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 142-47 (noting that corrective justice theorists have
focused on the duty of repair rather than primary duties of conduct); see also Linda Ross
Meyer, Just The Facts?, 106 YALE L.J. 1269, 1307 (1997) (reviewing DON DENVEEs ET AL.,
EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY (1996))
(claiming that "corrective justice theorists face a serious difficulty in trying to articulate a duty
of care that does not dissolve into cost-benefit analysis"). For some of the leading articulations of corrective justice theory, see generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
(1992); ERNEST J. VEINRM,THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundationsof
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992).
24 There are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides?: Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 315, 353-63
(1990) (defending the concept of duty against Holmesian and Realist attacks and linking duty
to social norms and conventions).
2'441 P.2d 912, 916-17 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (embracing Prosser's notion that duty is a
reflection of policy considerations in finding that a defendant who negligently killed a child
could be liable to the child's mother for emotional harm).
26 443 P.2d 561, 563-68 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (employing Prosserian duty analysis to reject traditional distinctions between landowners' duties to trespassers, licensees, and invitees).
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As a descriptive legal theory, the model has always had a hard time explaining some of the most basic limitations on negligence liability. These
limitations often derive from doctrines that, on their face, raise issues of
duty including the existence of a duty to rescue, the duty to take precautions
against economic or emotional harm, and the duty of care owed by professionals to nonclients. 27 Faced with these limitations, scholars working
within the Holmes-Prosser paradigm have been forced into one of two unenviable positions: either they concede that these doctrinal areas are
duty isanomalous, 28 or they develop ad hoc explanations as to why such
29
of liability.
levels
socially-optimal
about
questions
really
are
sues
At a more basic level, Holmesian skepticism about duty has not merely
failed to explain the contours of negligence doctrine. It has rendered problematic the very institution of the common law of torts. According to
Prosser, judges are to set the limits of negligence liability by making allthings-considered decisions as to whether it would be good or bad for society to permit such liability. Yet our understanding of the relative strengths
and weaknesses of political institutions often leads to the conclusion that the
legislative and executive branches are more capable, or at least more appro30
priate, institutions for making such decisions. Given the predominance of
27 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356-85

(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (discussing "limited duty" doctrines); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1,
27-40 (1998) (noting duty-based limitations on liability in negligence law).
28 See Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 948-54 (1981) (treating no-duty cases as historically-rooted
exceptions to the rule of liability for injuries caused by negligence).
29See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, at 358 (observing that "duty" is explicable as a
policy-based limitation of liability); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEG.
STUD. 29, 38 (1972) (positing a "general rule[] that the defendant owes to those whom he
might chance upon and injure a duty to exercise due care," and then explaining limited-duty
cases as artifacts of pre-modem law or efficiency-maximizing limitations on liability); see
also Zipursky, supra note 27, at 40-55 (arguing that instrumentalist accounts of negligence
cannot explain an important set of no-duty cases).
30Consider, for example, the California Supreme Court's decision in Kentucky Fried
Chicken, Inc. v. SuperiorCourt, 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997), in which the majority ruled that a
restaurant could not be held liable for injuries to its customers resulting from its refusal to
comply with a robber's demands for money. Whatever the merits of the holding, one of the
court's main rationales-that imposition of liability would encourage robberies-was utterly
unsupported. See id. at 1270 ("[W]e are not satisfied that persons who commit armed robbery
would not become aware of and be encouraged by the existence of such a duty."). For similar
reasoning, see Boyd v. Racine Currency Exch., Inc., 306 N.E.2d 39, 42 (111.1973), which
stated that the establishment of a duty to comply with a robber's demands will increase "the
risks to invitees upon business premises."
One can certainly argue that courts are sometimes better policymakers than legislatures, or
that policy is best made through a "dialogue" between the branches. Cf.Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653 (1993) (defining the "process of
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instrumentalist thinking about negligence, it is therefore not surprising to
asserting their prerogative to reshape the tradifind legislatures increasingly
31
tional domain of tort law.
The Holmes-Prosser model has proved equally inept at generating a
framework for analyzing negligence problems. Its core claim-that negligence turns on judicial policy analysis of the costs and benefits of different
liability rules-tends to leave judges and juries to decide cases by means of
the arbitrary, indeterminate, and doctrinally unstable device of factor balancing.3 2 Often defended as an open and honest mode of judging (in contrast to "formal" modes of analysis), 33 balancing methodology in fact obscures the rationale for judicial decisions.3 4 In addition, as every torts
professor knows, the reduction of negligence to policy analysis threatens to
drain the analytic structure from torts. This problem manifests itself in part
as a pedagogic problem: sometime in November, usually in conjunction
with a discussion of Palsgraf35 and the Wagon Mound decisions, first-year
torts students are taught that the distinct elements of negligence collapse
into an unstructured and indeterminate policy inquiry. Perhaps more importantly, the collapse of "duty," "breach," and "proximate cause" into poljudicial review" as an "elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic"). Our point
is that the instrumentalist view of negligence law as policy-driven more readily provides an
argument for greater legislative jurisdiction over tort law than alternative views.
31 See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 22, at 597 (recognizing current efforts in tort reform and advocating the formation of new federal product liability law); Shuchman, supra
note 22, at 485 (noting recent significant efforts of both Congress and the state legislatures to
reform tort law).
32 The California Supreme Court's decision in Rowland is the prototype. See 443 P.2d
561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (noting that in order to decide negligence cases, courts must
weigh a number of factors, including "the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [and] the moral blame attached to the defendant's
conduct").
33 For an influential statement of this view, see Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negli28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1033-44 (1928) (advocating honest multigence Cases (Part1),
factor judicial decision-making over the "mocking emptiness" of formalized tests and rulebased decision-making).
34 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L. 467, 468 (1976) (noting that "under all the circumstances" tests for
liability threaten to degenerate into vacuity). Although we do not believe that policy analysis
and balancing tests are irrelevant to negligence law, we are of the view that they ought not to
play anything close to the starring role that they have in the Holmes-Prosser model. See infra
note 418 and text accompanying notes 414-18.
35 Palsgrafv. Long Island R-R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
36 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound No. 2), [1967]
1 App. Cas. 617, 644 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] 1 App. Cas. 388, 426 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Austl.).
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icy has caused lawyers and judges basic confusion in briefing and analyzing
negligence cases, as well as allocating the respective functions of judge and
jury.37 Excessive reliance on the malleable term "foreseeability"--which
now pops up in duty, breach and proximate cause discussions-is symptothe undisciplined nature of the inquiry under the Holmes-Prosser
matic of
8
3

model.

Finally, as a prescriptive theory of negligence, the instrumentalist model
leaves a great deal to be desired. In the first place, because ordinary morality employs notions of duty, the model has generated legal conclusions that
39 Moreseem ridiculous, or at least overly demanding and inappropriate.
over, by abandoning the psychologically rich notion of duty in favor of a
policy- and sanction-driven account, the Holmes-Prosser conception of negligence has undercut the motivation for complying with the law that is built
into the concept of duty itself. Both the judges who make the law, and the
corporate and individual decision-makers governed by it, having been told
for most of this century that tort law is about policy, not duty, now tend to
regard tort law as a cost of doing business rather than a collection of
obligatory norms. 40 In a like manner, the model has effected an undesirable
37See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39-40 (Cal. 1975) (noting that duty
is a question of law for the court, while foreseeability, which is a factor in determining duty, is
a question of fact for the jury); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891,
900 (Tenn. 1996) (same).
38CompareBallard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 635 (Cal. 1986) (stating that foreseeability is
relevant to duty, breach, and proximate cause analysis), and Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279,
281-82 (Me. 1992) (stating that foreseeability is relevant to duty and proximate cause analyses), with Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 136-37 (Mont. 1996) (stating that
foreseeability is relevant to duty analysis, but irrelevant to proximate cause analysis). Compare McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992) (stating that foreseeability is different in duty and proximate cause analyses), with Yonce v. SmithKline Beecham
Clinical Lab., Inc., 680 A.2d 569, 579 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) ("[F]oreseeability is an element inthe determination of a duty and in the determination of proximate cause and is defined
the same in each.").
39See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 556 (Ct. App. 1996) (explaining the enactment of legislation to overturn California decisions holding that landowners
owe a duty of due care to burglars injured by negligently maintained premises), afid, 968
P.2d 65 (Cal. 1998); Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437, 439, 446 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that a
negligent driver can be held liable for emotional distress experienced by a second driver who
viewed the severely injured driver in the wreckage).
40For the classic account of law as liability rules, see O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458-59 (1897). In criticizing the instrumentalist notion that tort law
reduces down to a set of liability rules, we do not thereby mean to endorse Professor Weinrib's equally extreme claim that one must argue for the existence of non-instrumental components of negligence law only on non-instrumental grounds. See WEINRM, supra note 23, at 38 (criticizing "functionalist" justifications of tort and contract law and arguing that "the purpose of private law is to be private law"). Rather, we maintain that there are strong conceptual
and instrumentalist arguments for the retention of a non-instrumentalist concept of duty in
negligence law, and that both sorts of argument are appropriate to negligence analysis.
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flattening of the legal landscape. 4' We are told that we must act reasonably
to avoid foreseeable harms, but have little sense of what this actually means,
and are losing our feel for whom we should be taking care not to injure.
In sum, the failure to question the reigning model of negligence cannot
be traced to the unqualified success of the model built on Holmesian dutyskepticism. Rather, it is a testament to the fact that duty-skepticism has
achieved the status of orthodoxy, and thus has resisted scrutiny. Our goal in
this paper is to provide grounds for questioning prevailing orthodoxy by reconsidering the soundness of the original assault on duty. Such a project
will strike some as a misguided effort to raise the dead. As the recent development of constitutional scholarship demonstrates, however, an examination of whether the problems we face today are due in part to a past conceptual wrong turn can prove to be a fruitful enterprise.
Taking our cue from the course of constitutional scholarship, we aim to
point to an alternative approach to negligence by telling a different story
about the progress marked by MacPherson-astory that provides a basis for
the resuscitation of a workable concept of duty in negligence. MacPherson,
we argue, should be understood as a case affirming, rather than renouncing,
the centrality of duty in negligence law.4 2 Much in the manner of modem
constitutional law and theory, Cardozo's opinion recognized that the problem with Winterbottom was not its invocation of the notion of duty, but its
rigid and regressive interpretation of that concept. A manufacturer's duties
of care, he rightly argued, are not owed only to those with whom the manufacturer has contracted. Businesses, like individuals, owe a broad range of
obligations to others to take care not to injure them, duties that derive from
social and legal norms outside of contract law. Indeed, as Cardozo explained, it is precisely because a manufacturer has a duty to be vigilant
against loss of life or limb to the consumer that liability will be imposed
when its negligence causes such injury.
Duty, therefore, is not rejected in MacPherson. It is the core of MacPherson. This is because Cardozo viewed negligence law as embodying
moral principles that contemplate a set of civil obligations we owe one another.43 As Cardozo emphasized in MacPhersonand elsewhere, one central
41

Cf George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 962-64

(1985) (describing "flat" legal reasoning typified by overemphasis on the concept of reasonableness).
42 See infra text accompanying notes 321-48 (analyzing Cardozo's employment of a relational notion of duty in negligence law).
43 See John C.P. Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Reconstructing Cardozo's Theoretical Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1324, 1334 (1990) ("Cardozo described the common law doctrine of negligence as a judicial attempt to capture within ajuridicial concept a range of obligations which members of his society believed individuals owed
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task of the courts is to elaborate those obligations in a manner that meshes
with modem understandings and modem problems; to articulate the set of
obligations that matches, roughly, what citizens believe about the care they
owe one another. He thus believed that one could deploy the concept of
duty in negligence law in a manner that was progressive and pragmatic
without being an instrumentalist. That, we shall argue, is the true moral of
MacPherson.
The positive aim of this Article is to further articulate this moral by
outlining what a satisfactory account of the concept of the duty of due care
might look like. Such an account, we argue, must take note of three aspects
of the concept of duty as it is found in Cardozo's analysis and elsewhere in
the common law of negligence. First, it must conceive of duty as relational,
that is, as owed by specific defendants or classes of defendants to specific
plaintiffs or classes of plaintiffs, rather than by each individual to the world
at large.44 Second, it must conceive of duty as relationship-sensitive,as opposed to abstract, transcendental, or context-independent. Third, it must
conceive of duty as a non-instrumental(or deontological) concept by taking
seriously the idea that "duty" carries with it a notion of obligatory force. In
our view, an account of duty that adequately captures these three ideas is not
only intelligible, but essential to the articulation of any satisfactory descriptive and prescriptive account of the tort of negligence.
Part I presents and analyzes the narrative that leading scholars have
constructed around MacPherson. Using Prosser as a spokesperson for
mainstream modem tort scholarship, this Part first reconstructs the dutyskeptical arguments developed by Holmes and later elaborated by Prosser,
Green, and others, and articulates the philosophical premises from which
that critique proceeds. It then demonstrates how leading tort scholars from
Prosser to Posner have read MacPhersonas both evidence of, and authority
for, duty-skepticism and the embrace of a policy-driven or instrumentalist
account of negligence. Part I concludes with a brief assessment of the impact of the Holmes-Prosser model on modem tort law and scholarship.
Part II discusses the development of constitutional scholarship. The
bulk of this Part is devoted to demonstrating that early post-Lochner constitutional scholarship relied for its critique of Lochner and rights discourse
on the same reductionistic, Holmesian conception of law and normative disone another in their private interactions.").
44 One of us has already argued in related contexts that the duties of negligence law, and
tort law generally, are best understood as relational in structure. See Zipursky, supra note 27,
at 59-60 (distinguishing between relational and non-relational norms, and arguing that tort law
is made up of relational norms); see also Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective
Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND U.S. TORT LAW (Gerald Postema ed.,

forthcoming 1999).
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course that tort scholars used as the basis of their critique of Winterbottom
and duty. In Part II.D, however, we note that most modem constitutional
theories have diverged from modem tort theory by reintroducing rights
analysis into constitutional law.
Part III seeks to complete the analogy between tort and constitutional
scholarship by explaining how the reinvigoration of rights-based thinking
developed in part out of a broader rethinking of the possibilities for normative reasoning, and, with it, the rejection of the Holmesian idea that reductive forms of instrumentalism provide the only respectable form of such reasoning. To demonstrate that these same philosophical considerations
support the rejection of wholesale instrumentalism in tort law and a corresponding revival of a notion of duty, we revisit and rebut the influential antiduty arguments presented by Prosser in his treatise.
Having established the philosophical viability of duty, we turn in Part
IV to the task of outlining the positive case for the concept of duty in negligence law and scholarship. Part IV.A argues that MacPherson should indeed be regarded as a testament to sound thinking about negligence, but not
because it embraces Holmes-Prosser duty-skepticism. In fact, we argue,
duty-skeptics have a good deal of trouble making sense of Cardozo's opinion. The great virtue of MacPherson, it turns out, was not its rejection of
duty, but its'rejection of Winterbottom's narrow and static account of duty in
favor of a more sophisticated, context-sensitive understanding. Building on
this analysis, Part IV.B sketches our "relational" conception of duty in negligence law and offers reasons for believing that it captures important and
attractive aspects of negligence doctrine that are not easily explained on the
Holmes-Prosser model. This conception, we suggest, can more easily accommodate the diverse body of negligence case law, more adequately explain the courts' institutional role in deciding duty questions, better lay a
foundation for a stable and manageable negligence law, more comfortably
mesh with our common sense understanding of how we are obligated to act
toward one another, and more sensibly integrate social change into negligence law. Finally, we redeploy the constitutional analogy to suggest that,
just as rights are central to constitutional law because of the ways in which
they constrain state decision-making, so duties are central to negligence law
because of the ways in which they frame the daily decisions of individual
citizens.
I. MACPHERSON AND MODERN TORTS SCHOLARSHIP

In this Part, we will present and analyze the conceptual and normative
progress that tort scholars have attributed to MacPherson. In so doing,'we
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aim to articulate the premises and substance of what we have called the
Holmes-Prosser or instrumentalist model of negligence.
A. Winterbottom as a "No-Duty" Decision
1. Duty as an Element of Negligence
To understand the scholarly assault on Winterbottom and the subsequent
embrace of MacPherson, one must first appreciate the place of these two
decisions within the doctrinal context of nineteenth and early-twentieth

century negligence law. Negligence emerged in the mid-nineteenth century
as courts and commentators struggled to rationalize the diversity of actions
recognized under the common law.45 Commentators, in particular, went
about this task by trying to distill from the case law a compendium of tort
45

On the standard historical account, the emergence of negligence is associated with the

increasing volume of so-called "running-down" cases--carriage and ship accidents. See J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 466-67 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing
reasons for the explosion in the number of running down cases in the late eighteenth century);
MORTON J. HoRwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 88 (1977)
(explaining that the running down cases, the first to involve joint actors, inevitably led courts
to shift attention to issues of fault); M.J. PRICHARD, SCOTT V. SHEPHERD (1773) AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 26-33 (Selden Soc'y 1976) (describing the transition from recognizing a duty of care owed by stagecoachmen and ship navigators to recognizing other cases of negligence). Unfortunately, this association has caused many historians
to superimpose onto the historical emergence of the negligence tort a particular and contestable description of the tort, a description we attribute to Holmes. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-88 (detailing Holmes's theory of torts). On Holmes's "non-relational" account, an
actor commits the tort whenever he acts unreasonably (toward anybody) and thereby causes
injury (to anybody). Because these historians have, perhaps unwittingly, accepted the Holmesian account, they have falsely assumed that the tort of negligence must conform to Holmes's
description. They have therefore misleadingly asserted that the running down cases are the
source of the modem tort of negligence not merely in the sense that courts started using the
term "negligence" to refer to a distinct cause of action soon after they began hearing a large
volume of those cases, but because the imposition of liability in cases involving accidents
between strangers logically presupposed the Holmesian idea that the negligence cause of action is structured around a non-relational, "general," "generic," or "universal" duty of care.
See BAKER, supra, at 468-70; HORWITZ, supra, at 88-89; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 12-13 (1985); Rabin, supranote 28, at 945-47.
In our view, the imposition of liability in the "running-down" cases did not in fact presuppose the embrace of Holmes's universal duty of care. See infra text accompanying notes 34548 (discussing how Cardozo's opinions in PalsgrafandMacPherson reveal a relational account of duty that encompasses duties owed to strangers). These scholars have thus erred by
conflating the emergence of the negligence cause of action-which did in fact occur in the
mid-nineteenth century-with the emergence of the particular and contested theory of negligence articulated by Holmes, which was not explicitly embraced by any court until the middle
decades of the twentieth century. In so doing, they have given unwarranted credibility to an
argument that the Holmesian account of negligence is the "original," "true," or "authentic"
account of the tort. See infra text accompanying notes 102-04 (discussing Winfield's claim
that early common law embraced a non-relational theory of duty).
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actions broken down into analytic elements.46 Thus, as it was first systematized in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the tort of negligence was
typically defined in terms of the four elements still recited in modem
case47
books: duty, breach, cause (in fact and proximate), and damages.
The first element-duty-was designed to capture a long-standing feature of many trespass and case actions. 48 Since the time those actions were
distinguished in the late fourteenth century, suits brought under either
heading tended to be available only against defendants who, by virtue of
voluntary acts and/or customary norms, stood in certain relationships with
the plaintiff.49 Courts and treatise writers captured this aspect of the cases
by requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care. As one treatise writer noted, for a negligence action to proceed, "it must of course be clearly proved that the law imposes upon the defendant the duty which he is charged with neglecting." 50 Likewise, another
explained that, to make out a claim, the "plaintiff must state and prove facts
51
sufficient to show what the duty is, and that the defendant owes it to him."
46

See WHITE, supra note 45, at 12-19 (discussing the academic search for the organizing

principles of tort law).
47 See C.G. ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 22 (2d ed. 1872) (identifying the elements
of negligence as duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and injury); I THOMAS G. SHEARMAN
& AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 5, at 4 (5th ed. 1898)
(listing the elements of negligence as a legal duty to use care, a breach of that duty, damage to
the plaintiff, a natural and continuous sequence connecting the breach of duty with the damage, and the absence of an distinct intention to produce the precise damage); FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 3, at 3 (1874) (listing the elements of

negligence as inadvertence, duty, imperfection in the discharge of a duty, and an injury to another or the public, as a natural and ordinary sequence). Other variations appeared in scholarly literature from the turn of the century. See Frances Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 209 (1905) (noting that the elements of
negligence are "a duty of care, a breach of that duty by negligent act or omission, and injury
naturally resulting therefrom"). Leon Green reported in 1928 that a version of this formula
had been "rather widely adopted." Green, supra note 33, at 1022. But see RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 (1934) (defining the elements of a negligence action roughly as follows: (a) plaintiff has an interest that is protected against unintentional invasion; (b) defendant engages in conduct that is negligent with respect to that interest or some other similar
interest; (c) the conduct legally causes an invasion of plaintiff's interest; (d) plaintiff is not
contributorily negligent).
48 Although we believe that the treatise writers were correct in identifying duty as a requirement built into the causes of action that eventually came to be known as negligence, we
also believe it is somewhat misleading to describe duty as a formal "element" that must be
pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in making out her prima facie case. For convenience,
however, we will from time to time refer to duty as an element of negligence.
49 See PRICHARD, supra note 45, at 30-31 ("In the field of relationship negligence the assertion by the plaintiff of a duty on the defendant is as old as the action on the case itself.").
50 ADDISON, supra note 47, at 17-18 (citation omitted); see also 1 SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, supra note 47, § 8, at 6 ("If there is no duty, there can be no negligence.").
51 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 47, § 8, at 7 (footnotes omitted).

1748

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 146: 1733

Grounds for establishing the existence of a duty of care tracked the tra-

ditional contours of the common law causes of action. In some instances,
the plaintiff could establish a duty of care by virtue of the defendant's undertaking to provide plaintiff with a service: for example, by providing

medical treatment to the plaintiff or acting as a bailee for the plaintiffs
goods.5 In others, the defendant was held to be engaged in an activity that
generated a duty of care owed to any member of the general public who
availed himself of the defendant's services, regardless of the existence of a
specific undertaking.5 3 In this class of cases fell certain personal injury and
property damage actions against innkeepers and common carriers. In still
others, the claim was that the plaintiff enjoyed a certain status vis-A-vis the

defendant; for example, the plaintiff was a social guest or customer of the
54
defendant and was thus owed care while on the defendant's property. In
some instances, duty could be established by appealing to broadly defined
customary principles of conduct, such as the principle that a property owner
ought not use his property so as to injure another. For example, it was on
the basis of the neighbor-neighbor relationship that the court in Vaughan v.
Menlove rejected defendant Menlove's claim that he had no duty to exercise
reasonable care in building his hay rick so as to prevent fire damage to
Vaughan's adjoining property.55 Finally, the courts recognized that, even in
the absence of any business or social relationship, certain basic duties of
care were owed by one individual to another: that is, that stranger-stranger
was a salient category of relationship for purposes of determining the existence of a cause of action. Thus, for example, courts were prepared to hold
individuals whose activities in public spaces foreseeably injured othliable
56
ers.
See Wickstrom v. Swanson, 120 N.W. 1090, 1090-91 (Minn. 1909) (finding a bailee
liable based on either contract or tort); Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865, 870 (Ohio 1902) (im52

posing liability on a surgeon based on his performance of an operation); Phillips v. Hughes
Bros., 33 S.W. 157, 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ) (finding a bailee liable for damage to
leased property).
53 See Zabron v. Cunard S.S. Co., 131 N.W. 18, 20-21 (Iowa 1911) (acknowledging the
defendant's common-carrier duty to the plaintiff, but denying recovery because the plaintiff
claimed only emotional harm unaccompanied by physical impact or injury); Lyttle v. Denny,
71 A. 841, 842 (Pa. 1909) (holding an innkeeper liable to guests).
54 See Graham v. Joseph H. Bauland Co., 89 N.Y.S. 595, 596 (App. Div. 1904) (finding a
duty owed by a department store to its customers); Brown v. Stevens, 99 N.W. 12, 13-14
(Mich. 1904) (finding a duty to store customers); Pennsylvania Co. v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St.
637, 644 (1884) (holding that a negligent railroad owes a duty to the son of the employee of
another railroad when the son is assisting the employee in repairing a freight car).
5' 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492-94 (C.P. 1837) (finding that tort duty of care rests on the established principle that a man must use his property so as not to injure others).
56 A famous early instance of such liability is found in Mitchil v. Alestree, 86 Eng. Rep.
190 (K.B. 1676), which held the defendant liable for injuries resulting from his attempt to
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The much-cited 1883 opinion of M.R. Brett (later Lord Esher) in
Heaven v. Penderattempted to induce from these cases a general description
of the conditions that would suffice to establish the duty of care necessary
for the imposition of negligence liability. In Brett's formulation, a defendant owed a duty of due care to the plaintiff whenever he was
by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every
one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognise that if he did not
use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the
57
other ....

Roughly forty years later, in Donoghue v. Stevenson, Lord Atkin famously
offered his own rendition of Brett's test. 58 According to Atkin, the duty of
care was owed to one's "neighbours," whom he defined as persons "so
closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them
in contemplation as being so affected when I am59directing my mind to the
acts or omissions which are called into question."
Just as they identified various bases for the duty of care, so courts and
treatise writers by the same token held that negligence actions ought to be
dismissed where duty was lacking. Thus, negligence claims were dismissed
if the plaintiff failed to allege an undertaking by defendant, if the plaintiff
complaining of injury on defendant's land had the status of a mere trespasser, if the plaintiff's injury bore only a remote relation to the defendant's
negligence, or if the plaintiff suffered a type of harm (such as pure emotional distress) against which defendant was not required to guard. In each
of these cases, the courts continued to treat duty as an independent component of the negligence tort: they assumed that the defendant had acted unreasonably, and that this failure proximately caused harm to the plaintiff, but

train an unruly horse in a public space.
" 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
58 See 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Sess.).
59 Id. at 580. For criticism of the Heaven and Donoghue formulations, see infra notes
310-14 and accompanying text.
60 See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927) (holding that
a "tortfeasor [is not] liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong"); Carrington v. Louisville & N. R.R., 6 So.
910, 911 (Ala. 1889) (finding no duty to a trespasser absent a reason to expect his presence);
Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420-21 (Ga. 1903) (denying recovery for purely economic harm
due to a third party's negligence); Zabron v. Cunard S.S. Co., 131 N.W. 18, 20-21 (Iowa
1911) (denying recovery because the plaintiff claimed only emotional harm unaccompanied
by physical impact or injury); Magar v. Hammond, 88 N.Y.S. 796, 798 (App. Div. 1904)
(limiting a landowner's duty to trespassers to insuring that custodians do not treat trespassers
"wantonly [or] maliciously, or inflict willful injury"), rev'd,76 N.E. 474 (N.Y. 1906).
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they denied liability nonetheless on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish that defendant owed a duty not to act unreasonably toward him.
2. From Winterbottom to MacPherson
With this conceptual and doctrinal backdrop in mind, one can better understand the place of Winterbottom and its progeny. Winterbottom was a
classic "no-duty" decision holding that certain types of plaintiffs could not
recover, even if they proved that they had been harmed by the fault of certain defendants. Indeed, in the minds of many modem tort scholars, it constitutes perhaps the single most important instance of the genre.
61
The
Winterbottom was decided in 1842 by the Court of Exchequer.
defendant was under contract with the English Postmaster-General to provide and maintain a coach for use in delivering mail. The plaintiff, a
coachman employed by another contractor with the Postmaster-General,
was rendered lame when the coach collapsed on him. The plaintiff sued on
a claim that defendant had failed to maintain the coach in proper condition.
Assuming for purposes of the decision that the defendant had acted unreasonably, the Barons unanimously ruled that the plaintiff had failed to state a
claim.62 In their view, the defendant's obligation to maintain the coaches
was owed only to the Postmaster, not to the plaintiff. The defendant had
made no undertaking to provide services directly to the plaintiff, and was
not engaged in the sort of activity that courts had previously recognized as
carrying with it a duty of care to strangers. Thus, the defendant owed the
plaintiff no duty of care sounding in tort. In the absence of a tort duty, the
only possible remaining basis for the plaintiffs action was contract. Because there was no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, however,
the plaintiff could not establish that63the defendant had voluntarily assumed
an obligation of care to the plaintiff.
Winterbottom's dual holding-that the plaintiff could establish neither a
tort nor a contract duty of care-generated the infamous "privity" rule. Persons injured by negligently-made products or negligently-provided services
generally could not recover for those injuries if they were not the immediate
purchaser of the product or service. Although subject to certain excep-

61 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842).
62 See id. at 405 ("[T]he breach of the defendant's duty [was] his omission to keep the

carriage in a safe condition... but if a duty to the plaintiff be intended (and in that sense the
word is evidently used), there was none.").
63 See Vernon Palmer, Why Privity Entered Tort-An HistoricalReexamination of Winterbottom v. Wright, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 85, 92 (1983) (noting that in Winterbottom
"plaintiffs were not owed a duty in contract which could be converted into a tort").
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tions, 64 the privity rule operated for the next seventy-five years6 5 as a significant limitation on liability for negligently-manufactured products. 66 In
1916, however, the New York Court of Appeals decided MacPherson.
MacPherson had purchased a car manufactured by Buick from a dealer.
One of the car's wheels collapsed while MacPherson was driving, causing
him serious injury. MacPherson sued Buick, arguing that Buick was negligent in failing to use adequate care in inspecting the car. As presented to the
Court of Appeals, Buick's failure to take reasonable care was presumed.
Thus, according to the court, "[t]he question to be determined is whether the
67
defendant owed a duty of care and [vigilance] to any one but the [dealer]."
MacPherson argued that a motor car capable of moving at fifty-five
miles per hour fell within the exception to the privity rule for "inherently
dangerous" products, and that its manufacturer therefore owed a duty of care
to ultimate purchasers and end-users. 68 Buick countered that its product did
not fall within the exception, which was reserved for products such as guns

64 The most important of these was the exception for "imminently dangerous" products.
See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-20 (1949) (discussing
case law). A leading application of this exception was Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397,
409-11 (1852), which held that a maker of poison owed a duty to ultimate consumers to take
care not to mislabel its products. Some courts extended this exception to food and other ingestibles. For one such instance, which also provides an interesting application of res ipsa
loquitur, see Pillarsv. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 78 So. 365 (Miss. 1918). "[I]f [human]
toes are found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." Id.
at 366. Courts sometimes struggled in determining whether to apply the privity rule or one of
its exceptions. CompareDevlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 477-78 (1882) (scaffolding inherently
dangerous), with Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494, 496-97 (1873) (defective boiler not inherently
dangerous).
65 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 732, 739-40 (6th ed.
1995) ("During the nineteenth century, Winterbottom v. Wright was a leading case not only in
England but also in the United States.").
66 For a representative application of Winterboitom's no-duty reasoning, see Lebourdais
v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 80 N.E. 482, 482 (Mass. 1907), holding that a plaintiff injured by a defective emery wheel cannot recover despite the defendant manufacturer's presumed lack of
care, as "[tihe manufacturer of an article of merchandise ... ordinarily is not responsible in
damages to those who may receive injuries caused by its defective construction, but to whom
he sustains no contractual relations, although by the exercise of reasonable diligence he should
have known of the defect." See also Curtain v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 244-45 (Pa. 1891)
(holding that a contractor who completed a building is not liable to a third person who sustains
injuries caused by defective construction); Collis v. Selden, 3 L.R.-C.P. 495, 496-97 (1868)
(holding that the plaintiff, injured by a falling fixture which was hung by the defendant in a
guest house, could not recover for failure to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty of care).
67 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916). The actual text in
this passage contains the typographical error "viligance." Id.
68 See id. at 1053; see supra note 64 (discussing the exception for "inherently dangerous"
products).
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and poisons. 69 Writing for the five-judge majority, Cardozo chose to downplay the distinction between types of products: any product, he said, that "is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently
made... is then a thing of danger." 70 Precedent, he maintained, supported
the principle that each manufacturer owes a duty of due care to users of its
products when the manufacturer knows, or reasonably should know, that
consumers will use the product without inspection and will probably be hurt
by the product if it is negligently made. 7 '
As Chief Judge Willard Bartlett pointed out in dissent, Cardozo's opinion, although moderate and lawyerly in tone, was revolutionary in result. It
effectively overruled Winterbottom by replacing the principle that product
manufacturers' negligence liability should be determined by contract with
72
the principle that they owe a duty of care to end-users. Cardozo's opinion
seemed to acknowledge as much in one of its more resonant passages:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothof the obligation where it ought to be. We
ing else. We have put the source
73
have put its source in the law.
The subsequent direction of case law confirmed Bartlett's assessment:
jurisdiction had embraced Macwithin a few years, almost every American
74
Phbrson's"overruling" of Winterbottom.

B. Holmes, Prosser,and the Academic Assault on Duty
At the time it was decided, MacPhersonreceived the hearty approval of
tort scholars who, led by Frances Bohlen, had been calling for the restriction
or elimination of the privity rule for some time.75 Scholars writing subse69

See MacPherson, 11 N.E. at 1052.

70

Id. at 1053.

71 See id. ("We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished

product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers. If he is
negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow.").
72 Id. at 1056-57 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "absence of such liability [for
negligence on the part of the original vendor] was the very point actually decided in the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright").
73 Id. at 1053.
74 See Prosser, supra note 7, at 1100-02 ("During the succeeding years this decision swept
the country, and with the barely possible but highly unlikely exceptions of Mississippi and
Virginia, no American jurisdiction now refuses to accept it.").
75 See Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV.
372, 378 (1939). Cardozo cited Bohlen extensively in his opinion. See MacPherson, 111
N.E. at 1053-54. One of the opinion's most effective passages is, moreover, an unattributed
paraphrase of a passage from Bohlen. Compare MacPherson, Ill N.E. at 1053 ("The dealer
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quent to the decision have gone further. In their view, the importance of
MacPherson is not only doctrinal but also theoretical. MacPherson, they
argue, rejected not only the privity rule, but the conceptual foundation of
that rule, namely the idea that "duty" constitutes an autonomous component
of the negligence tort. Indeed, as we discuss in Part I.C, infra, MacPherson
is often treated as an emblem of the courts' realization of this conceptual
breakthrough in the law. But first, let us turn to the scholarly account of
duty and negligence law that undergirds this reading of the decision.
1. Holmes on Torts
Modem American negligence theory has been shaped as much by the
work of two scholars as any: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and William L.
Prosser. Indeed, the critique of duty described at the outset of this Article is
probably given one of its clearest, most concise treatments in Prosser's trea*76
That text, in turn, derives in large part from Holmes's work. In this
tise.
and later sections, we trace the assault on duty from its Holmesian origins
through its major expositor, Prosser, to its present place in negligence theory
and doctrine.
Holmes's theory of torts was animated by his historicism, his legal
positivism, and his acceptance of the political and economic theories of
classical liberalism. For Holmes, as for Sir Henry Maine, the story of modem history was in large part the story of the evolution from "status to contract": the waning of organic or hierarchical notions of community and

was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some approach to certainty that by
him the car would not be used."), with Bohlen, supra note 47, at 351-52 ("mhe dealer is the
only person who cannot be expected to sustain any physical injury if [the product] be defec-

tive.").

See WiLLiAm L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 29-31, at 172-82
(1941) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (explicating the author's conception of duty). The frst edition of Prosser's treatise was published in 1941. Subsequent editions have reorganized the
discussions of duty and related concepts, but have not changed the substance of the discussion.
See infra note 109 (noting that the duty element of the four part negligence test is largely unchanged in recent editions of Prosser's work). For convenience of reference, we will provide
parallel citations to the current edition of the treatise. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27.
It may seem odd that we focus our analysis on a "handbook" that purports merely to organize black-letter law. However, Prosser's treatise is worthy of close examination for several
reasons. First, it is important simply because of its huge influence on lawyerly and judicial
understandings of duty and other basic features of negligence law. Second, it accurately embodies the "received wisdom" about duty passed down from leading tort scholars, including
Holmes and Leon Green. Finally, it is a prolonged and highly effective brief on behalf of an
instrumentalist understanding of negligence. In this regard, it is important to heed Professor
White's observation that Prosser possessed an uncanny ability to couch strong, controversial
arguments within seemingly non-controversial statements of doctrine. See WITnE, supra note
45, at 162-63.
76
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caste, the weakening of religion, tradition, and custom, and the reorganization of society around voluntary individual transactions grounded
exclusively in the pursuit of worldly goods and ends." Holmes's positivism
flowed from this social theory. Modem law should not be understood as
grounded in religious or moral laws, nor as an organic expression of tradition, but instead ought to be conceived of as a set of directives formulated
and enforced by individual officials (judges) on behalf of the State and in
furtherance of the State's own regulatory purposes. This understanding was
the upshot of Holmes's tireless effort to establish that modem law aimed "to
'78
standards which derived
transcend moral and reach external standards,
79
to be convenient."
"understood
was
epoch,
or
era
from what, in any given
Holmes's understanding of the movement of history also reinforced his
commitment to classical liberalism, a commitment which in turn led him to
argue that the substantive standards set by modem law would and should
afford individuals a broad sphere of liberty of action while simultaneously
protecting them from excessive interference with their security and liberty.
Thus, for example, he argued that modem common law generally rejected
80
strict liability as unduly hampering individual freedom and initiative.
In the strongest version of Holmes's theory of law, these three elements-historicism, legal positivism, and classical liberalism--coalesced
into a claim that modem common law courts had settled on a single legal
principle that would, when applied by the courts in specific instances, pro77 See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (1871) ("[W]e may say that the
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movementfirom Status to Contract."); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 10-17 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1963) (1881) (explaining that the modem doctrine of respondeat superior is a vestige of ancient status- and vengeance-based law). Holmes clearly read
Maine, although he denied that Maine influenced him. See FREDERIC ROGERS KELLOGG,
THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES:

THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGAL

PHILOSoPHY 12 (1984) (quoting Holmes as stating, "I don't think Maine had anything to do

with [the ideas set forth in The Common Law] except to feed the philosophic passion").
78 HOLMES, supranote 77, at 135.
79 Id. at 2.
8o See id. at 95-96 ("As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is

obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon
the actor."). But see DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN

HIsTORY 98-123 (1995) (arguing that Holmes believed that the unifying principle of common
liability was not unreasonableness but foreseeability, and hence that Holmes endorsed, in
principle, strict liability for foreseeable harms). It would be neither possible nor appropriate to
provide a full response to Rosenberg's claim here. In our view, he misconstrues Holmes's
acknowledgement that the need for clear, categorical, per se rules of negligence would sometimes generate de facto instances of strict liability as if it were an endorsement of the principle
of strict liability. See HOLMES, supra note 77, at 162-63 (conceding that the need for concrete
rules of negligence will cause the law to impose liability in cases in which there is no actual
fault, but emphasizing that the law does not thereby adopt the principle of strict liability).
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vide the average citizen with adequate security while at the same time permitting him a broad realm of freedom of action. This was the principle that
each citizen is obliged to act with reasonable prudence. Thus, whether a legal action alleged a civil or criminal wrong, a tort or contract claim, or an
intentional or negligent act, the governing legal principle, and therefore the
basic precondition of liability, was always the same: the plaintiff had to
prove that particular facts existed at the time the defendant acted such that a
man of ordinary experience and prudence could have foreseen and taken
steps to avoid the type of harm realized.8s Given such proof of unreasonableness, liability could attach, notwithstanding that the defendant's wrong
was neither intentional,
nor knowing, nor a violation of religious, moral, or
82

customary norms.
Holmes's understanding of the law of torts reflected this theoretical
commitment. In his view, tort law, like all common law, was essentially
regulatory; it was a device that the state employed to advance a particular
set of public goals-in this case, the goals of deterring harmful conduct and
indemnifying citizens for invasions of their security.8 3 Furthermore, tort
law, like all common law, sought to achieve those goals by means of simple
directives from courts instructing citizens to behave reasonably, or rather by
a series of situation-specific directives that applied the general reasonableness principle to recurring categories of conduct. 8 The major distinction
between tort and criminal law was that tort law enforced the directive to act
reasonably by ordering defendants who violated it to indemnify victims of
harms caused by their violations.

81See HOLMES, supra note 77, at 75-76, 106-07 (observing that the common law contains
a general theory of liability based on the failure to act as would a reasonable, prudent man).
82In his later writings, Holmes refined his account of negligence by introducing the idea
that courts sometimes ought to immunize defendants from liability for their unreasonable acts
when necessary to promote public policy. See Holmes, supra note 40, at 471 ("[TMhe law regards the infliction of temporal damage by a responsible person as actionable... except in
cases where upon special grounds of policy the law refuses to protect the plaintiff or grants a
privilege to the defendant."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8
HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-3, 9-10 (1894) ("fW]hether, and how far, a privilege shall be allowed is a
question of policy."); infra note 111 (arguing that Prosser's policy inquiry echoes that made
implicitly by Holmes).
83 See HOLMES, supra note 77, at 144 ("Be the exceptions more or less numerous, the

general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm
to person, reputation, or estate, at the hands of his neighbors, not because they are wrong, but
because they are harms.").
84 See id. at 111 ("Imhe featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such
care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be continually giving place
to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those circumstances.").
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Holmes's theory of torts further entailed a particular account of the obligations created by tort law. Given his premises, modem tort law could not
be described as reflecting or enforcing moral or conventionally-recognized
duties owed by one citizen to another. In modem societies, there were no
such duties. Instead, the courts imposed liability for unreasonable conduct
because they had concluded that it was the only rule that provided deterrence and compensation without unduly interfering with individual freedom.
Accordingly, it was a mistake to say that a given defendant's tort liability
derived from his breach of an obligation owed to the injured plaintiff.
Rather, liability attached because the defendant had violated state directives
citizen to refrain from unreasonable conduct threatening
commanding each
85
injury to others.
Suppose, for example, a court held a shopkeeper liable for acting negligently and injuring a customer. In Holmes's view, liability did not attach
because shopkeepers owe duties of care to their customers. Rather, liability
was appropriate because an individual had failed to observe the requirement
of reasonable care "imposed [by the State] on all the world, in favor of
all."'86 If one had to use the language of obligation and duty, one could say
' 87 Howthat the tort law imposed "duties of all the world to all the world.
ever, Holmes found even this formulation misleading insofar as it suggested
that tort law presupposed a mysterious set of extra-legal duties. To say that
tort law imposed a duty on all to act reasonably toward all was, in the end,
an imprecise way of saying that courts had adopted a rule imposing liability
on anyone who causes harm through an unreasonable act. Thus, for
Holmes, negligence was necessarily non-relationaL The tort was not properly described as causing harm by an unreasonable act toward a particular
or class of persons, but simply as causing harm by acting unreasonaperson
88
bly.
2. Prosser and the Critique of Duty
Prosser's understanding of tort law was largely Holmesian. He, too,
viewed negligence law as designed to balance individual liberty and secu-

85See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L.

REV. 1, 6 (1870) [hereinafter Codes] ("'[The law of torts] contains duties from all the world to

all the world."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660-61
(1873) [hereinafter Torts] (stating that torts generally consist of a breach of "a duty imposed
on all the world, in favor of all").
86 Holmes, Torts, supra note 85, at 661.
117
Id. at 660.

a See Holmes, supra note 40, at 471-72 (criticizing the suggestion that negligence liability must rest on "special circumstances outside of the tendency of the act [to cause harm]").
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rity 89 by means of a simple, non-relational directive9" requiring citizens to
conduct themselves in accordance with a state-generated standard of reasonable care, 91 coupled with an enforcement mechanism entailing indemnification for harms caused by violations of that directive. 92 But Prosser also introduced three important refinements to this view. The first of these
concerned the core concept of reasonableness. As indicated, both men
treated reasonableness as a state-generated and objective standard. But,
whereas Holmes ultimately endorsed the standard because it promoted, or at
least respected, the liberty of citizens, Prosser explicitly linked reasonableness to utility maximization, thereby helping to pave the path from Holmes
to modem economic analysis of tort law.93 According to Prosser, when tort
law directs each citizen to avoid acting unreasonably, it seeks to enhance
social utility by directing each person not to generate94risks of harm to others
that outweigh the benefits that accrue from so acting.

89 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 3, at 16 ("Men wish to be secure in their
persons against harm and interference, not only as to their physical integrity, but as to their
freedom to move about and their peace of mind."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 3, at
16 (same).
90 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 36, at 224 ("[I]n negligence cases, the duty
is ahvays the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 32, at 173 (same).
91 According to Prosser,
It is now more or less generally recognized that the "fault" upon which liability may
rest is social fault .... The law finds "fault" in a failure to live up to an ideal standard of conduct which may be beyond the knowledge or capacity of the individual,
and in acts which are normal and usual in the community, and without moral reproach in its eyes.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 4, at 20-21; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 4,
at 22 (same).
92 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 2, at 10 ("The civil action for a tort... is
commenced and maintained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate
him for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer."); PROSSER & KEETON,
supranote 27, § 2, at 7 (same).
93 For Prosser's utilitarianism, see PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 3, at 17, arguing that tort law should be structured, in Jeremy Bentham's words, to "promote that 'greatest happiness of the greatest number,' which by common consent is the object of society."
The current edition of the treatise, revised after Prosser's death, departs rather markedly from
the spirit of the Prosserian project by describing utility maximization as one among multiple
possible goals.
A decisionmaker might deliberately seek to use the law as an instrument to promote
the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," or instead might give greater emphasis to protecting certain types of interests of individuals as fundamental entitlements
central to an integrity of person that the law upholds above all else.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 3, at 16 (citation omitted).
94 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 1, at 9 ("[Tort law strives] to strike some
reasonable balance between the plaintiff's claim to protection against damage and the defendant's claim to freedom of action for his own ends .... "); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
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The second refinement introduced by Prosser, and the refinement of
greatest concern to us, concerns the duty element of negligence law. Although Holmes had a good deal to say on the subjects of duty and negligence, he had little to say about the implication of his theory of torts for the
duty element recognized by the common law of negligence, in part because
he was probably not bothered by decisions such as Winterbottom. Subsequent scholars with different political sympathies, including Prosser, were
very troubled by these decisions, and they soon harnessed Holmesian analysis to mount a full-scale attack on the use of duty as a negligence concept.
In particular, they developed two arguments that purported to demonstrate
the necessity of abandoning the traditional treatment of duty as an independent element of negligence. First, they argued that the courts' justification for decisions like Winterbottom-that defendant owed no duty of care
to the plaintiff-had to fail because it presupposed something which did not
exist, namely an intelligible concept of duty. We call this "the conceptual
argument for duty-skepticism." Prosser and his contemporaries also argued
that the concept of duty was unattractive because it was inherently conservative. We label this "the political argument for duty-skepticism."
a. The ConceptualArgumentfor Duty-Skepticism

Nineteenth century courts and authorities, as we have seen, inquired under the aegis of duty whether the plaintiff could bring himself within the
scope of a definite obligation owed by the defendant to him. They seemed
to regard this as a legal inquiry that stood independently of any analysis of
the reasonableness of defendant's conduct, or the utility of sanctioning such
conduct. 95 According to the conceptual argument against duty articulated
by Prosser, this sort of analysis was necessarily confused. Cast in its
strongest form, Prosser's claim was that duty is meaningless-a piece of
"artificial" gibberish. 96 A judicial opinion written so as to conclude that "liability does not attach because the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff,"
may as well have been written to conclude that "liability does not attach be27, § 85, at 608 (same). By contrast, Holmes adhered to the traditional common law view of
unreasonableness as a failure to use "ordinary" care. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 77, at 106
(noting that, under the leading case of Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850), the plaintiff is
required to prove that the defendant "was wanting in the care which men of ordinary prudence
would use under the circumstances").
95See supra text accompanying notes 48-56 (discussing the criteria used by courts to inquire into the existence of a duty between the parties).
96 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 179-80 ("Th[e] concept of a relative
duty is not regarded as essential by the continental law, and it has been assailed as serving no
useful purpose, and producing only confusion in ours. Its artificial character is readily apparent... ."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 357 (same).

1998]

THE MORAL OF MACPHERSON

1759

cause defendant is not a carrot." Alternatively, Prosser asserted that the notion of duty, even if intelligible, was hopelessly indeterminate. The notion
of "relation" and its metaphoric counterpart-Lord Atkin's "neighbour"
principle-were "so vague as to have little meaning, and as a guide to decision [they had] no value at all."'97 A court desirous of finding liability could
always "find the necessary 'relation' in the position of the parties toward
98
one another, and hence to extend the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.,
Thus, in the blunt terms of Prosser's 1953 Michigan lectures: "There is a
duty if the court says
there is a duty; the law, like the Constitution is what
99
[courts] make it."
In addition, Prosser-following Leon Green and Percy Winfield-argued that, to the extent duty had any determinate content, its content was redundant with, and in fact determined by, the substantive liability standard of
reasonableness.10 0 The "breach" element already required the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant acted without reasonable care. To say further, as
Brett did in Heaven v. Pender, that no duty is owed unless an ordinary person would have recognized the potential for harm to the plaintiff, was
merely to reiterate in different words that the defendant would not be held
liable unless the plaintiff could show that he failed to "conform to the legal
standard of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk."' 0 1 Nor was it a
surprise to Prosser that the only intelligible formulations of the duty element
simply reproduced the reasonableness inquiry under the breach element.
Because the duty of care was understood by Holmes and Prosser to be a
duty owed to the world, the duty element by definition had to be satisfied in
every case. Once a court presumes that the plaintiffs injury was the proximate result of the defendant's unreasonable conduct, all the requisite conditions for imposing negligence liability (on the Holmesian model) have been
met. Duty thus could only be given substance at the cost of rendering it superfluous.

97WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 168 (2d ed. 1955);

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 359. This critique of Heaven first appears in the
1955 second edition of the treatise.
98PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
27, § 53, at 357.
99Prosser, supra note 2, at 213.
100
See Green, supra note 33, at 1028-29 (noting that as duty is defined by the courts, it is
synonymous with breach); Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L.
REV. 41, 43 (1934) ("Duty means a restriction of the defendant's freedom of conduct; and the
particular restriction here is that of behaving as a reasonably careful man would behave in
similar circumstances.").
101PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 36, at 224; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
27, § 31, at 169.
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This redundancy argument against the concept of duty reflected more
than a preoccupation with the doctrinal elegance of negligence law. It went
hand-in-hand with a final, instrumental argument against duty, implicit in
the foregoing conceptual analysis. Where conduct was proved to be unreasonable, imposition of liability served a deterrent function; where the plaintiff was injured, imposition of liability also served a compensatory function.
Causation (particularly when qualified by proximate cause principles) provided the nexus necessary to permit the simultaneous achievement of these
policy goals. There was, it seemed, no practical function left for the concept
of duty to perform.
In sum, according to the different versions of Prosser's conceptual argument, the concept of the duty of care was meaningless, indeterminate,
doctrinally redundant, and pragmatically pointless. On any of these arguments, it followed that the legal concept of duty could not possibly have
provided courts with a reason justifying their decisions denying liability. A
judicial opinion reasoning that a defendant cannot be held liable because he
owed no duty to the plaintiff only restated its premises; its articulated reason
carried no justificatory weight.
Taking a step back, we can see that Prosser's variations on the conceptual argument against duty flowed quite naturally from his Holmesian approach to torts. Holmes, after all, had expressed the view that the concept of
duty ought to be purged from legal analysis. At best, it conveyed in an imprecise way the expectation of official sanction. At worst, it was a misleading legal fiction. Likewise, Holmes was the original and most forceful
advocate of the view that the standard of conduct set by the common law of
negligence was simply a generic reasonableness standard: the requirement
that each person act reasonably toward all the world. More generally,
Holmes viewed the law as essentially regulatory: a means by which the
State sought to channel conduct so as to achieve certain aggregate results.
Given these commitments, Prosser's conceptual argument against duty
makes perfect sense. The notion that individuals owe relational duties to
one another runs counter to the basic conceptual commitments of the Holmesian project.
b.

The PoliticalArgumentfor Duty-Skepticism

Prosser's argument against duty also contained a political dimension.
Duty, he argued, was not merely a legal fiction, it was a dangerous fiction,
because it led lawyers and courts to import their biases into negligence doctrine without understanding or owning up to what they were doing. This
much, Prosser claimed, had been demonstrated by Percy Winfield's analysis
of the historical pedigree of the concept. According to Winfield, prior to the
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early 1800s, there had been "virtually no consideration of duty," and "little
trace of any notion of a relation between the parties, or an obligation to any
one individual, as essential in tort." 1 2 It was only when the tort of negligence was being developed in the 1830s and early 1840s-a time when "the
courts sought, perhaps more or less unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of growing industry within some reasonable bounds"-that duty
emerged as a tort element. 10 3 Duty, in other words, was a child of antiregulatory, laissez-faire ideology. The courts had seized on the notion of
duty because it seemed to justify, as a matter of principle (although it did
not), their inclination to limit sharply the range of conduct that could generate negligence liability. 1' 4
In short, according to Prosser, the fact that courts began analyzing negligence claims in terms of duty in the mid-nineteenth century proved that
duty was merely a projection of certain historical and class biases. That is,
duty was a pseudo-concept masquerading as a freestanding justification for
the conclusion that even devastating individual injuries often should be left
uncompensated.10 5 As such, duty belonged to the family of fictions that
should be blacklisted as tools of laissez-faire ideology. 10 6 The concept of
duty, at least as traditionally understood, had to be expunged from negligence lest it continue to mislead courts and lawyers into regarding their conservative biases as moral or legal truths.

102 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76,

§ 31, at 178-79 n.60 (citing Winfield, supra

note 100); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 357 & n.4 (same).
103PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 179; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
27, § 53, at 357.
104According to Winfield, Winterbottom's use of duty to limit liability marked a radical
break with precedent and tradition because, in his view, the common law had for centuries
operated on the Holmesian notion of universal or non-relational duty. His argument, however,
is anachronistic and profoundly wrong-headed. As Professor Rabin has noted, for centuries
before the heyday of laissez faire, the common law of civil obligations was filled with "noduty" cases-cases in which a defendant whose fault caused harm was held not liable because
he had no obligation to take care not to injure the plaintiff. See Rabin, supra note 28, at 946
("In the supposed heyday of the fault principle, there was in fact no abstract notion of a general duty of due care irrespective of time, place and status .... "); id. at 934, 937, 945-46 (providing examples of no-duty cases).
105 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 83, at 674 (noting that nineteenth-century
judges believed "that it would place too heavy a burden upon manufacturers and sellers to
hold them responsible to hundreds of persons at a distance whose identity they could not even
know, and it was better to let the consumer suffer"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 96,
at 682 (same).
106This roster also included the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
and caveat emptor. See FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 10-11, 102, at 25-30, 232 (1st ed. 1933).
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3. Reconceiving Duty as Policy
As we will see, Prosser's renditions of the conceptual and political ar10 7
Yet they left him with a
guments against duty have been quite influential.
place in his account of
no
had
Prosser
Holmesian,
a
As
problem.
serious
element of the tort.
independent
an
negligence for the notion of duty as
However, as a self-proclaimed scholarly reporter of the law-and one with
an acute desire to influence the courts that he studied-Prosser could not
simply announce in his treatise that duty, and its accompanying case law,
ought to be eliminated. 10 8 Instead, he needed to find a way nominally to re0 9
Taking his
tain, yet rationalize and liberalize, that mischievous concept.'
110
Prosser solved his problem by offering an alternative
lead from Green,
explanation for the no-duty decisions, one that accounted for many or most
of them without resorting to the incoherent, regressive concept of duty.
Courts such as the Winterbottom court had denied recovery ostensibly
because the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care. According to a
Holmesian such as Prosser, this description was necessarily erroneous: each
had been decided on the assumption that defendant had violated the simple,
infra text accompanying notes 138-55 (describing the place of duty in modem tort
theory and doctrine).
10' See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180 (stating that duty is "embedded
far too firmly in our law to be discarded"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 358
(same).
109 To this day, the treatise still begins its exposition of negligence by perfunctorily reciting the traditional four-part negligence formula of duty, breach, cause and damages found in
nineteenth-century treatises. Moreover, it initially describes the duty element in traditional
terms, explaining that, under the duty element, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
"[a] duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring [the defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks." PROSSER,
HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 30, at 177; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 30, at 164.
The breach element is in turn defined as a "failure [by the defendant] to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty." PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 30, at 177;
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 30, at 164.
This apparent embrace of the traditional notion of duty should fool no one. By the third
edition, Prosser was clear in his own mind that "duty" could not possibly refer to an element
of negligence. Thus, he moved duty from its position as the first element of the tort (section
31), see PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, §31, at 178, to its current position (section 53),
see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, §53, at 356-59, in which it is treated as an external,
policy-driven check on negligence liability. Thus, under its current organization, the treatise-and, more confusingly for students, the Prosser casebook-lays out the traditional fourpart test for negligence, then somewhat mysteriously ignores element one and proceeds to discuss in detail elements two, three and four. Moreover, when the reader is finally returned to
the duty element under the miscellaneous heading of "limited duty," she is greeted by the
compendium of duty-skeptical arguments discussed above. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra
note 76, § 31, at 178; PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 27, § 53, at 356-59; JOHN W. WADE ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTS 385 (9th ed. 1994).
110See Green, supranote 33, at 1023-26.
107 See
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non-relational directive to act reasonably, and thus each involved a breach
of the duty of care in its only meaningful rendition. Prosser was compelled,
therefore, to provide an alternative explanation as to why the courts had
concluded that the defendant's presumed violation of the legal liability standard should not elicit the normal sanction requiring indemnification of the
injured party. To conceive of the problem this way, however, was to identify its answer. The no-duty cases were not no-duty-of-care cases. Rather,
they were no-duty-to-compensate cases. In each instance (by hypothesis),
the defendant owed the world a "duty" of care and violated that "duty." The
courts had nonetheless concluded that, because of an unusual alignment of
policy factors, the prudent course was not to penalize conduct that was, by
the terms of negligence law, sanctionable."I
Prosser memorably conveyed this crucial point in a passage that has
formed one of the leading slogans of modem American negligence jurisprudence:
The statement that there is or is not a duty [of care] begs the essential question-whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant's conduct.... It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather
than an aid to analysis in itself..... "[D]uty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but

only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.

"Duty," in short, is "nothing more than a word" that judges rely upon to
convey their belief that, notwithstanding a defendant's violation of the directive to act reasonably, the ordinary rule of liability for harms caused by
such acts ought to be overridden in the interests of social utility. 1 3 Thus,
whenever they had rendered "no-duty" decisions, the courts had actually
determined that there was some policy reason not to apply the default rule of
compensation for harm caused by unreasonable acts, perhaps because application of that sanction would generate a flood of costly litigation, or would
I1 Thus, on Prosser's account, the tort of negligence contains two legal inquiries: (1) Did
the defendant behave unreasonably, and (2) if so, is there any policy reason not to impose liability for damage caused by that behavior? In this, too, Prosser was essentially following
Holmes, although Holmes did not explicitly hitch the second-stage policy inquiry to the duty
element of the negligence tort. See supra note 82 (discussing Holmes's view that courts
should sometimes immunize defendants for their unreasonable acts when necessary to promote public policy). But see Holmes, Torts, supra note 85, at 661 n.1 (analyzing the no-duty
holding in Collis v. Selden, 3 L.R.-C.P. 495, 496-97 (1868), in Prosserian terms).
112PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
27, § 53, at 358.
"' PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 185 ("The real problem, and the one to
which attention should be directed, would seem to be one of social policy: whether the defendants in such cases should bear the heavy negligence losses of a complex civilization, rather
than the individual plaintiff."); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 43, at 287 (same).
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impose crushing liability on a nascent industry. Indeed, the very language
used by the Winterbottom Barons revealed to Prosser that their decision was
driven by such an assessment. It was Lord Abinger, after all, who had dismost absurd and outrageous consemissed plaintiff's claim as entailing "the
114
quences, to which I can see no limit."
4. Institutional Implications of the Critique of Duty
In order to appreciate why Prosserian duty-skepticism led to the scholarly embrace of MacPherson,and to set the stage for the analogy to constitutional scholarship discussed in Parts II and III, it is now necessary to note
the third way in which Prosser's critique and reconstruction of the duty element extended Holmesian negligence analysis. Specifically, we must consider the implications of Prosser's recasting of doctrine for the acceptability
ofjudge-made negligence law.
According to Prosser's account, nineteenth-century courts ascertained
neither the concept of duty itself, nor their conclusions in specific cases, by
interpreting the case law or the concept of duty. Judges instead used the
duty concept to express their policy judgments that liability for unreasonable
conduct sometimes had to be limited in the name of the public good." 5 The
inquiry conducted under the guise of the duty element was thus an unconstrained inquiry into the social utility of imposing or denying liability.
Hence, according to Prosser, "the problem of duty is as broad as the whole
law of negligence" in that it concerns "whether the plaintiffs
16 interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct."']
Prosser's recasting of duty seemed to carry with it potentially vast implications for negligence law and tort law as a whole. Because the duty
question ultimately turned on questions of policy, the justification for judgemade negligence law would have to lie in a claim that judges ought to be
entrusted with the responsibility of setting the socially optimal level of tort
liability. Prosser never backed away from this implication of his analysis.
Indeed, he forthrightly argued that judge-made negligence law had to be
conceived of and defended on the ground that judges are competent to un-

supra note 76, § 31, at 179, § 83, at 674; PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 27, § 53, at 357, § 96, at 682. Prosser's reading of Winterbottom is likely
mistaken. See infra note 357.
115 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180 (arguing that duty is a mere
"expression" of underlying policy considerations); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 53,
at 358 (same).
116PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
27, § 53, at 357-58.
114

See PROSSER,

HANDBOOK,
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dertake "social engineering." 117 To be sure, he thought that courts sometimes were too quick to find a policy reason for denying claims brought by
plaintiffs who had been injured by others' unreasonable conduct. He nevertheless argued that courts could and should decide the duty-policy question. 118 The early California decisions embracing the Holmes-Prosser model
clearly understood this message, concluding that their task under the headliability at the point at which it generated more soing of duty was to cut off
119
cial costs than benefits.
Occasionally, one sees judges and scholars who share Prosser's Holmesian duty-skepticism and his optimism about the utility of social engineering, yet reject Prosser's argument that judges are well-suited to undertake
such analysis. According to them, Prosserian analysis in fact demonstrates
the propriety of placing responsibility for tort law in the hands of legislators
or administrators. 20 Other scholars share Prosser's duty-skepticism but reject the idea that any political institution is well-positioned to engage in intelligent social engineering. Since, in their view, decisions of the sort called
for under the duty element cannot be made rationally, they conclude that
most or all of the issues in negligence should be left to the jury. One might
see an early instance of this more radical critique of duty-and of the judi11

"Social Engineering" is the title of section 3 of the original Handbook. See PROssER,

HANDBOOK,supra note 76, § 3, at 15. Just as it backs away from Prosser's forthright utili-

tarianism, see supra note 93, the current edition of the treatise also departs from the Prosserian
project by qualifying his enthusiasm for judicial engineering. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 27, § 3, at 15 (retitling the section "Policy and Process"); id. § 3, at 17-20 (adding a discussion of "Lawmaking by Courts").
18 As we discuss below, at the same time scholars like Green and Prosser were arguing
that their skeptical critiques of duty demonstrated the propriety of judicial engineering in tort
law, constitutional scholars were developing a similarly skeptical critique of rights, yet concluding on the basis of their critique that courts were not competent to make policy. Thus, at
the very time that constitutional law scholars were decrying judicial legislation, Prosser was
advocating judicial social engineering. See infra text accompanying notes 208-23 (contrasting
arguments for restrained judicial review with Prosser's endorsement of judicial policymaking). This may not be the first time in American legal history when skeptical critiques of law
have generated opposing assessments of institutional competence in public and private law.
See HORWrrz, supra note 45, at 254-56 (arguing that early nineteenth-century scholars were
instrumentalists about common law, but formalists about constitutional law).
19 See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (finding that landowner liability should depend on the facts of the case, not on "rigid classifications" of plaintiffs); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (in bank) (discussing a tortfeasor's duty
to third parties who suffer emotional harm).
120 See Stephen D. Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555, 642-64
(1985) (arguing that modem tort law should be altered so that "[d]eterence would be the domain of administrative agencies"); W. Kip Viscusi et al., DeterringInefficient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1437, 1467 (1994) (discussing the failure of tort law as a regulatory mechanism
for pharmaceuticals).
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cial role in formulating tort law-in Judge William Andrews's dissent in
Palsgraf121 A duty-skeptic, Andrews argued that the defendant railroad,
which was presumed to have acted negligently, could be held accountable
for any injury it caused. Setting limitations on that liability raised "a question of expediency," that is, whether it would be good for society to impose
liability for a remote consequence of a wrongful act. 122 But, according to
Andrews, this judgment of expediency is not amenable to principled resolution. Indeed, about the most that could be said is that it requires consideration of various incommensurable policy factors. The question was one of
"practical politics" that could only be answered by "common sense. 123 Accordingly, it should be left to the jury except in extraordinary cases in which
a judge can say, as a matter of law, that imposition of liability would clearly
be inexpedient. On this version of duty-skepticism, negligence law is again
reduced to policy-making, but policy-making is in turn reduced to process.
Since no institution is in a better position to make intelligent policy, no institution can claim authority on the basis of competence or expertise. Instead, the institutional allocation of decision-making responsibility rests on
in this case, the principle that
legal principles of pedigree or accountability:
124
juries are to decide common law actions.
The judge-skeptics and the more radical policy-skeptics probably still
remain a minority in the legal academy. Prosser, his contemporaries, and
his heirs inside and outside of law and economics, by and large remain wedded to the idea that duty-skepticism is compatible with a belief in the continued propriety and legitimacy of judicial lawmaking in torts. Thus,
Prosser's skeptical reduction of duty to a public policy limit on liability has
not generated an argument for judicial restraint or for the displacement of
the judiciary by some other law-making institution. Quite the opposite, as
indicated by the embrace by Prosser and other duty-skeptical scholars of
Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson, the reconceptualization of duty has for
the most part been125thought to provide an argument for aggressive judicial
reform of tort law.

121Palsgrafv.

Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).

"2 Id. at 104.
'2' Id. at 103-04.

124Certain modem California decisions arguably tend toward this latter, un-Prosserian
approach to duty-skepticism. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal.
1975) (leaving a large role for the jury to play in determining "duty").
125See infra text accompanying notes 126-37 (discussing the endorsement of MacPherson by Prosserian scholars).
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C. The MoralofMacPherson: The StandardAccount
At last we are in a position to appreciate the significance that modem
scholars have attached to MacPherson and its rejection of Winterbottom. In
their eyes, MacPherson marks the rejection by one of our greatest jurists of
the most egregious instance of conceptually muddled and politically regressive duty-talk. Conversely, the decision constitutes Cardozo's clear-eyed
embrace of the Holmes-Prosser model of negligence, combining a simple,
non-relational state directive to act reasonably with judicially-crafted immunities from liability where necessary to further public policy.
As the story is told by Prosser, MacPherson "struck through the fog"
created by Winterbottom's no-duty holding by identifying clearly that the
question in the case was not whether the manufacturer owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff, a question which in turn rested on the subsidiary doctrinal issue of whether a car constituted an inherently dangerous
product.1 26 Those questions needed no answer. Under the Holmes-Prosser
model, Buick, like any other person or entity, was subject to the generic directive to act reasonably; thus, any product could serve as the basis for negligence liability if it posed a risk of harm.12 7 For the same reasons, Buick's
liability did not turn on evidence as to the existence of some relationship
between Buick and MacPherson. Indeed, as Prosser read MacPherson, it
held that a manufacturer like Buick was subject to liability "based upon
nothing more than the sufficient fact that [it] ha[d] so dealt with the goods
come into the hands of another, and
[in question] that they [we]re likely 1to
28
to do harm if they [we]re defective."'
Moreover, because MacPherson came to the Court of Appeals with the
unreasonableness of Buick's actions assumed, Prosser maintained that Cardozo, being a good Holmesian, must have recognized that the only real
question before the court was whether Winterbottom had properly granted
manufacturers a policy-driven waiver of the compensation sanction that
negligence law ordinarily imposes for harms caused by unreasonable acts.
Even if the Winterbottom decision was justified in 1842, it could not be
sustained in 1916. The intervening years had seen a "definite change" in
126 See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76,

§ 83, at 677 (explaining that MacPherson

did not "merely ...extend the class of 'inherently dangerous' articles"); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 27, § 96, at 683 (same).
127See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 83, at 677 (noting that liability for defective products is now part of the general responsibility to act reasonably); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 27, §96, at 683 (same); see also Prosser, supra note 7, at 1100 (explaining the
scope of a manufacturer's negligence liability).
128 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 83, at 674, 678 (noting that so long as conduct
is likely to affect the interests of others, it is potentially unreasonable); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 27, § 96, at 682 (same).
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both "social philosophy" and economic reality. 129 Accordingly, Cardozo
that Winterbottom had
properly revoked the privilege to act unreasonably
130
granted to Buick and other manufacturers.
Prominent contemporary scholars, notably Professors Rabin and White,
even more explicitly attribute to MacPherson the embrace of modem, Holmesian negligence. In his important analysis of the rise of the "fault principle," Rabin sought to trace the historical transition from pre-Holmesian notions of negligence liability, in which duties of care were thought to be
relational, to the modem Holmesian fault principle-the notion of a comcare. 131
prehensive liability principle founded on a "general" duty of due
Pointing to the continued vitality of no-duty cases like Winterbottom into
this century, Rabin argued that previous scholars had misdated this transition by claiming that it had already occurred when Holmes was writing in
the late nineteenth century. As was clear from the privity cases and other
"no-duty" decisions, negligence law continued to retain "doctrinal barriers
that served to vitiate the fault principle" well into this century. 132 Thus, according to Rabin, it was only after Cardozo "artfully manipulated" the privfault principle was established
ity rule and its exceptions that the Holmesian
133
in the critical area of products liability.
Even though it is one of Rabin's targets, Professor White's intellectual
history of American tort law provides a similar account of MacPherson.
According to White, although Cardozo may not have been the first to embrace Holmes's notion of "universal duty"--the idea "that the negligence
principle.., was not tied to status or vocation or contract, but was a reflection of generalized civil obligations"'13 4-- his rejection of Buick's privity argument constituted a seminal instance of Holmesian thinking. Thus, "MacPherson appears as a classic modem negligence case, where a broad

129

See PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 83, at 674, § 31, at 179; PROSSER &

KEETON, supra note 27, § 96, at 682, § 53, at 357.
130 One finds in Prosser's contemporaries a similar reading of MacPherson. See 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.1, at 1535 (1st ed.

1956) (noting that MacPherson reached the sound judgment that "liability would not unduly
inhibit the enterprise of manufacturers"); Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence
Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 778, 798 (1953) (stating that MacPherson"recognized probability
of harm as the broad basis of duty in [sale of goods] cases (as it is in negligence law generally)"); see also Seavey, supra note 75, at 378 (explaining that MacPherson brought liability
for negligently manufactured products into line with the general principles of negligence articulated by Holmes and others).
131 See Rabin, supra note 28, at 936-38 (discussing the evolution of liability based on the
fault principle).
132 Id. at 936.
133 See id.at 937.
134 WHITE,

supra note 45, at 125.
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is substituted for particularized obligations owed only
universal duty of care
135
persons."'
certain
by
Finally, Judge Posner expresses much the same view of MacPherson in
his recent study of Cardozo. According to Posner, the hallmark of Cardozo's decisions was his overriding concern to "mak[e] law more prag136
matic," that is, to enact intelligent social policy through his decisions.
While noting that Cardozo's MacPhersonopinion is devoted to an analysis
of cases, Posner nevertheless argues that the decision was driven by Cardozo's assessment that Winterbottom's waiver of liability amounted to bad
policy, and that liability was in fact most efficiently placed upon manufacturers like Buick. That Cardozo chose not to justify his decision in these
terms is seen by Posner as a testament to Cardozo's tactical wisdom. Rather
than writing a policy tract, he wrote what appeared to be a traditional judito increase the likelihood that his judicial brethren
cial opinion in order
137
would embrace it.

Thus, from Prosser to Posner, mainstream tort scholars have maintained
a near-consensus on the moral of MacPherson. They believe that it represents a seminal decision marking the judicial embrace of the HolmesProsser model of negligence. That model rejects the notion that a question
exists as to whether a given defendant owes a given plaintiff a duty of care.
There is always such a duty because the tort of negligence imposes a generic
standard of reasonable care owed by all to all. The only questions that require consideration under the model are: the jury question of whether that
generic standard of care was breached in a manner that proximately caused
the plaintiff harm, and the judicial question of whether there is any public
policy reason to override the default sanction that ordinarily requires a defendant to compensate the plaintiff for that harm. By refusing to rely on the
distinction between inherently dangerous and not-inherently-dangerous
products, Cardozo embraced the generic, or universal, duty of care. All
products, he argued, might pose unreasonable risks of danger, and hence all
manufacturers were potentially subject to liability for injuries caused by
those products. Likewise, by rejecting the privity limitation, Cardozo signaled his progressive assessment that, as a class, manufacturers no longer
were entitled to the immunity from negligence liability that Winterbottom
had afforded them.

135id.

A STUDY IN REPUTATION 92 (1990).
137See id. at 109 ("[I]t is the very caution, modesty, and reticence of the opinion that ex136 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO:

plain its rapid adoption by other states.").
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D. The PresentStatus ofDuty in Negligence ScholarshipandLaw
More than a century after The Common Law was first published, eighty
years after MacPhersonwas decided, and a half century after the first issuance of Prosser's treatise, the Holmes-Prosser critique of duty, as well as
their positive reconstruction of duty as a catch-all policy inquiry, have
achieved the status of dogma in mainstream tort scholarship. Thus, the
treatment afforded duty by a leading torts scholar in his 1997 primer could
have been written by Prosser, or for that matter, Holmes.
"Duty" is a largely question-begging concept that can be safely used if one
is not misled by it ....

Asking whether the defendant had a duty to the plain-

tiff and whether that duty was breached is... just another way of asking
whether the defendant was negligent, and whether that negligence was a

proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm. Analyzing the problem in terms of
duty adds nothing, and could lead to the mistaken conclusion that even after
the negligence and proximate cause questions have been answered, there is still
no liability unless the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty independent of the
obligation to exercise reasonable care. In the ordinary case this conclusion is
mistaken, because the defendant's negligence is precisely the breach of duty
that is alleged.
There is a class of cases, however, in which the defendant is not liable for
negligence. This class of cases can accurately be described as involving "limited duty," in the sense that because the defendant is not liable for harm caused
by his negligence he owes no duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring the plaintiff.I'8

Casebooks, treatises, and primers that attempt to articulate more or less
accounts of negligence are rife with similar Prosserian statemainstream
139
ments.

Academic treatments of negligence informed by economics have likewise proceeded largely on Holmesian premises. For example, in his economic analysis, Judge Posner has mainly sought to add rigor to the two central features of the Holmes-Prosser model of negligence: the liability
standard of reasonable (efficient) care, and the notion of duty as a policy (efficiency) limitation on liability for harms caused by unreasonable conduct.
His debt to Holmes and Prosser is thus evident in his opinion for the Sev-

138KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMs AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 225 (1997).
139 See,

e.g.,

GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF

TORTS 104-05 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing duty and negligence liability); MARC A. FRANKLIN &
ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 115-16 (6th ed. 1996) (discussing negligence and the duty requirement); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAv OF TORTS: EXAMPLES
AND EXPLANATIONS 171-74 (1995) (discussing situations where negligent defendants are not
liable because they owe no duty of care to the plaintiff); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27,

§ 53, at 356-59 (explaining the concept of duty in negligence).
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enth Circuit in Edwards v. Honeywell, Inc.140 There, Posner concluded that
a cause of action against a defendant who was presumed to have acted unreasonably so as to cause the death of plaintiffs decedent ought to be dismissed for lack of "duty," because potential defendants not sued by the
plaintiff arguably could have more cheaply guarded against the harm in
14 1

question.

To be sure, corrective justice theorists such as Jules Coleman,142 George
Fletcher, 143 and Ernest Weinrib t 44 have provided effective critiques of central aspects of economic analyses of tort law and Holmesian instrumentalism
generally. Moreover, they have made important strides toward providing a
non-instrumentalist interpretation of the idea that tortfeasors are obliged to
make reparations to their victims and have emphasized the "relational" nature of this remedial duty. 145 However, their discussions have mainly focused on this secondary duty of repair rather than on the content or existence of primary duties of conduct. Coleman, for example, has selfconsciously constructed a moral argument for the duty to repair that refrains
from linking that duty to a particular conception of what constitutes wrongful or tortious conduct. 146 Other anti-instrumentalist theorists who have offered philosophical analyses of "fault" and "wrongful risk-taking" as the basis for negligence liability have tended not to address the duty of care as a
distinct issue. 14 7 Although some scholars have attempted to develop a non14050

F.3d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1995).

141 See

id.

142 See COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 303-60 (articulating the mixed theory of corrective
justice).
143See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 537-43 (contrasting the corrective justice paradigm of
"reciprocity" with the instrumentalist paradigm of "reasonableness").
144 See WEnRIB, supra note 23, at 6-8, 46-55, 145-70 (criticizing instrumentalist renderings and economic analyses of tort law and offering an alternative, "formalist" account of tort
law as corrective justice).
145 See COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 374-75, 381 (stating that corrective justice creates a
duty for the injurer to make whole the injured party because of their normative relationship);
WEINIBM, supra note 23, at 135 (explaining the duty to repair as growing out of the defendant's breach of the duty of care owed to the plaintiff).
146See COLEMAN, supra note 23, at 348-49. There are some indications in Coleman's
work that he links his account of corrective justice to a relational account of the primary duty
to conduct oneself with due care towards certain others. See id. at 356-57 (suggesting that
corrective justice is only compatible with accounts of wrongdoing in which wrongdoing is
conceived in terms of breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff). Likewise, Professor Weinrib has argued for a relational conception of the primary duty of due care, although
his usage of the term "relational" is rather different from ours. See WEINRM, supra note 23, at
158-64 (analyzing Palsgrafv. Long Island R.Rt, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)). For a discussion
and critique of Weinrib's account, see Zipursky, supra note 27, at 73-75 and infra text accompanying notes 371-76.
147 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGILL L.J.
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instrumental conception of negligence in which the concept of foreseeability
sets a moral limit on the scope of the duty to repair, 14 the reality of our
complex and variegated case law casts doubt on the prospect of reducing
negligence to a duty of due care derived from a single, uniform concept of
foreseeability. 149 Similar problems face those scholars, such as Weinrib,
who have broached the subject of duties of conduct by superimposing onto
tort law a transcendental Kantian notion of duty. 50 Such a notion is distant
tort law. 51
from the context-sensitive concept of duty that pervades ordinary
In contrast to its dominance in the academy, the Holmes-Prosser model
has received a mixed reaction in the courts. Certainly, the model received
an enormous boost when the Califomia Supreme Court explicitly adopted it
in decisions such as Rowland v. Christian.152 Indeed, the California Court
went Prosser one better by adding a pseudo-scientific gloss to the public
policy determination, famously phrasing it in terms of a multi-factor inquiry
designed to balance various policy factors, including foreseeability, proximity, blameworthiness, and deterrence. 153 Moreover, courts in a majority of
91, 110-11 (1995) (identifying a general theory of fault in terms of an accommodation of liberty and security interests); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312-13 (1996) (arguing that negligence relies on a general standard of due care derived from a Rawlsian idea of reasonableness). There are,
however, a number of important articles addressing specific duty doctrines within negligence
law. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liabilityfor Economic Loss in Tort
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (discussing the rationale for a limited duty to refrain from negligently causing pure economic
harm); Stephen K Perry, ProtectedInterests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42
U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 264-67 (1992) (arguing that a general duty to avoid negligently causing
economic loss would violate moral norms underpinning liberal-capitalist societies); John A.
Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1929, 1973-80 (1988) (criticizing instrumentalist arguments for expansion of accountants' liability and noting the importance of fairness constraints on such liability); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980) (arguing for duty to undertake easy rescues).
148 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 23, at 509-10 (analyzing liability for injuries in terms of
fault and foreseeability).
149See infra text accompanying notes 360-76 (explaining the concept of relational duty);
see also text accompanying notes 339-48 (describing and criticizing readings of MacPherson
that claim Cardozo conceived of foreseeability as setting a cap on liability for negligence).
15oSee, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in PrivateLaw, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698,
737-40 (1996) (reviewing WEINRIB, supra note 23, and criticizing Weinrib's theory of corrective justice for its indeterminacy and inability to take into account the plurality of considerations that drive different areas of tort law).
151 See infra text accompanying notes 350-76 (noting the context-dependent nature of
duty analysis).
112 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (finding that the duty issue in negligence is whether
there is a policy reason supporting an exception to the general rule of liability for negligence).
153See id. The Court found that duty turns on:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
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the states have at one time or another cited or quoted the Prosserian mantra
that duty is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to
analysis in itself, and an expression of the sum total of considerations of
policy. 54 And many regard the California court as having effected a salutary liberalization
of negligence by removing duty-based limits on negli1 55
gence liability.
Still, it would be wrong to suggest that the model has come to dominate
the courts as it has the academy. Most courts, for example, continue to adhere to some categorical rules in nonfeasance, 156 duty-to-rescue, 157 emosuffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. (citations omitted).
134See Hawks v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 908 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1995); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.,
936 P.2d 70, 80 (Cal. 1997); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (in bank); Bath
Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Wills, 847 P.2d 1141, 1152 (Colo. 1993); Jaworski v. Kieman,
696 A.2d 332, 336 (Conn. 1997); Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 522 (Del. 1991);
District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 321 (D.C. 1984); Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d
658, 667 (Fla. 1982); Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1296 (Haw. 1997); Webb
v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991); Teunissen v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 484
N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1992); Wicina ex rel. Wicina v. Strecker, 747 P.2d 167, 173 (Kan.
1987); Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky. 1987); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, Inc., 642 A.2d 219, 225 (Md. 1994); Buczkowski v. McKay, 490
N.W.2d 330, 333 (Mich. 1992); James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 113 (Neb. 1985); Turpel v.
Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Nev. 1985); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986);
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1322 (Ohio 1997);
Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795 P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990); Fazzolari ex rel. Fazzolari v.
Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Or. 1987) (in banc); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d
672, 682 (Pa. 1979); Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994); McClung v.
Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894-95 (Tenn. 1996); Langle v. Kurkul, 510
A.2d 1301, 1305 (Vt. 1986); Mostert ex rel. Mostert v. CBL & Assocs., 741 P.2d 1090, 1093
(,Vyo. 1987). For examples of courts stating Prosserian conceptions of duty without expressly
crediting Prosser, see Lee v. Chicago Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493, 501 (Ill. 1992); L & H
Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn. 1989); Sacco v. High Country
Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 418 (Mont. 1995); and Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156,
1160 (Utah 1991).
155See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 608-09 (1992) (describing how courts perceived the
elimination of doctrinal restrictions on a landowner's duties of care as modernizing obsolete
rules).
156 For nonfeasance cases, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 56, at 373-74, discussing the extent to which courts are willing to find liability in nonfeasance cases.
157See, e.g., Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (finding no
general duty to rescue when injury is not the fault of the person charged); Yania v. Bigan, 155
A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (finding no duty to rescue unless one is legally responsible for
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159
tional harm, 158 and/or economic harm cases, citing "no-duty" rationales
without providing exhaustive consideration of Prosserian policy factors.

placing the other party in danger). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314
(1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.").
158Two states recognize no duty to avoid negligent infliction of emotional distress. See
Gideon v. Norfolk S. Corp., 633 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 1994); Mechanics Lumber Co. v.
Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark. 1988). Six states extend a duty of care for emotional injuries only to those individuals who experience some physical harm. See OB-GYN Assocs. v.
Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ga. 1989); Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.
1991); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d
141, 145-46 (Ky. 1980); Slaton v. Vansickle, 872 P.2d 929, 931 (Okla. 1994); Hammond v.
Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593, 596 (Or. 1991) (in banc). Ten states, the
District of Columbia, and federal courts in FELA cases recognize the "zone of danger" rule,
where a defendant only owes a duty not to inflict emotional injury to individuals within the
zone of physical danger created by the defendant's conduct. See Consolidated R.R. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 554-56 (1994) (establishing a zone of danger duty limitation for FELA
claims); Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 670 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc) (limiting a defendant's
liability to the zone of danger created by her negligence); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163,
1165 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (same); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 210 A.2d 709, 714-15 (Del.
1965) (same); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1066-67 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (same);
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (same); Resavage v. Davies, 86
A.2d 879, 880 (Md. 1952) (same); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Minn. 1980)
(same); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)
(same); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 844 (N.Y. 1984) (same); Whetham v. Bismarck
Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (same); Boucher ex rel. Boucher v. Dixie Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 850 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1992) (same).
159 Courts in numerous contexts have refused to recognize a duty of care to avoid causing
pure economic injury. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309
(1927) ("[A] tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to
another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to
the doer of the wrong."); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (denying recovery for pure economic loss in maritime context); Bright v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 463 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that a manufacturer
has no duty to avoid pure economic loss in products liability context); RK Constructors, Inc.
v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153, 157 (Conn. 1994) (deciding that a third party tortfeasor owes
no duty to an employer for economic loss through higher workers' compensation premiums
caused by the negligent injury of an employee); Steele v. J & S Metals, Inc., 335 A.2d 629,
630 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974) (holding that a third party tortfeasor owes no duty to an employer
for lost profits resulting from the negligent injury of an employee); Just's, Inc. v. Arrington
Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho 1978) (concluding that a contractor owes no duty to
store lessee for lost profits resulting from delayed construction on a contract between the contractor and lessor); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987)
(ruling that there is no duty to preserve possible evidence for another party to assist that party
in future litigation against a third party); Mandal v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 527 P.2d 387, 389
(Or. 1974) (holding that there is no "duty [to the plaintiff] where the only negligence charged
is the failure to perform a contract with a third party," even if the plaintiff is economically
harmed by the failure). But see People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated R.R., 495 A.2d
107, 118 (N.J. 1985) ("[A] defendant who has breached his duty of care to avoid the risk of
economic injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic
losses that are proximately caused by its breach of duty.").
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They also continue to focus on the relation between defendant and plaintiff
in a wide range of professional malpractice 16 and landowner liability
cases, 161 again apparently assuming that this issue has some intrinsic im160One group of professional malpractice cases involves accountant liability to third parties. See, e.g., Selden v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256, 259 (Alaska 1988) (holding that, when giving
tax advice to a client, an "accountant owes a duty of care to third parties only if [he] specifically intends the third parties to invest relying on his advice, and only if he makes his intent
known"); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (refusing to impose upon an auditor a general duty of care to anyone but a client); Waters v. Autuori, 676
A.2d 357, 361-62 (Conn. 1996) (concluding that the promulgation of professional accounting
standards by a professional accounting society does not create a duty of care to unknown third
parties). Another group of professional malpractice cases involves attorney liability to third
parties. See, e.g., Stephens v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908, 912 n.5 (Alaska 1987)
("[l]n general, the state does not owe its citizens a duty of care to proceed without error when
it brings legal action against them."); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Mich. 1981)
(holding that an attorney owes no duty of care to an opposing litigant). See generallyBenjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 649 (1998) (arguing that relational account of duty provides better account of legal malpractice law than Prosserian model). A third group of cases involves physician/psychiatrist
liability to third parties. See, e.g., Zamstein v. Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 786-87 (Conn. 1997)
(holding that a psychiatrist who evaluated whether a child had been sexually abused owed no
duty of care to the father, the alleged abuser); Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 998 (Ind.
1991) (concluding that "generally physicians do not owe a duty to unknown nonpatients who
may be injured by the physician's treatment of a patient").
161 Six states and the District of Columbia have followed the lead of California in Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968), by abolishing all common law landowner
liability distinctions. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Webb v. Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 733 (Alaska 1977); Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 452
P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367, 371 (La. 1976);
Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 496 (Mont. 1985); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364
A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976). Twelve states
have abolished the licensee/invitee distinction, but have either endorsed or left intact the
common law rules for trespassers. See Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Jones
v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 & n.5
(Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-52 & n.7 (Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach,
199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1972); Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb.
1996); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (N.M. 1994); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 (N.D. 1977); Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d
1056, 1062 (ILL.1994); Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Tenn. 1984); Antoniewicz v.
Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11-12 (Wis. 1975). Fourteen states have expressly refused to
abolish the common law landowner liability distinctions. See McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d
950, 951 (Ala. 1977); Baldwin v. Mosley, 748 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ark. 1988); Lawson v. Safeway, Inc., 878 P.2d 127, 129 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Ass'n,
612 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Conn. 1992); Bailey v. Pennington, 406 A.2d 44, 47-48 (Del. 1979);
Mooney v. Robinson, 471 P.2d 63, 65 (Idaho 1970); Kirschner v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,
743 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Ky. 1988); Astleford v. Milner Enter., 233 So. 2d 524, 525 (Miss.
1970); Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. 1995) (en banc); Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247
N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ohio 1969); Sutherland v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 595 P.2d 780, 782
(Okla. 1979); Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); Younce v. Ferguson, 724 P.2d
991, 995 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo.
1981). Illinois has abolished the distinctions by statute. See Premises Liability Act, 740 ILL.
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over doctrinal
portance. Even the California courts now show some concern
of duty. 162
problems generated by the Prosserian account
The courts' uncertainty about what to do with duty is displayed in their
uneven use of the concept of foreseeability. Sometimes foreseeability is
deemed part of the issue of breach and thus left to the jury. Other times it is
deemed the essence of duty and kept for the courts. Still other times it is left
163
What one court finds
for the jury under the heading of proximate cause.
unforeseeable as a matter of law, another court will find foreseeable as a
matter of law. 164 Foreseeability is sometimes a necessary condition of li165
merely a factor.
ability, sometimes a sufficient condition, and sometimes
Far from cleaning up duty-analysis, the concept of foreseeability illustrates
the confusion courts currently experience dealing with the duty element.
In sum, the Holmes-Prosser model of negligence, although dominant in
the academy and highly influential with judges, has never completely taken
hold of the judiciary. Many courts, in fact, seem to experience an uncomfortable tension here. On the one hand, they perceive that duty adds some
intuitive and well-motivated contours to negligence law, and they recognize
that duty has an appealing ring to it. On the other hand, they have been told
COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/2 (West 1994). The remaining seventeen states have not addressed
the issue and, therefore, presumably have maintained the common law distinctions.
162See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 825-26 (Cal. 1989) (noting that factor-balancing
has produced inconsistent rulings and provoked criticism by scholars). Even prior to Thing,
the California court had not been entirely faithful to the Holmes-Prosser model. Indeed, as we
discuss below, see infra text accompanying notes 392-93, 410-12, a number of prominent
California cases seem to have been decided on the basis of the relational conception of duty
that Prosser deemed nonsensical.
163See supra note 36.

16'Compare Buczkowski v. McKay, 490 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 1992), with Kitchen v. KMart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997). In both cases, the plaintiff sued K-Mart for selling
ammunition (and in the Florida case, a .22 caliber rifle) to an intoxicated customer who subsequently shot the plaintiff. In Buczkowski, the Michigan Supreme Court denied liability, holding that the shooting "was no more foreseeable than the potential harm from any product sold
to an apparently inebriated customer that might be used to injure third parties." 490 N.W.2d
at 335. In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court in Kitchen held that the sale created a "foreseeable 'zone of risk' of harming others," 697 So. 2d at 1202, and that the negligent entrustment
claim should go to a jury. See id. at 1208. The Florida court expressly sought to distinguish
Buczkowski, noting that in Buczkowski the defendant sold only shotgun shells, but in the immediate case the defendant sold both ammunition and a firearm, thus requiring greater contact
between the store clerk and the intoxicated customer. See id. at 1206. This distinction appears weak given the fact that both courts acknowledged (or presumed for the sake of analysis) that the customer was visibly intoxicated. See Kitchen, 697 So. 2d at 1201; Buczkowski,
490 N.W.2d at 334-35.
16 Compare Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound
No. 1), [1961] 1 App. Cas. 388, 426 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.) (foreseeability necessary and sufficient), with Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39-40 (Cal. 1975) (foreseeability a factor).
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repeatedly by all manner of academics that hard-headed, no-nonsense
thinking reveals that duty is a mushy fiction, and that a rational law of negligence would do well without it. In short, they seem to be caught in an
awkward position of feeling that the law's concept and categories of duty
have a pull and texture of their own, but nevertheless believing that the intellectually honest alternative is the policy-driven conception of duty that
leading scholars and some of our most aggressive courts have confidently
championed. The underlying question in the remainder of this Article is
whether there is something to be said for their intuition-whether it is possible to construct a conception of duty distinct from Prosser's public policy
analysis that is capable of functioning within contemporary negligence law.

II. RIGHTS-SKEPTICISM INCONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP
In Part I, we outlined the contours of the model that has come to dominate scholarly thinking about negligence. At the heart of that model is a
philosophical claim that duty, cast as a non-instrumental concept, is incoherent, empty, or redundant, and hence that duty cannot possibly be understood as an independent element of the tort. Rather, if duty means anything,
it can only constitute an oblique reference to considerations of public policy
that counsel for or against the imposition of liability on unreasonable actors.
Both the content of modem duty-skepticism and its scholarly acceptance,
we argued, are reflected in the fact that Cardozo's landmark opinion in
MacPhersonhas been widely celebrated by tort scholars as marking the judicial embrace of a progressive, instrumentalist reconceptualization of duty
analysis as policy-making. Finally, we briefly pointed out at the end of Part
I how this approach has influenced modem academic and judicial understandings of negligence.
In this Part, we seek by means of an intellectual-historical analysis of
another department of law to identify conceptual grounds for attacking the
largely unchallenged acceptance of the Holmes-Prosser model of negligence
law. Until recently, constitutional scholarship was dominated by the assumption that a similarly reductive model provided the only intelligible account of constitutional law. Yet, in roughly the last twenty-five years, many
important constitutional scholars, building in part on a broader philosophical
rejection of reductive instrumentalist modes of thought, have argued with
considerable force that non-instrumental notions of rights have played and
should continue to play a vital role in constitutional law. On the same basis,
we suggest in Parts III and IV that non-instrumental tort concepts-in par-
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had and ought to continue to have a vital
ticular, the concept of duty-have
166
role in negligence law.

A. From Allgeyer to West Coast Hotel
In its 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held
that the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of an individual's liberty "without due process of law" conferred a right on each American citizen "to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential
to his carrying out to a successful conclusion [the lawful enjoyment and use
of his faculties].' 6 7 According to the Court, this right barred legislatures
from enacting and enforcing any law regulating the terms of contractual
agreements, unless the regulation could be shown to serve certain essential
as the maintenance or improvement of public safety,
public goods, such
168
health, or morals.

For roughly the next forty years, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments were regularly invoked by federal and state
courts as a basis for reviewing, and intermittently invoked as a basis for
voiding, legislation regulating industrial working conditions. 69 The use of
the doctrine to defeat such legislation is now associated most famously with
the Court's 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York, striking down the state's
maximum hour law for bakers. 170 But Lochner was, of course, only one important decision within this line of cases. Other notable substantive due
process decisions included Adkins v. Children'sHospital,171 Adair v. United
States,172 and the New York Court of Appeals decision in Ives v. South
166This summary may understate our claim. As we note in Part IV.B.4, infra, the case to

be made for the reinvigoration of duty in negligence is arguably immune from objections that
have often been thought to pose serious obstacles to, or limitations on, arguments for the reinvigoration of rights.
167 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
168See id. at 591 (acknowledging the "right of the State to enact such legislation in the
legitimate exercise of its police or other powers as to it may seem proper").

169In this period, the Court also invoked the Commerce Clause and other provisions to

limit the scope of legislation. See, e.g., CORWiN, CONsTITUTIONAL REVOLUION, supra note

1, at 13-26 (discussing prominent Commerce Clause cases of the period). Recent historians
have emphasized that the courts were hardly single-minded or relentless in their application of
these doctrines.

See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W.

FULLER, 1888-1910, at 74-75 (1995) (noting that the Fuller Court made no persistent attempt
to shield businesses against legislative attempts to impose public controls).
170See 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
171261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
prohibits Congress from enacting minimum wage laws).
172208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
prohibits Congress from imposing criminal penalties on an employer who discharges an atwill employee on the basis of the employee's membership in a union).
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Buffalo Railway Co., striking down the New York workmen's compensation
statute under the due process clauses of both the State and Federal constitu17
tions. 1
The Lochner era came to an abrupt close in the mid-1930s, when the
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions through which it abandoned the
project of policing economic regulation. Among the most significant of
these was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,which signaled the Court's repudiation of Lochner by conceding that "the Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract" and that "the legislature has necessarily a wide field of
discretion" in determining what measures will in fact serve the public
good.

174

B. Holmes, Corwin, and the Academic Assault on Rights
Substantive due process analysis was attacked by James Bradley Thayer
even before its formal christening in Allgeyer. 175 From that time until well
after its demise forty years later, the doctrine was subject to criticism by a
number of prominent legal scholars, historians, political
scientists, jurists,
178
17 7
176
Felix Cohen,
and lawyers, including Leonard Boudin,

Morris Cohen,

'73 94 N.E. 431, 441 (N.Y. 1911) ("[I]n its basic and vital features the right given to the
employd by this statute, does not preserve to the employer the 'due process' of law guaranteed

by the ConstitutionlI ....

).

174West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 393 (1937).
175See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 148-50 (1893) (positing a limited role for judicial review of
legislative acts). Although Thayer developed his arguments for judicial restraint before the
Supreme Court formally invoked the "liberty" provision of the Due Process Clause to invalidate legislation, he was reacting in part to precursors to Allgeyer, including Chicago, Milwaukee & St. PaulRy. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,456-57 (1890), which struck down railroad
rate regulations as unreasonable under the "property" language of the Due Process Clause.
See Thayer, supra,at 148 n.1 (summarizing the issue in the railroad rate regulation case); see
also Thomas C. Grey, Thayer's Doctrine: Notes on Its Origin, Scope, and Present Implications, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 28, 32-36 (1993) (describing Thayer's criticisms ofjudicial activism).
176See Louis B. Boudin, Government By Judiciary, 26 POL. ScI. Q. 238, 265 (1911)
(criticizing "the annulment of legislation in recent years [through] the modem doctrines of
'due process of law' and 'liberty of contract').
n See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLuM. L. REv. 809, 818-20 (1935) (asserting that the concept of due process employed by
the Court is nonsensical).
17 See Morris R. Cohen, The Bill of Rights Theory, 2 NEW REPUBLIC 222, 222 (1915),
reprintedin MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND Ti SOCIAL ORDER 148, 149-51 (1933) (asserting
that "due process" is too vague to provide an adjudicative standard, and that the defenders of
aggressive judicial review have failed to establish that the polity benefits from having the judiciary second-guess the wisdom of legislation).
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8
Felix
Henry Steele Commager, 1 Edward Corwin, is Herbert Croly,"'
4
18 3
18 2
Frankfurter, Learned Hand, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1 Vernon Parrington,' 85 Roscoe Pound, t1 6 and Thomas Reed Powell. ts7 Most, but not all
of these critics-Holmes being the most notable exception-were political
"progressives" who viewed the development and application of substantive
due process as thwarting socially beneficial legislation. All, however, endorsed broadly instrumentalist accounts of law, all were predisposed to be
skeptical of judicial attempts to adumbrate within their constitutional analysis substantive notions of individual rights, and hence, all argued that a
proper understanding of the nature of law undermined the foundations of

decisions like Lochner and Ives.

In this sub-Part we will use Corwin as the constitutional analogue to
Prosser, that is as an articulate representative of a generally Holmesian approach to constitutional theory. As we will demonstrate, there are remarkable similarities between Prosser's critique of Winterbottom and duty, and
Corwin's critique of Lochner and rights. Indeed, they stem from the same
179See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 43-56
(1943) (arguing that the historical record shows that the judiciary has been no more protective
of minority rights than the legislature, and thus that substantive due process analysis is misguided).
18OSee CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 112-17 (celebrating the

Supreme Court's abandonment of the approach that dominated the Lochner era); EDWARD S.
CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 181-84 (1934) [hereinafter TWILIGHT] (advocating that the Court cease its attempt to use the Due Process and other clauses to "supervise" national legislation).
181See HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESsIvE DEMOCRACY 137-40 (1914) (describing how
courts seized on the Due Process and other clauses to assert policy making preeminence).
182See Felix Frankfurter, The Red Terror ofJudicialReform, 40 NEW REPUBLIC 110, 112
(1924), reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF
FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 10, 13 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds.,
1939) (advocating the elimination of due process jurisprudence).
183See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-HourDay, 21 HARV. L. REV.
495, 507-09 (1908) (stating that courts should only strike legislation if the legislature has no
"sane"'justification, and concluding that eight-hour day legislation should not be struck).
'" See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Supreme Court should not read the Due Process Clause to incorporate controversial
laissez-faire economic theory).
185 See VERNON Louis PARRINGTON, 3 MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 118-

20 (1930) (finding that a "plutocracy" promoted judicial review and substantive due process to
bar redistributive legislation).
186 See Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 615-16 (1908)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's substantive due process decisions rely on an illegitimate
"jurisprudence of conceptions," whereby the Court purports to deduce specific conclusions
from an abstract concept of liberty).
187See Thomas R. Powell, The Judicialityof Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 545, 545-46, 555-56 (1924) (asserting that due process is determined entirely by the
policy preferences of individual judges).
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basic assumptions about what constitutes an adequate justification for judi188
cial decisions.
1. Holmes on Rights
Holmes devoted relatively little scholarly attention to constitutional law,
in part because he treated that branch of law on the same terms as he did
common law, namely through the lens of a certain kind of legal positivism. 189 For Holmes, constitutional law, as much as tort law, was the creation of judicial decisions, construed as authoritative interpretations of the
dictates of the sovereign. 190 The notion that the Constitution drew its content from rights existing independent of the state's acts struck him, like his
predecessor and kindred spirit Jeremy Bentham, as a piece of unscientific,
metaphysical nonsense. 9 1 The only meaningful notion of substantive rights
(as opposed to remedial rights, or rights of action) was the notion of positive
or legal rights, rights that existed by virtue of their recognition and enforcement through judicial decisions.
Yet, just as he concluded that even the narrow concept of legal duty
ought to be eradicated from law, Holmes also concluded that even the narrow concept of legal rights should be jettisoned.1 2 On Holmes's view, duties, or more accurately, the state directives and sanctions which regulate
conduct, "precede rights logically and chronologically." 193 An attribution of
188Since Corwin was, in fact, an admirer and defender of the institution of judicial review, as well as a critic of theories of legislative supremacy, it may strike some readers as odd
for us to identify him as a Holmesian, in part because Holmes is often associated with the idea
of maximal judicial "restraint." However, as we mentioned in connection with Prosser, see
supra text accompanying notes 117-24, and as we explain below in connection with Corwin,
see infra text accompanying notes 219, 231, one can be a Holmesian skeptic about moral concepts of "duty" and "right," as well as their legal counterparts, yet still endorse a role for the
judiciary in private and/or public law. We attribute such a view to Corwin.
189 This is not meant to suggest that Holmes thought that judges ought to operate with the
same degree of freedom in the constitutional realm.
190 According to Holmes,
It must be remembered, as is clear from numerous instances ofjudicial interpretation
of statutes in England and of constitutions in this country, that in a civilized state it is
not the will of the sovereign that makes lawyers' law, even when that is its source,
but what a body of subjects, namely the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his
will.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notices, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872).
191See JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACiEs 269 (Parekh ed. 1973) (1795)
("Natural and imprescriptable rights [are] rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts."); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, NaturalLaw, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918) (stating that notions of natural law unjustifiably attribute transcendental status to what is simply familiar or accepted).
192 See Holmes, supra note 40, at 464 (advocating the banishment of all words of moral
significance from legal analysis).
193Holmes, Codes, supranote 85, at 3.
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legal rights, to his mind, was simply an imprecise way of stating that a given
individual happened to be the beneficiary of judicially articulated directives
curtailing the freedom of others. Once rights were properly understood as
rooted in judicial limitations on the liberty of others, their claim to having a
special character or status within legal or normative discourse was easily
debunked. The judicial directives which indirectly generated rights derived
from the same "legislative" considerations of social policy that formed the
basis for all judicial directives. An individual's rights, in short, turned out to
be nothing more than indirect consequences of sovereign directives towards
others; directives that were generated by the same considerations of aggrethe political branches employed when enacting and
gate social welfare that
194
laws.
any
interpreting
2. Corwin and the Critique of Rights
According to Holmesians such as Corwin, the questionable premise of
substantive due process was that economic legislation raised a set of justiciable legal questions, questions that could be resolved by application of legal
concepts such as "due process," "liberty of contract," and "reasonableness."
Judges deciding these cases purported to put aside their own judgments as to
whether such legislation would be good or bad for society, and claimed instead that they were merely interpreting the Constitution. 195 Holmes, however, had exposed the fallacies underlying these pretensions. Thus, just as
Prosser harnessed Holmes to attack the concept of duty, Corwin found in
Holmes the basis for a conceptual and a political attack on the concept of
rights.
First, Holmes had shown that rights-talk, like duty-talk, was often, if not
always, gibberish. The judges who engaged in substantive due process
194 See id. ("Even those laws which in form create a right directly, in fact either tacitly
impose a duty on the rest of the world, as, in the case of patents, to abstain from selling the
patented article, or confer an immunity from a duty previously or generally imposed, like
taxation.").
195Justice Roberts's statement in UnitedStates v. Butler was taken to be the epitome of
such claims.
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts ... the judicial
branch of the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.... This court neither approves nor condemns any
legislative policy.
297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936). For criticism of Roberts's views, see CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 12-13, criticizing Justice Roberts's oversimplified treatment of
judicial review in the Butler decision, and CORWIN, TWILIGHT, supra note 180, at xxvi-xxvii,
185 n.8, citing Justice Roberts's opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933), to support Holmes's criticisms of anti-regulatory judicial decisions.
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analysis could not point to any clear textual support for the right to liberty of
contract. Indeed, they seemed to believe that this right derived from a shadowy normative order that existed independently of the order imposed by official decision; an ethereal body of natural law principles "not made but declared."'196 Rights-talk presupposed that courts could act as "the automatic
mouthpiece of 'a brooding omnipresence in the sky,' whether it be called
constitution, statute, common law, law of economics, or law of Evolution." 197 If this was so, then rights-discourse was a species of nonsense.
from the natural world precisely
The social and political world is distinct1 98
because it does not reflect any such order.
Corwin also argued that rights-based concepts were radically indeterminate. After the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court insisted that the Due Process Clauses, like the Privileges or Immunities Clause, said nothing about the ability of government to regulate private
economic transactions. 99 Yet, within thirty years, it had found within the
same clauses a substantive right to freedom of contract. 20 Worse, as articulated, that right was subject to an important qualification: it could be
overridden if the legislation bore a "reasonable" relation to the achievement
of certain public purposes. The Court had thus rendered the substance of the
"right" of substantive due process completely malleable, depending on
whether it was inclined to emphasize the importance of liberty or the reasonableness of the legislation.
In short, the "due process" clause came to arm the Court with a supervisory
power over governmental function virtually without statable limits-to render
it, in the words of Justice Brandeis, a "super-legislature." Obviously, a power
so vague, so indefinite, was available in 1935 to support practically any
evaluation the Court chose to put upon the New Deal
20 1 legislation from the point
of view of its own conception of the public good.

supra note 180, at 107; see also CORWIN, CONSTTrUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that judicial decisions unavoidably invoke the "sovereign prerogative of choice" (quoting Holmes (unattributed))); CROLY, supra note 181, at
164 ("[Tihose who would subordinate democracy to the Law must believe in the existence of
certain permanent constructive principles of political conduct, to which society must conform
196 CORWIN, TWILIGHT,

197 CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 94 (quoting Holmes (unat-

tributed)).
198See id.at 33 (noting that the varieties of life cannot be captured in a formula).
19 See CORWIN, TWILIGHT, supra note 180, at 72-73 (interpreting Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1876), as instructing the railroads "to go to the polls and not the courts").
20 See id. at 74-78 (detailing the accelerated use of the Due Process Clause by the Court
to implement principles of laissez-faire capitalism).
201 CORWIN, CONSTrrUTIONAL REVOLUTION,

supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted). In

the interest of interpretive accuracy, we should note that Corwin's claim about the indetermi-
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Likewise, according to Corwin, the other key rights-bearing provisions of
the Constitution could be invoked to support any conclusion the Justices
thought expedient. 20 2 Hence, his skepticism extended beyond substantive
due process to all important constitutional rights. Indeed, Corwin took considerable delight in quoting Governor (later Chief Justice) Hughes on this
under a Constitution, [but] the Constitution is what the
point: "[W]e are
203
is."
it
say
judges
That rights proved upon examination to be nonsensical or indeterminate, in turn, fueled in Corwin's work a version of Prosser's political argument against duty. Just as Prosser claimed to find political significance in
the timing of the invention of the duty element of negligence, Corwin concluded from the fact that late nineteenth-century judges were the ones to
have read the right of economic liberty into the Due Process Clauses, that
rights functioned as a label behind which courts could further the political
cause of limiting state regulation of private activity. Substantive due process, as Holmes pointed out in his Lochner dissent, owed its existence not to
of rights, but to a generation of judges enchanted with laissez
a theory
20 4
faire.
3. Reconceiving Rights as Policy
Like Prosser, Corwin and his fellow rights-skeptics articulated a positive account of what court decisions that purported to invoke rights were
really about. In some sense that account was inevitable; it was contained in
the skeptical critique of substantive due process and related doctrines. Thus,
as we have seen, Corwin thought that the due process decisions ultimately
masked courts' views as to the substantive merits of particular pieces of
legislation. Indeed, it was evident to him that, in decisions such as Lochner,
the courts were making fact-dependent legislative judgments as to the beneficial or harmful effects of particular legislation. 205 For Corwin, as for

nacy of constitutional analysis was tied to a historical claim that the Court had, during the
course of the nineteenth century, rendered constitutional law indeterminate by building conceptual antimonies into its cases interpreting critical clauses. These antimonies then provided
the Justices with a stock of thrusts and parries that permitted them to reach any outcome they
thought best for the country. See id. at 31-33.
202See id. at 11-38 (explaining how several critical constitutional provisions had been
interpreted by the Supreme Court so as to give it complete discretion in determining the substance of those provisions).
201 Id. at 64.
204 See id. at 85-87 (describing judicial application of laissez-faire concepts); CORWIN,
TWILIGHT, supra note 180, at 49 ("Beginning about 1885 the Court's construction of the
clause underwent a curious development, largely in response to the laissez faire impulse.").
205 See, e.g., CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLuTION, supra note 1, at 86-88 (discussing
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Holmes, the rights afforded by the Constitution were emanations of judicial
directives, which directives in turn rested on "legislative" judgments about
how best to attain a certain state of affairs. Holmes's claim about the nature
and sources of common law therefore applied with equal force to constitutional law: "'The very considerations which judges most rarely mention,
and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws
all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient
for the community concerned.', 2 0 6 For Corwin, the Due Process Clauses,
and the other broad provisions of the Constitution, provided a vehicle by
which the Court passed judgment on legislation "from the point of view of
its own conception of public good.

20 7

4. Institutional Implications of the Critique of Rights
As should be clear by now, Corwin's Holmesian rights-skepticism
tracked very closely Prosser's Holmesian duty-skepticism. Corwin and
Prosser both believed that Holmes had shown that judicial decisions that
purported to rely on non-instrumental legal and moral concepts had to be
confused or disingenuous because such concepts were nonsensical or indeterminate. Thus, it is no accident that Prosser's most pithy rhetorical attack
on the concept of duty--"There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the
law [of negligence], like the Constitution, is what we make it"2 0 ---literally
tracks Corwin's favorite anti-due process slogan--'"[W]e are under a Constitution, [but] the Constitution is what the judges say it is."' 20 9 Moreover,
both men, along with many of their contemporaries, believed that the concepts of "rights" and "duty" were merely reifications of a set of attitudes and
beliefs "typical of the social viewpoint of the nineteenth century" concerning the undesirability of government regulation. 10 Finally, according to
both Prosser and Corwin, it followed from these arguments that judicial invocations of these concepts had to be understood as dressed-up instrumental
arguments. Hence, one finds the precise analogue to Prosser's claim that
"duty" is "shorthand" for "the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protecthe Court's willingness to rely on its own factual investigations).
206Id. at 93 (quoting HOLMES, supra note 77, at 35).
207 Id. at 30.
208Prosser, supranote 2, at 15.
209 CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at

64 (quoting CHARLES

EVAN HUGHES, ADDRESSES 139 (1908)).
210PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 83, at 674 (citing privity requirements in tort
law as an example of "the social viewpoint of the nineteenth century"); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 27, § 96, at 682; see also CORVIN, TWILIGHT, supra note 180, at 48-49 (lamenting
the influence that laissez-faire concepts had on the Court).
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tion ' 211 in Corwin's claim that the Due Process Clause empowered the
legislation "from the point
Court to give any evaluation it chose to put upon
212
good."
public
of
conception
of view of its own
a. Rights-Skepticism and JudicialReview
Their close kinship notwithstanding, Prosser's duty-skepticism and
Corwin's rights-skepticism diverged with respect to their institutional implications, a divergence that was foreshadowed in Holmes's own work and that
has, until now, partially obscured the otherwise close resemblance of their
arguments. Prosser, as we have seen, believed his deconstruction of duty
would help the courts make better decisions because it would lead them to
understand that duty questions entailed policy decisions about which liability rules were most desirable from a social point of view.2 13 His Holmesian
analysis thus generally supported the idea that judges214ought to make negligence law by engaging in frank cost-benefit analysis.
Corwin's rights-skepticism had a rather different implication for the judicial role. Indeed, once rights arguments were revealed to be pure policy
arguments, the question arose as to whether courts should have any significant constitutional law-making authority. This is because the courts' claim
of authority to invalidate legislation was much more closely tied to the validity of the concept of rights than was their claim of authority to make
common law tied to the soundness of the concept of duty. Once the claim
about rights was debunked, a serious question emerged as to whether there
was any basis for the judicial claim of institutional competence; indeed,
Corwin and like-minded scholars thought it fairly obvious that courts were
incompetent to tackle many of the policy issues they confronted.
This conclusion was most obvious in the case of economic substantive
due process. With the exposure of the incoherence of rights, the courts were
left to justify their authority to strike legislation on the unlikely claim that
their economic policy judgments were superior to those of the legislative
and executive branches. Holmesian reductionism thus demonstrated the impropriety of aggressive review of economic legislation. 2 1 To varying degrees, rights-skeptics such as Corwin reached the same conclusion about
many, if not most, of the key rights-bearing provisions of the Constitu211 PROSSER, HANDBOOK, supra note 76, § 31, at 180; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note

27, § 53, at 358.
212CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supranote 1, at 30.

213See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
214See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
215 See generally CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 16-30 (de-

scribing the manner by which judges expanded their role in economic regulation).

1998]

THE MORAL OF MACPHERSON

1787

216
tion.
As a result, although the central question of modem negligence
scholarship after Prosser has been the question of how judges ought to
evaluate and accommodate competing policy considerations, the central
question of constitutional scholarship after Corwin has been the question of
judicial review-how a court's interpretation of constitutional rights could
justify the court in striking down popularly-enacted legislation.

b. Two Kinds of Rights-Skepticism
The link between Holmesian rights-skepticism and Holmesian dutyskepticism thus has been partially obscured because the former, unlike the
latter, seemed to entail general hostility to robust judicial decision-making.
It has been further obscured because the Holmesian rights-skeptical argument against judicial review, unlike the duty-skeptical argument for judicial
revision of tort law, has, in the last half-century, increasingly taken the form
of a strongly skeptical "legitimacy" argument, rather than the "functional"
argument favored by Prosser and Corwin. 7
As we saw above, Prosser's Holmesian skepticism about duty translated
into a functional argument that courts should-in the context of tort lawengage in "social engineering. ' 218 Likewise, Corwin joined to the
Holmesian premise that rights questions are policy questions the
functionalist idea that policy questions are in principle amenable to rational
resolution. This combination of rights-skepticism and functionalism often,
although not always, provided a strong argument against judicial review.
Judges, it was argued, confronted social problems through the distorting lens
of individual litigation, analyzed those problems by lawyerly analysis of
precedent and abstract principle rather than assessments of facts and
probable effects, and typically possessed the conservative biases and
216 See id. at 13-16 (discussing various ways in which the Court aggressively interpreted
constitutional provisions including the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 117-19 (noting Prosser's defense of the propriety
of policy reasoning to decide negligence cases). Our distinction between "functional" rightsskepticism and "legitimacy" rights-skepticism resembles Ronald Dworkin's distinction between the "skeptical" and "deference" theories of judicial restraint. See RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 138 (1978) (arguing that critics of judicial review fall into two
camps: those who are skeptical that rights exist, and those who are skeptical that courts do a
better job of protecting rights than legislatures). However, there is an important difference.
Dworkin distinguishes two skeptical theories ofjudicial competence, one that denies the existence of rights and one that acknowledges them. Ours is between two different bases for being skeptical about rights. This difference is important, in part, because it allows us to acknowledge constitutional theorists who reject across-the-board moral skepticism, yet argue
that rights-talk reduces to consequentialist considerations of utility and/or expediency.
218 See supra text accompanying note 117 (describing Prosser's justification for supporting judge-made negligence law).
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prejudices of the elite class from which they were drawn. In Robert
McCloskey's later description, courts that engaged in aggressive judicial review thus gave themselves "the assignment of playing baseball with a billiard cue."219
By contrast, other critics of judicial review have tended to link their
Holmesian rights-skepticism to a broader, more thoroughgoing skepticism
foreign to Corwin and Prosser; one which more closely resembles the disposition we earlier attributed to Judge Andrews' Palsgrafdissent. 2 Courts,
these "legitimacy" critics argue, ought to play a lesser role not because they
are particularly inept at answering policy questions, but because such questions are evaluative and have no correct answer. Because policy questions
ultimately must be decided by fiat, the fairest way to resolve them is by
counting preferences or opinions through democratic elections. The legitimacy critic--of whom a good example may have been Learned Hand-thus
puts aside any substantive notion of what good decisions would consist of,
and adopts instead a framework where normative priority rests entirely upon
process and pedigree. 22 1 Although, in torts, this kind of skepticism entailed
giving all important questions to the jury, in constitutional law, it entailed
ensuring that all questions, or at least all questions not unequivocally and
unambiguously answered in the literal text of the Constitution, be resolved
by elected officials.
These two variations on rights-skepticism ultimately reflect two very
different analyses of the language of rights. A functionalist skeptic like
Corwin believed that statements about rights are capable of rational assessment, once it is recognized that the metric for assessing them is the impact
on human welfare of the legal scheme they created and not some airy conception of justice. By contrast, to a legitimacy skeptic such as Hand, statements about rights can only be seen as mere assertions of power and expressions of attitude, not genuinely capable of rational assessment. In current
222
constitutional theory, one often sees the language of the legitimacy critic.
219ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 22 (1960).

By contrast,

to the extent one could identify areas of policymaking for which the courts were relatively
well-suited, the functional critique of rights supported judicial review. See infra note 231.
220 See supra notes 121-23.
221See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 341-42 (1996) (discussing Hand's value-skepticism); DWORKIN, supra note
217, at 140 (same).
222 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Judge Bork, and Lino Graglia have all employed the skeptical
language of the legitimacy critic, although they maintain that this skepticism is compatible
with an originalist theory of judicial review. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 257 (1990) ("There is going to be no moral philosophy that can begin to justify
courts in overriding democratic choices where the Constitution does not speak."); Lino A.
Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1030
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Although this may be accurate as a gloss on the work of some of the most
vociferous modem critics of judicial review, it neglects a large and important version of rights-skepticism which has held significant sway in academia and in the courts-the functionalist version. 223 More pertinently, the
ascendancy of the legitimacy branch of rights-skepticism has obscured the
otherwise obvious parallel between the development of tort theory and constitutional theory in the first half of this century. In both areas, scholars became vigorous critics of a certain kind of judicial reasoning, namely reasoning in terms of non-instrumentalist normative concepts contained within
the law. In tort law and scholarship, duty-skepticism has remained iargely
tied to a functionalist reduction of duty language to policy analysis. In constitutional law, however, the attack on rights has often played out in the
form of a legitimacy argument against judicial review. This difference, although important, should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that, in the
end, the skeptical arguments against Lochner and rights were the same
skeptical arguments used against Winterbottom and duty.
C. The MoralofWest Coast Hotel: The FirstGenerationAccount
Whether in its functionalist or legitimacy cast, the immediate prescription that flowed from the Holmesian analysis of judicial (in)competence was
the same. Courts had to stop second-guessing legislative assessments of the
probable effects of economic regulatory legislation. 224 Thus, when the Supreme Court finally heeded forty years of academic criticism, as well as the
Depression and President Roosevelt's shot across the bow, Corwin was delighted. As he read it, the decision in West Coast Hotel clearly reflected the

(1992) ("There is no escaping that 'natural law' is a matter of prescription masquerading as
description, dependant on who is doing the prescribing."); William H. Relnquist, Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693, 704-06 (1976) (arguing that
in order to effectuate individual moral judgments in a democratic society, individuals should
use the mechanisms of the democratic process rather than allow federal judges to impose their
own ideals). Although we have sharply distinguished them here, it is probably the case that
advocates of functionalist and legitimacy skepticism often adopt arguments that belong to
each other's conceptual framework.
223 The classic modem statement of functionalism is found in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROuS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986). Bickel suggests that the justification for judicial review rests on identifying
a function [for the courts] which might (indeed, must) involve the making of policy,
yet which differs from the legislative and executive functions; which is peculiarly
suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere
if the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable in a
[democratic] society.
Id. at 24.
224 See CORWIN, CONSTIrUTIONAL REvOLUTION, supra note 1, at 115.
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225 Indeed,
judicial embrace and validation of Holmesian instrumentalism.
the Court had conceded that the Constitution "does not speak of freedom of
contract," and does not "recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty,"
but instead requires only that governmental regulations serve "the interests
of the community," where it is understood that "the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion" in determining what measures will in fact
226
Similar conclusions seemed to follow for other proserve those interests.
visions of the Constitution that purported to identify and to protect abstractly conceived rights against the state. And so, by 1941, Corwin could
optimistically write of a future in which the Court would limit its function to
a handful of less obtrusive tasks.227

D. The Moral ofWest Coast Hotel Reconsidered: The Rights Revival
As just demonstrated, the efforts of Holmesian tort and constitutional
scholars to rid their respective fields of what they regarded as incoherent
and regressive concepts of duty and rights proceeded on parallel tracks
throughout the first half of this century. Since then, however, their respective paths have diverged. Whereas tort scholarship has continued steadily
down the Holmesian path, constitutional law has made a sharp turn "rightsward." In this section, we will briefly describe the revival of rights-based
analysis in constitutional law in order to build our case for a revival of dutybased analysis in tort law.
1. The Persistence of Rights
Even in their heyday, the instrumentalist rights-skeptics faced serious
difficulties in accounting for constitutional law and practice. Their most
fundamental problem was explaining how they could embrace strong rightsskepticism without thereby advocating the elimination of judicial review: a
2
radical conclusion that few explicitly endorsed 8 and that the newly pro225 See id. at 78 ("In the Parrish case the long-standing judicial taboo on minimum wage
legislation was revoked.").
226 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-93 (1937).
227 See CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 115 (discussing the
modest role that courts might play in the future). This is not to assert that Corwin would necessarily have maintained the same prescription for the courts had he confronted contemporary
problems in civil rights. As a "functional" account ofjudicial review, Corwin's theory was, in
fact, relatively adaptable to changing social, economic, and political conditions.
228 Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter's hesitancy to approve of a court's interference with legislative action. At least early in his career, Frankfurter was sufficiently committed to rights-skepticism that he was willing to condemn on principle instances of judicial review that reached results he found congenial, including Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). Yet, Frankfurter also maintained that courts should invoke Fourteenth Amendment
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gressive Supreme Court never pursued.229 Even the most vociferous academic critics of the Court rejected plans to dismantle the mechanism of judicial review, seemingly in the belief that the courts ought to be doing
something under the heading of constitutional law.23 Yet, given the stringent nature and broad
scope of the rights-skeptical critique, such a belief
2 31
was hard to justify.
The problems faced by rights-skeptics only escalated in the 1940s, '50s,
and '60s as academics struggled to come to terms with the Supreme Court's
burgeoning free speech, privacy, criminal procedure, and equal protection
due process to prevent certain forms of discrimination. See Sanford V. Levinson, The DemocraticFaith of Felix Frankfurter,25 STAN. L. REV. 430, 439 (1973) (noting that "[i]n April
1924, Frankfurter declared himself to be 'strongly for restricting 14th Amendment [jurisprudence] to "unreasonable" racial and religious discriminations' (citations omitted)).
229 Even as the Court swore off economic substantive due process, it adhered to, and expanded upon, the rights-driven notion of "incorporation," while also laying the groundwork
for the modem law of equal protection. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin,
and race "may be a special condition... which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry"); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (noting that Fourteenth
Amendment due process protection against the states encompasses those guaranties of the Bill
of Rights necessary to maintain ordered liberty); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (finding that an act requiring all children to attend public school "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right "to contract, to engage in ... the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness").
230 See NVILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULIsTs, PROGREssIvEs, AND THE
LABOR UNIONs CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 59-60 (1994) (explaining that progressives were reluctant to condemn judicial review outright); see also DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 211-47 (1997) (discussing progressive academics'
ambivalent attitude toward judicial protection of free speech).
231 Functionalist rights-skeptics, like Corwin, tended to argue that, although courts could
only claim constitutional supremacy by asserting that they possessed superior policymaking
abilities to the political branches, there were certain functions for which they could plausibly
make such a claim. Thus, for example, Corwin occasionally alluded to the idea, later developed by the "Legal Process" school, that courts were uniquely equipped to force legislatures
to reason clearly about the purposes of specific enactments and whether the terms of the enactments were likely to achieve those purposes.
I am far from saying that... Judicial Review... should be scrapped. Judicial review still has its uses, and important ones. Especially does it present an admirable
forum in which to rationalize and clarify, to authenticate in terms of broad principle,
the determinations of political authority, and to articulate them with the more durable
elements of tradition.
CORWIN, CONsTrTUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 1, at 115. Corwin also endorsed, with
qualifications, courts' "increased concern to protect against hasty and prejudiced legislation
the citizen's freedom to express his views-a right of vital importance for the maintenance of
free institutions." Id.
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jurisprudence. If a single case can be said to illustrate these problems, it
was Brown v. Board of Education.232 It was clear at the time of Brown that
"nine old men" were imposing their normative judgments on legislatures
whose members and constituents had embraced, by a clear majority, opposing normative judgments.233 And, few believed that historical or textual
data, original intent, or precedent justified the Court's decision; in fact, most
234
Yet, Brown's statements that
of those materials seemed to cut against it.
for all races, that segprotection
the Constitution commands a right to equal
ultimate concluregation violates the rights of African-Americans, and its 235
correct.
seemed
all
sion that segregation is unconstitutional,
The rights-skeptic was not left speechless by Brown-a number of nonrights-based explanations might have been and were offered. But, in the
world of constitutional law and scholarship, Brown became a paradigm of
the courts doing something right, just as Lochner was a paradigm of the
courts doing something wrong. And, as the writings of Hand, Hart and
Sacks, and Wechsler attest, Brown was neither a natural application of, nor
236 The conflict between what made
easily explained by, rights-skepticism.
232 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools violates the

equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
233See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 32-33 (1959) (proposing that Brown "must have rested on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed").
234 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-33 (2d ed. 1977) (noting that
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that it was not intended to outlaw segregated schools); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REvIEW 30-41 (1980) (same); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1,58-59 (1955) (same).
235See BICKEL, supra note 223, at 237-38; Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (endorsing Brown on the ground that
segregation was part of a system "set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping [a
whole race of people] in an inferior station"); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1959) (supporting
the judgment of Brown, although expressing dissatisfaction with its opinion).
236See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
LECTURES, 1958, at 54-55 (1958) (criticizing the Brown Court for substituting its legislative
judgment for that of elected officials); Wechsler, supra note 233, at 32-34 (questioning
whether a principled justification for Brown could be found); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The
Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1587 n.67 (1996) (reviewing HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M.

SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:

BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF LAW (1994)). Sebok notes in his review that:
It is hard not to imagine that Hart and Sacks are addressing the specter of Brown v.
Board of Education when they state that "[tjhe present question is whether the enthusiasts for adjudication as a method of settling every kind of social problem may
not be open to the charge of trying to make a similarly parasitic use of the prestige of
the method."
Id. (citation omitted).
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Brown right jurisprudentially and what made Lochner wrong may not have
been sharp, but it clearly was deep.
2. Reviving Rights
Brown and other decisions of the Warren Court helped spawn a number
of new approaches to constitutional law, distinguishable from the approaches taken by the first-generation critics of Lochner by their embrace of
some notion of rights. Indeed, academic rights discourse has flourished
since the 1960s, manifesting itself in many different forms. In briefly surveying the array of such views, our goal is not to align ourselves with any
one of them; rather, it is to point out that academics and judges with a wide
range of political commitments and widely divergent conceptions of judicial
review have endorsed the intelligibility and value of rights-based reasoning
about constitutional law.237 By pointing this out, we hope to highlight the
oddity of the continued rejection of duty analysis in negligence scholarship.
We also hope to fend off the unwarranted inference that our argument for
the revival of duty-based analysis is linked to the acceptance of unenumerated rights generally, or the particular doctrine of substantive due process.
The first theory of rights we will identify is one that has been widely
adopted by modem heirs to legitimacy skeptics such as Hand. These scholars have attempted to temper Hand's position by distinguishing between
rights clearly embodied and defined in the constitutional text and all other
rights. Courts, according to this view, are not permitted to engage in unstructured normative inquiries about rights, but can nonetheless enforce the
'explicit' limitations on governmental activity contained, for example, in the
first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights. The Constitution is thus conceived as a piece of positive law, containing certain provisions that have a
core of meaning which can be determined without recourse to moral or instrumentalist reasoning. This core, at a minimum, establishes a framework
in which judges can claim a legitimate function-namely, that of applying
clearly enacted law. The critique of rights and judicial review is therefore
triggered only when the judiciary is faced with the discretionary task of construing the vague provisions of the Constitution.238
2 We recognize, of course, that some modem constitutional scholars continue to advocate various forms of rights-skepticism. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX.

L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (outlining four related critiques of rights).
28 The idea that there is a strong distinction between enumerated and unenumerated
rights is most famously associated with Justice Black's approach to incorporation doctrine.
See generally Paul A. Freund, Mr.Justice Black and the JudicialFunction, 14 UCLA L. REv.
467, 468 (1967) (discussing Black's initial reluctance "to agree that the exclusionary rule of
evidence, established as a corollary of the search-and-seizure clause, was binding on the
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A second approach, which might be dubbed the "pragmatic account of
rights," maintains that one can assert the existence of rights-and justify
courts' exercise of judicial review-without recourse to a full-blown theory
of rights. According to this view, judicial enforcement of rights is justified
because there are times when governmental bodies, whose work the courts
review, simply fail to make the decisions that, morally or prudentially, they
ought to make. Insofar as there is any theoretical explanation as to why the
courts ought to be making these decisions, it is a practical response: there is
a job to do and the courts are sometimes available and prepared to do it.
This approach to constitutional rights and judicial review is in some sense
anti-theoretical. It accepts the idea that citizens possess rights that render
certain governmental actions off limits; yet, it rejects the need for articulating those reasons in the form of a theory of rights. Many constitutional
scholars who operate in the spirit of legal realism probably subscribe to a
version of this approach.239
A third important post-Warren Court approach to constitutional law is
the process-based theory of rights, foreshadowed in Justice Stone's famous
240
The most eloquent
footnote four of the Carolene Products decision.
modem elaboration of this view is, of course, John Hart Ely's Democracy
and Distrust.241 According to the process-theorists, the rights-skeptics are
basically correct to conclude that democratically responsive governmental
bodies are better, or nmore legitimate, decision-makers. Nevertheless, the
skeptics failed to realize that democratic rule presupposes certain rights, including rights to equal representation, equal protection, privacy, and freedom of speech and association.242 Thus, the Warren Court could coherently

states, since it could not be derived from the text of the fourth amendment"). This distinction
has been defended by, among others, Justice Scalia and Judge Bork. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37-47 (Amy Gutman ed.,
1997) (arguing for textualism on the ground that it is necessary "to embed certain rights in
such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away"); Robert Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971) (criticizing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), on the ground "that new basic rights could [not] be
derived logically by finding and extrapolating a more general principle of individual autonomy underlying the particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
239See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 192 (1995) (endorsing an antitheoretical, "felt need" account of rights and judicial review); J. Skelly Wright, Professor
Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 803-05
(1971) (defending the Warren Court and its supporters for acting to protect fundamental

rights).

240 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
241See ELY, supra note 234.
242See id. at 74 (discussing the Warren Court's interventionist decisions, which were fu-

eled "by a desire to ensure that the political process ... was open to those of all viewpoints on
something approaching an equal basis").
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claim that it was engaged in the distinctive enterprise of rights-based reasoning, so long as it sought to articulate and protect the rights necessary to
maintain the fair workings of the democratic process. Later writers working
within this tradition have sought to redefine the rights protections implicit in
the principle
of democratic rule by introducing broader conceptions of de243
mocracy.
Another modem theory of rights, which might be described as broadly
originalist or historicist, seeks to identify and define rights by reference to
epochal social and political transformations, such as those that occurred as a
result of the New Deal and during the civil rights era. According to this
school, led by Professor Ackerman, constitutional rights are defined and
determined in periods of heightened political activity and awareness, and
these rights are to be enforced by the courts until such time as a new political order is established.244
Still another account of rights, articulated by Justices Harlan and Cardozo, 245 and endorsed by modem scholars including David Strauss, Laurence Tribe, and Harry Wellington, adopts what might be described as a
common law approach to constitutional rights.246 Under this approach, the
243See, e.g., CASS R. SUNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTITUTION 133-53 (1993) (explaining

the theory of deliberative democracy and its implications for judicial review); Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1683 (1997) (arguing that feminist
constitutional theory should identify the necessary preconditions of women's effective political participation); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1532-36 (1988) (arguing that democratic citizenship ought to entail privacy as a political right); see also Fleming,
supra note 6, at 214-17 (comparing the theories of Ely and Sunstein); Lawrence G. Sager, The
Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 915-24 (1990) (comparing the theories of
Ely and Michelman).
244See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1022-31 (1984) (discussing the "dualistic conception of political life" presented in
THE FEDERALIST).
245 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Mhe full scope
of liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise
terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.... It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.... (citations omitted)); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (discussing the doctrine of selective incorporation and "ordered liberty').
246See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 76-

79, 116-17 (1991) (discussing Harlan's "process of interpolation and extrapolation" with respect to the specific liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and advocating his approach to
constitutional decision-making); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrruTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 77-123 (1990) (discussing
the development of constitutional law through adjudication); David A. Strauss, Common Law
ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 879 (1996) (claiming that the common
law tradition, which "rejects the notion that law must be derived from some authoritative
source and finds it instead in understandings that evolve over time,... best explains, and best
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courts claim a special competence and obligation to identify various norms,
including rights, within evolving practices and traditions. Thus, to the extent that our liberal traditions and modem social practices reflect commitments or aspirations to rights against majoritarian legislation, courts may
claim the authority to constrain legislative and executive discretion and acof this position. Justice Souter recently provided an eloquent articulation
24 7
Glucksberg.
v.
Washington
in
tion in his concurrence
The last, and in some respects the most ambitious, approach to constitutional rights derives from the work of a group of scholars that includes,
most prominently, Ronald Dworkin.24 8 According to Dworkin, by explicitly
incorporating a Bill of Rights, and by creating an independent judiciary to
enforce those rights, the Constitution established a political order that regards certain interests as so fundamentally important to the individual that it
prevents a majority from invading those interests, even when doing so
would further laudable public goals.2 49 These interests are not merely to be
weighed against the value of the public goals; they "trump" those goals and

justifies, American constitutional law today").
247 See 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2283 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that in constitutional review it is the job of a court to determine whether the statute in question "falls inside or
outside the zone of what is reasonable in the way it resolves the conflict between the interests
of state and individual").
248 See DWORKIN, supra note 221, at 1-38 (advocating a "moral reading" of the Constitution); RONALD DWORKIN,LAW'S EMPIRE 397-99 (1986) (defending the theory of "constitutional integrity," which supports strong judicial protection of counter majoritarian rights);
DWORKIN,supra note 217, at 133 (defending a rights-based account of constitutional law);
see also SOTTIos A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER 235 (1993) (criticizing the modem belief that "a more or less willful assertion of personal preference is all that
can lie behind judicial choice in hard cases" of constitutional interpretation); DAVID A.J.
RiCHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 11-19 (1986) (discussing Dworkin's rightsbased philosophy and criticizing Ely's refusal to incorporate substantive rights into constitutional theory); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (arguing that accountability is "a structural feature of the constitutional architecture, the goal of which is to protect liberty"); James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995) (proposing that "our basic liberties" are
manifestations of "deliberative democracy" and "deliberative autonomy," themes which "help
orient our deliberations, reflections, and judgments about our Constitution and our constitutional democracy"); Walter F. Murphy, An Orderingof ConstitutionalValues, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 703, 749 (1980) (discussing how the rights and restrictions of the Constitution "enhance
the freedom of the individual by curtailing government, leaving it ...only enough power in
domestic affairs to prevent one segment of society from oppressing another"); Sager, supra
note 243, at 936 (discussing constitutional decision-making as a judgment-driven process that
"does not depend upon the direct support of political majorities").
249 See DWORKIN, supra note 217, at 133 ("The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of
Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a
majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes to be
the general or common interest.").
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The trumping character of
cannot be invaded in the pursuit of them.
rights, in turn, explains why the judiciary is the appropriate institution to enforce the Bill of Rights. Because the interpretation and application of the
Constitution is an articulation of the concept of rights that the framers
placed in the Constitution, it is essential that judges engage in reasoning
about the nature and content of those rights. If the judiciary fails to enforce
them, there will be no check to determine whether the government has complied with its obligation to leave undisturbed the rights that the Constitution
was designed to protect. 251 Likewise, by arguing that the Constitution incorporates a set of normative political principles built around a theory of individual rights that deems the political branches illegitimate to the extent
that they trample upon certain kinds of individual interests, Dworkin's theory directly confronts the "legitimacy" objection to judicial review. Because their roles as rights-enforcers are precisely what gives courts the
demands that
power to review the acts of the other branches, legitimacy
2 2
5
analysis.
their
of
medium
the
be
reasoning
rights-based
3. Lochner and West Coast Hotel Revisited
With the resurgence of rights theory in constitutional law, new understandings have emerged as to what was wrong with decisions such as
Lochner. Indeed, according to many contemporary scholars, the problem
with Lochner is not its invocation of rights-based reasoning, which these
scholars regard as legitimate. Instead, they offer a number of different explanations about what was really wrong with Lochner.
The most straightforward view is that the Court was not doing anything
wrong theoretically or methodologically, it simply got the wrong answer
when it concluded that there is a fundamental constitutional right to economic liberty. This is the view expressed by the joint opinion in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, which disowned economic substantive due process,
while endorsing due process in certain non-economic spheres. 253 Others,
such as Ely, criticize Lochner and substantive due process more generally,
not for deploying the concept of rights, but rather, for doing so in a "substantive" context where the judiciary's involvement is not necessary to
250 See id. at xi ("Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals
have rights when... a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what
they wish .... ).
251 See id. at 142-43 (stating that "decisions about rights against the majority are not issues that in fairness ought to be left to the majority").
212 See id. at 147.
2" See 505 U.S. 833, 847-50, 861-62 (1992) (distinguishing among personal liberties that
are or are not secured by substantive due process rights).
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maintain the integrity of the democratic process. 254 Still, others suggest that
Lochner was right at the time it was decided, but rendered "wrong" by subsequent social, economic, political, and theoretical changes which collectively amounted to the rejection of the laissez-faire conception of the
state. 5 Perhaps the most extended post-instrumentalist critique of Lochner
is provided by Sunstein in the piece whose title provides the eponym of our
own.256 According to Sunstein, Lochner's mistake lay not in its deployment
of the concept of rights, but in its equation of constitutional rights with the
257
distribution of entitlements mandated by the common law status quo.
This equation, he argues, was accomplished by two questionable means.
The first consisted of the judicial claim that constitutional rights reflect a
pre-political, neutral order. The second was a presumption that the legal
status quo at the time of Lochner accurately reflected that order and that
legislative departures from this baseline were therefore illegitimate. 258 The
lesson of Lochner, according to Sunstein, is not that rights are nonsense or
have no place in constitutional law, but that we should not presume that our
current scheme of positive law rights correctly identifies the rights that are,
or ought to be, protected by the Constitution. Instead, Sunstein argues that
constitutional law calls on lawyers, scholars, and politicians to use various
forms of normative reasoning, including rights reasoning, to assess the validity of existing social and political arrangements.2 59

254See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 938-41 (1973) (suggesting that the Lochner philosophy grants "unusual protection to

those 'rights' that somehow seem most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude for them").

255See Ackerman, supra note 244, at 1056-57 (arguing that "twentieth century Americans
rejected the higher law handed down by the Supreme Court in the name of their predecessors"); Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.

L.REV. 395, 421-23 (1995) (noting that advances in economic theory undermined the view
that economic regulation was fundamentally irrational).
256See Sunstein, supra note 3.

257See id.
at 903 (asserting that Lochner was wrongly decided because it "depended on
baselines and consequent understandings of actions and neutrality that were inappropriate for
constitutional analysis").
258 See id. at 904 ("Efforts to change the common law framework are not by virtue of the
fact constitutionally suspect, and measures that respect the framework are not 'inaction' necessarily to be immunized from legal scrutiny.").
59See id. at 918 ("mhe task for the future is to develop theories of distributive justice,
derived from constitutional text and purposes, that might serve as the basis for evaluating any
particular practice.").
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III. RECONSIDERING DUTY-SKEPTICISM

Modem academic rights-skepticism and duty-skepticism were bom at
roughly the same time out of roughly the same arguments. 260 Largely
through the influence of Holmes, a view emerged that concepts of rights and
duty are incoherent, and thus cannot have any genuine content apart from
utilitarian considerations of policy or the personal attitudes of those who invoke them. As we have seen, however, the force and popularity of rightsskepticism has greatly diminished among constitutional scholars. 261 Many,
if not most, no longer believe that rights reasoning is inevitably incoherent
or regressive. Indeed, many have embraced rights thinking as an important
conceptual tool for encouraging and directing positive social change. Yet,
tort scholars cling to duty-skepticism out of a belief that it is the only philosophically and politically respectable way of thinking about negligence.
In this Part, we review some of the reasons that undergirded the widespread rejection of rights-skepticism. We then argue that, for these same
reasons, duty-skepticism cannot be understood as the only intellectually respectable position to take in tort law. In support of this conclusion, we revisit and rebut Prosser's conceptual and political arguments for eliminating
duty from negligence law. Our method here is partly that of intellectual
history-we briefly describe and explain a set of changes in the intellectual
landscape that has left constitutional theorists and lawyers more receptive to
certain kinds of reasoning than their predecessors in the eras of Holmes and
Corwin. But, in delving into this history, we are also asserting that the reasons for this increased receptiveness are sound. We think the conceptual
and philosophical reasons offered in support of the Holmesian skepticism
about rights and duties do not stand up to close scrutiny, but instead display
a set of dogmatic attitudes about values, meaning, and knowledge. It does
not follow that reasoning in terms of rights and duties is philosophically
mandatory. Rather, by noting the inadequacy of certain global objections to
rights-based and duty-based reasoning, we merely show why they should be
considered as available options. For present purposes, that is more than
enough, because until now, the vast majority of modem tort scholars seem
to have believed otherwise.

260 See

supra text accompanying notes 208-12 (comparing Corwin's Holmesian rights-

skepticism to Prosser's Holmesian duty-skepticism).
261 See supra text accompanying notes 238-52.
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A. The Grounds ofRights-Skepticism
At the heart of the instrumentalist analysis of constitutional law was a
skeptical view of the discourse of rights. According to either the functionalist or the legitimacy argument, the evil of Lochner was the courts' claim
that there exist rights that are normatively grounded, yet distinct from instrumental concerns about social goals, and that are empirically ungrounded,
262
Once the aryet relied upon as a basis for the judicial exercise of power.
the
uncovered,
been
had
discourse
of
rights
nature
tificial and inscrutable
defercase had been made for a clearminded, efficacious, and progressive
ence by the judiciary to the political branches.
A functional critic, such as Corwin, would claim that rights discourse
was merely a guise for reasoning about the desirability of various social
goals and the most efficacious means of realizing them. The functionalist
thus operated within the influential Anglo-American traditions of utilitarian,
pragmatist, and empiricist thinking about political theory and moral epistemology. At the level of political theory, both British utilitarians and American pragmatists argued that laws and legal systems had to be evaluated in
terms of their ability to promote desirable consequences, usually increased
human happiness or welfare.263 Very broadly speaking, this prescription reflected the core empiricist idea that statements have meaning only insofar as
they are connected to observable consequences in the world.264 Looking at
the impact of acts (or laws) on human welfare is necessary, according to this
view, to render normative statements meaningful.
Given these commitments, it is not surprising that utilitarians such as
Corwin felt compelled to recast rights in terms of policy and consequences.
The courts talked about rights "existing," yet their existence could not be
described or verified in terms of observable states of affairs. 265 Moreover,
rights were conceived as constraints on state action whose validity was not
tied in any tight way to the consequences they generate. Cast as such, rights
could only strike the empirically oriented pragmatist or utilitarian as a confusion and a hindrance to the proper evaluation of acts, rules, and poliSee supra text accompanying notes 195-207 (discussing Holmesian criticisms of
rights-based constitutional analysis).
262

263

See generallyJEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (defining and
defending the utilitarian evaluation of laws and policies); JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Piest ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1957) (1861) (same).
264 See MILL, supra note 263, at 44-45 (stating that good is known through what is desired); Holmes, supra note 40, at 457-58 (arguing that the object of the study of law is "the
prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts").
265 See supra text accompanying notes 196-98 (discussing Holmesians' suspicion that
substantive due process presupposes the idea of natural rights).
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cies .266 Rights-talk therefore had to be reduced to statements about the desirability of different social end states. 26 7 The statement by the Lochner
Court that the right to economic liberty prevented the New York legislature
from enacting a maximum hour law could then be understood for what it
really was: a statement of the judges' belief that the welfare or happiness of
the citizens of New York would be diminished by that law.268
Although equally suspicious of rights-talk, legitimacy critics such as
Hand disagreed with functionalists as to the problems inherent in it. 269 Indeed, in the eyes of the legitimacy critic, the functionalist critics were provincial, because the same reasons that warranted the elimination of rights
discourse also undermined reliance on any notion of utility or public
good.270 According to someone like Hand, democratic rule was the most
desirable political order, precisely because it proceeded on the assumption
that evaluative statements of any kind are irrational, unjustifiable, and
hence, the subject of interminable disagreement.
Hand's strongly skeptical defense of democracy should be understood
against the backdrop of the broader intellectual movements of his time.
These movements included a radical version of empiricism developed in the
first half of this century by logical positivists and logical empiricists such as
7
1 Rudolf Carnap,2 72 and Carl Hempel,273
and their followers in
A.J. Ayer, 227122
other disciplines, including B.F. Skinner in psychology 274 and C.L. Stevenson in ethics. 275 Although all empiricists, including both pragmatists and
266See supra text accompanying notes 192-94 (noting Holmes's antipathy to rights).
267See, e.g., Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM 100-03 (1983) ("[W]hat look like descriptions
of how the law is are really expressed wishes, desires, ideas, about how the law ought to be.");
see also supra text accompanying notes 205-07 (discussing the Holmesian view that rights
derive from policy considerations).
268See supra text accompanying note 205 (noting the claim of Corwin and others that "in
decisions such as Lochner, the courts were making fact-dependent legislative judgments as to
the beneficial or harmful effects of particular legislation").
269See supra text accompanying notes 220-23 (discussing the legitimacy branch of rightsskepticism).
270See supra text accompanying notes 220-23 (noting several arguments offered by legitimacy critics).
271 See generally ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1952) (setting

forth the logical positivist program).

272See generally RUDOLF CARNAP, The Rejection of Metaphysics, in PHILOSOPHY AND

LOGICAL SYNTAX 9 (1935) (rejecting metaphysics and ethics as meaningless).
273See generally CARL G. HEMPEL, Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance:
Problems and Changes, in ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 101 (1965) (linking meaning to conditions of verification).

274See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971) (discussing be-

haviorism).
275 See generally CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944) (setting forth

an emotivist theory of ethical statements).
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verificationists, held up inductive science as the model for genuine knowledge, the verificationists were considerably more ruthless in their application of certain epistemological standards. Indeed, at various times, they
condemned as unverifiable nonsense not only moral discourse, but aesthetics, psychology, sociology, history, mathematics, and even philosophy itself.276 In his more hyperbolic moments, Holmes sometimes expressed the
radical sentiments of the verificationist, as when, for example, he suggested
that statements about legal rights and duties could be rendered verifiableand hence would have content277and meaning-only when understood as predictions of judicial decisions.
To varying degrees, then, scholars such as Holmes, Corwin, and Hand
operated in an intellectual culture that accepted as gospel that the only route
to knowledge was verification through perception, or inference from observation, and that the possibility of meaning depended on the possibility of
empirical verification. According to this understanding of knowledge-whether in its milder, "common sense" empiricist form, or its stronger
verificationist form-discourse about rights, like discourse about beauty,
was a prime candidate for debunking. Notions of rights and duties were not
easily explained in terms of observation or experience, and the variety of
normative categories and assessments they yielded were not amenable to
reduction to simple observational propositions. Indeed, the typical response
from an empiricist to a claim about rights was: what does it mean? and how
can it be verified? According to the utilitarians and the pragmatists, norms
of conduct could be verified only if expressed in terms of propositions about
observable human states of welfare. According to the verificationist, all
evaluative propositions-even those concerning individual welfare-were
278
to be understood as subjective expressions of attitude or imperatives.
B. The Grounds of the Rights Revival

1. Conceptual Grounds: Challenging Verificationism and Utilitarianism
While empiricism in some forms may remain strong, the unyielding
programmatic empiricism of the logical positivists and the other verifica-

276See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L. REv.

1679, 1682-89

(1997) (describing the aims of logical positivists and logical empiricists to undermine areas of
discourse that were not sufficiently tied to verifiable statements).
277See Holmes, supra note 40, at 461 (stating that "rights" and "duties" are nothing more
than predictions of what courts will do).
278See, e.g., AYER, supra note 271, at 108 (arguing that ethical terms are intended both to
express feeling and stimulate action).
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27 9
tionists fell prey to powerful philosophical critique starting in the 1950s.
The use of verification conditions as criteria for meaning was demolished by
Quine28 and Wittgenstein, 281 and the view of natural science as the unique

bastion of culturally unmediated knowledge was shaken by Kuhn.282 While
some hair-shirted skeptics took these critiques as reason to demote the status
of all areas of human inquiry and discourse, many philosophers took the op-

posite approach. They were motivated, in part, by the thought that, if scientific knowledge and language about natural phenomena could not even meet

the standards that philosophy had set for them, then there was probably
something inadequate about the theorizing that led to the development of
those unrealistic standards. Consequently, more flexible views of meaning

and knowledge have developed that emphasize the importance of establishing coherence within a web of beliefs or theoretical statements. The work of
the turn to
Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, and Richard Rorty exemplifies
"coherence" theories of truth, meaning, and knowledge. 28 3
Within normative scholarship, such as ethics, political theory, and law,
theorists have likewise expressed renewed confidence in the possibility of
intelligible theories that do not reduce to states of pleasure or to statements
of preference. Some, like Rawls, have set forth coherence theories within
ethics and political philosophy. 284 But an equally common, and somewhat
279

A highly influential account of, and contribution to, this series of criticisms is provided

by RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 257-311 (1979).
280 See generally WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A
LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20 (1953) (criticizing the verificationist theory of meaning and the
analytic/synthetic distinction).
281 See generally LUDWIG WrflGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed.
1958) (criticizing efforts to reduce the phenomenon of meaning to associations with perceptions).
282 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970) (arguing that scientific revolutions are not explained simply by reference to newly
acquired, uncontroversially superior evidence, but rather by a paradigm shift in the outlook of
the scientific community).
283 See generally DONALD DAvIDSON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in
INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION (1984) [hereinafter Conceptual Scheme] (asserting that a proper understanding of the impossibility of transcending language leads to rejection of the idea of incommensurable conceptual schemes); Donald Davidson, A Coherence
Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAvIDSON 307 (Ernest LePore ed., 1986) [hereinafter Coherence
Theory] (setting forth a coherence theory of truth and knowledge); HILARY PUTNAM,
REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981) (adopting a pragmatist theory of truth and a coherence
theory of knowledge); RORTY, supra note 279 (asserting that the failure ofverificationist, representationalist, and foundationalist projects are not grounds for skepticism, but instead,
grounds for abandonment of philosophy and tolerance of alternate discourses).
284See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-51 (1971) (setting forth the "reflective
equilibrium" model of moral theorizing and essentially adopting a coherence theory ofjustifiable moral belief).
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anti-philosophical, approach offered by philosophers such as Donald Davidson,"' Ronald Dworkin,186 Sabina Lovibond, 21 7 John McDowell,' and
Hilary Putnam, 289 has been to undermine the alleged philosophical reasons
for trying to squeeze normative theorizing into the conceptual and methodological boxes that prior generations of philosophers have prescribed for
2 90

it.

The opening up of moral epistemology, in turn, has helped to fuel a revival of interest in moral theories beyond simple utilitarianism. Although it
continues to enjoy considerable popularity, utilitarianism was the subject of
severe philosophical critique in the 1950s, '60s, and '70s. Rawls forcefully
argued that utilitarianism could not really accommodate the notion of fairness, which depended on a notion of reciprocity alien to the utilitarian
framework. 291 Rawls, Dworkin, and several others argued that the idea of
equality is not captured by utilitarianism's willingness to count each person's preferences equally to those of others.292 More generally, Rawls emphasized that utilitarianism, at some deep level, cannot respect the "sepa285See generally Davidson, Coherence Theory, supra note 283 (displaying openness to
the wide range of discourses that could come within the range of truth and knowledge from a
coherentist point of view).
286See generally Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996) (defending objectivity and truth in ethics by arguing, in part, that
hard realism based on a naive correspondence theory is a straw-man).
287See generally SABINA LoviBoND, REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS (1983) (rejecting anti-realism and hard realism in ethics and adopting a Wittgensteinian/Davidsonian
view).
288See generally John McDowell, Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in
WrrTGENsTEIN: To FOLLOW A RULE 141 (Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds.,
1981) (building from late Wittgenstein to a critique of anti-realism in ethics).
289See generally PUTNAM, supra note 283 (rejecting the fact/value distinction from
within a pragmatist, coherentist viewpoint).
290 This is not to say that the metaphysical and epistemological status of moral discourse
is now a dead issue in the philosophical world. There remains a vital debate in that area. See,
e.g., WALTER SINNOTr-ARMSTRONG & MARK TIMMONS, MORAL KNOWLEDGE?:

NEW

READINGS IN MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY (1996) (collecting contemporary articles that display
diverse points of view in metaethics). Important scholars continue to maintain the position
that moral discourse is not entitled to full status as a domain of potentially truth-bearing assertions.

See, e.g., ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICEs,

APT FEELINGS:

A THEORY OF

NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990) (discussing moral discourse as the domain in which persons
bring one another into normative practices through communicative interchange, but not the
domain in which speakers represent facts to one another). Notably, however, even those who
remain skeptical of the possibility of genuine truth and knowledge in ethics do not generally
purport to undermine the possibility of legitimate synthesis in moral discourse. See id. at 272
(suggesting that judgments about rights may involve a particular sort of moral sentiment subject to particular sorts of discourse).
291See RAWLS, supra note 284, at 14.
292DWORKIN, supranote 217, at 232-38 (noting that utilitarianism asks officials to satisfy
people's personal and external preferences, which may conflict).
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rateness of persons" because it treats a diminution in the well-being of one
person as offset by an increase in the well-being of another. 293 Bernard
Williams also argued forcefully that utilitarianism's strong conception of
negative responsibility renders it profoundly counterintuitive and presents
insoluble problems in explaining how morality is integrated into what individuals find important and worthwhile in their lives. 294 Finally, utilitarianism was the subject of more serious criticism by those who questioned what
was sometimes deemed
the most plausible version of the view: namely,
295
rule-utilitarianism.
The rethinking of epistemology and the critique of utilitarianism has
helped spur a proliferation of moral theories. Some, of course, remain wedded to skepticism, utilitarianism, or other forms of naturalism. 291 Others,
however, are openly deontological and Kantian.297 As a result of Rawls's
work, a broad social contract tradition has re-emerged, 298 and from quite a
different direction, feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Annette
Baier have constructed compassion-based accounts of ethics. 29 9 Through
the work of Philippa Foot, Alasdair Maclntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and "republican" historians and philosophers, even the virtues have come to enjoy a
place in contemporary moral philosophy. 0 0 Perhaps most interesting for
...
Id. at 26-27, 286-89 (arguing that utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction
between persons).
294 See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, UTIrTARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 93-118 (1973) (arguing that utilitarianism makes integrity as a value unintelligible).
295See, e.g., DAvID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 119-60 (1965)
(criticizing rule-utilitarianism). See generally UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen
& Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (providing criticisms of a variety of forms of utilitarianism).
296 See, e.g., GIBBARD, supra note 290 (constructing a naturalistic account of moral
norms); ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1995) (defending
utilitarianism and showing how it can be applied effectively over a wide range of public policies); GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY (1977) (presenting arguments for relativistic and naturalistic approaches to morality).
297See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978) (offering a contemporary
Kantian view that bases morality in reason).
298See DAvID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986) (discussing the social contract theory of morality, drawing upon contemporary game theory and decision theory);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (developing Lockean social contract theory in a libertarian direction); RAWLS, supranote 284.
299 See ANNETTE C. BAiER, MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS (1994) (emphasizing trust, compassion, and relationships in ethics); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982) (describing the role of caring and empathic bonds in female moral psychological development).
300 See PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1978) (finding a place for virtue concepts within contemporary analytic moral
philosophy); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981) (advancing a neo-Aristotelean
theory of morality, emphasizing the role of virtues); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY
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our purposes, numerous philosophers, including Thomas Nagel, Samuel
Scheffler, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, have used common sense morality as
an important repository of moral convictions, which reason and language
can shape into consistent and justifiable sets of moral beliefs. 0 1
2. Political Grounds: Progressive Rights
The intellectual climate since the 1960s and '70s has thus been one in
which rights discourse is no longer regarded as intellectually irresponsible,
as a mask for statements of preference or policy, or as a deviant departure
from the true path of utilitarian thinking. Of course, this change in rarified
academic circles was hardly the sole, or even the main, cause of the renewed
interest in non-instrumental moral concepts. Rather, it was a condition that
permitted academics to conceive of a set of important political and social
developments in certain ways. The civil rights movement, set against the
background of the war against fascism, created an environment in which
moral convictions about equality and fairness had depth and power that
utilitarianism and skepticism seemed unable to accommodate. 0 2 Equally
important, these broader changes provided evidence to rebut the argument
that rights necessarily function only to reify the status quo. Indeed, if the
Lochner Court had shown that rights-reasoning could be used to support a
rigid libertarian regime, then the Warren Court had shown that rights also
could function as a basis for progressive social change. Likewise, the
rights-theorists who sought to make sense of the Warren Court provided accounts of rights that distinguished them from policy considerations and advocated their use to constrain policy decisions, yet did so in part to protect
the interests of historically disenfranchised and subjugated members of society.30 3 Both the Court and a wide range of theorists concluded that there
OF GOODNESS (1986) (explaining the role of virtues in the good life).
301 See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (integrating subjective and
objective aspects of ordinary moral thought); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 133-51 (rev. ed. 1994) (reconstructing morality by recognizing the
sphere in which agent-centered concerns play a significant role); JUDrTH JARvIS THOMSON,

THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990) (constructing rights theory in part by using powerful moral
intuitions). These thinkers are not necessarily committed to reconstructing ordinary morality;
however, ordinary moral convictions are important to their methodology.
302See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:

THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL

DISCOuRSE 4-7 (1991) (linking the ascendance of rights discourse with both the rejection of
fascism and the rise of the civil rights movement).
303See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 217, at 206-39 (discussing civil disobedience and reverse discrimination); Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protectingthe Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (advocating the position that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to confer rights to
financial assistance from the state).
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were certain aspects of a progressive conception of democracy that were
best (if not exclusively) captured and protected by a notion of rights as a
special kind of constraint on political action.3 a The fact that the Lochner
Court advanced an inegalitarian political theory through the notion of rights
as constraints did not demonstrate the inherent regressiveness of rights, but
rather, the need for care and caution in articulating any theory as to the
rights we have.3 °5
C. Reassessing the Groundsfor Duty-Skepticism
Rights-reasoning in constitutional law withered in the middle of this
century in part because of the regressive use to which rights had been put, in
part because of the barren intellectual soil for normative thinking, and in
part because social and political exigencies tended to place questions of
macroeconomic policy at the forefront of constitutional law. As the social
and political landscape changed, the Warren Court demonstrated new uses
for rights-reasoning, and as the intellectual soil became increasingly fertile,
rights-reasoning once again began to flourish in constitutional law and
scholarship. Yet, despite these changes, and notwithstanding the valuable
contributions of corrective justice theory, mainstream tort theory remains
implacably opposed to the acceptance of substantive, non-instrumental,
normative theorizing in thinking about the standards of conduct that tort law
articulates.
We believe that a change in tort theory is overdue. We say this not
merely as a matter of keeping up with the Dworkins. The claim that global
duty-skepticism is the only intellectually respectable position in tort law is
as unpersuasive as the claim that rights-skepticism is the only respectable
position in constitutional law. The contentions with regard to duty, as with
those in regard to rights, are that certain kinds of concepts are incoherent or
indeterminate pseudo-concepts that merely provide cover for conclusions
reached on the basis of other considerations and that those concepts are inherently tools of regressive regimes. Such contentions are no less dogmatic,
and no more defensible, coming from Prosser than from Corwin.

304 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 217, at 133 (discussing how the moral rights of individuals are protected against the majority); ELY, supra note 234, at 73-104 (discussing the
Court's role in policing the process of representation).
305 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 917-19 (describing and criticizing accounts of constitutional law that accept common law distributions of rights and liberties as neutral baselines).
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Prosser's Conceptual Argument

Prosser, as we have seen, obtained a lot of mileage from his quip that
judicial talk of duty is merely conceptual shorthand for statements regarding
whether it would be advantageous to impose liability for a class of negligent
conduct. 30 6 Taken as obvious since that time, we can now see that this sentiment is little more than an expression of a set of reductive utilitarian and
empiricist assumptions. Indeed, all of Prosser's arguments against a substantive notion of duty can be understood as incantations of a philosophical
bias against the use of certain kinds of moral concepts in the law. This intellectual hostility to the concept of duty is most explicit in Prosser's rejec30 7
but the same philosophical astion of duty as a "meaningless" concept,
sumptions are apparent in the "indeterminacy," "redundancy," and
30 8
"pointlessness" arguments described above.
Prosser argued that the notion of duty had to be incoherent because judicial formulations of duty were prohibitively vague or indeterminate. At
first blush, this argument is impressive, for it is true that different judges
asking the duty question may (and do) reach different answers using a nonreductive conception of duty. But, this is true of virtually every substantial
concept embedded in the law, and as we have seen, it is certainly true of the
30 9
For
instrumentalist inquiry that Prosser substituted for duty analysis.
concept
the
with
associated
indeterminacy
the
to
stick,
argument
Prosser's
of duty must be particularly objectionable for some reason. Prosser, however, never offered such a reason. Indeed, his analysis does not so much
support the rejection of duty as it reflects a predisposition for thinking that
moral concepts are not really fit for reasoned discourse. In short, Prosser's
claim is not really an argument, but rather a bias, stemming from a set of
philosophical presuppositions that are no longer entitled to the status of presumptive conceptual truths.
Prosser's more subtle conceptual argument against a substantive moral
31
from redundancy. 0
conception of duty was his invocation of the argument
The claim of this argument is that duty contains no genuine content of its
own, because prominent general formulations of the concept, such as Brett's
306 See supra text accompanying notes 112, 138-51 (describing the judicial reception of

Prosserian statements regarding duty).
307 See supra text accompanying note 96 (describing Prosser's claim that duty is meaningless).
308 See supratext accompanying notes 97-100.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 32-38 (criticizing the Holmes-Prosser model of
problems).
negligence as inept at providing a framework for analyzing negligenceargument
that any deter310 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 (stating Prosser's
minate concept of duty is redundant with the substantive standard of reasonableness).
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in Heaven v. Pender,311 cast it in terms that reiterate the "reasonable person"
formula for determining breach.3 12 In fact, the conclusion that duty collapses into the notion of reasonableness is not, as Prosser seemed to suggest,
a matter of conceptual necessity, but instead, is driven by the substantive assumption that the duty enforced through negligence law consists of the generic Holmesian duty to act reasonably. Once one assumes, with Holmes,
Prosser, Andrews, and the California Supreme Court, that negligence law
imposes on each person a duty of reasonable care owed "to the world," then,
of course, there is nothing for a plaintiff to prove under the heading of
duty.313 The core of the redundancy argument is thus not a rejection of duty,
but a substantive assumption about the conceptual structure of duty in negligence. Pursuant to this view, the duty of due care is a general, nonrelational duty to the world to act in ways that do not unreasonably risk
harm.314

With hindsight, one can see why Prosser was attracted to the nonrelational conception of duty and hence to the redundancy argument. The
moral assessment of action, for the utilitarian, is a matter of discerning how
one's actions will affect everyone in the world who may be affected by
them. Favorable actions are ones that tend to increase human welfare; unfavorable actions are ones that tend to increase human pain, suffering, or injury above and beyond their contribution to welfare. 31 5 Perhaps a theorist
with Prosser's normative commitments could ask the question: did this sort
of conduct risk injury to this plaintiff?. But, the answer to that question
would not have a special saliency with regard to the normative assessment
of the conduct. That assessment requires looking at whether one unreasonably risked injury, all things considered.
All this makes sense as far as it goes, but it does not actually go very
far. The problem for Prosser is that, on a wide variety of theories, including
Q.B.D. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
Preliminarily, we note that this objection unjustifiably presumes that formulations such

31 11
312

as Brett's provide the best available account of duty, and more generally, that the measure of a
concept is its amenability to generic formulation. In fact, there is no obvious reason to privilege either Brett's formulation or concepts that happen to be readily available in abstract
terms. Notice that Cardozo in MacPhersontook great care in invoking Brett's formula, noting
that "Like most attempts at comprehensive definition, it may involve errors of inclusion and
exclusion." MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
313 This point is made most clearly by Judge Andrews in his Palsgrafdissent. See Palsgrafv. Long Island RIR., 162 N.E. 99, 102 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Due care is
a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A,
B, or C alone.").
314 See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
315 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 263, at 10 (noting that actions are right as they tend to produce happiness and wrong as they tend to produce unhappiness).
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Kantian, virtue-based, religious, libertarian, social contract and feminist
theories, it makes sense to talk about duties of care running to particular persons. 316 Duty language abounds in ordinary moral discourse and practice:
parents have duties to care for their children; friends have duties to watch
out for one another; professionals have circumscribed and well-defined duties to their patients or clients; strangers have at least a base set of negative
duties toward one another. Although it is perhaps embarrassingly obvious
to say these things, it is necessary to do so, because in the spirit of empiricist
rigor, Holmes, Prosser, and their followers have maintained that lawyers
cannot employ the concept of duty, notwithstanding the fact that philosophical theory and common sense had previously found it quite tenable.
Prosser's redundancy argument fails precisely because it assumes, without
justification, that it is incoherent to speak of duties running to particular persons or categories of persons.
The final and most overtly normative version of the conceptual argument suggests that duty is pointless (unless it is code for a floodgates argument), because the functions of deterrence and compensation are already
adequately secured by a system that imposes liability on the basis of unreasonable conduct proximately causing injury.3 17 This argument also rests on
a dogma about tort law, one which insists that conceptual categories must be
incoherent unless they are tied to specific utilitarian goals, such as deterrence, compensation or administrative ease. Prosser was not able to recognize the possibility of a principle that links the justification for imposing a
duty to compensate a plaintiff with the question of whether the defendant
had actually breached a duty to the plaintiff. This principle treats liabilityimposition as having a normative structure and significance apart from its
instrumental value. While courts (and more recently, non-instrumental
scholars of torts) give central prominence to this normative aspect of the
law, 318 Prosser clearly had no room for it.
For all of these reasons, Prosser's argument that duty is conceptually incoherent boils down to the uncritical acceptance of the reductionist brands
of empiricism and utilitarianism current in the legal academy of his day.
316 See supra notes 296-301 (describing utilitarianism and discussing contemporary Kantian views).
317 See supra text accompanying notes 156-62 (stating that most courts adhere to rules in
nonfeasance, duty-to-rescue, emotional harm, and/or economic harm cases without fully considering Prosserian policy factors).
31S See Coleman, supra note 21, at 66-67 (discussing the notion of correlativity essential
to corrective justice theory); Zipursky, supra note 27, at 59-70, 88-93 (describing the requirement that a defendant's conduct be wrong in relation to plaintiff as central to tort law); see
also WEINRIB, supra note 23, at 114-44 (stating that correlativity is essential to the normative
structure of private law).
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With widespread recognition within the philosophical world and other parts
of the legal academy that Prosser's purportedly "hard-headed" assumptions
about moral concepts can no longer be accepted as axioms, tort law ought to
be released from the grip of Prosser's meaninglessness, indeterminacy, redundancy, and pointlessness arguments. Whatever else can be said on its
behalf, the Holmes-Prosser model of negligence, and its non-relational conception of duty, can no longer claim the status of conceptual truth.
2. Prosser's Political Argument
Prosser's political argument against the concept of duty rests on the
claim that the concept was necessarily the servant of a politically and socially regressive regime of undercompensation. 31 9 This is a particularly important point in connection with privity and Winterbottom, and we shall
have more to say about it in connection with MacPherson,below. For present purposes, it is important to see how weak the political argument is as an
argument against use of the concept of duty. It hardly follows from the fact
that Winterbottom and other nineteenth-century decisions relied on a concept of duty to deny liability, that the concept of duty is inherently preservative of the economic or political status quo. Rather, it is the conjunction of a
requirement of duty with further premises, such as the premise that there is
no duty from manufacturers to product users, that preserved the status quo.
The Prosserian duty-skeptic has trouble recognizing this point, because he
has trouble grasping the possibility of retaining the concept of duty while
simultaneously rejecting its extant applications. This is because he does not
credit the concept of duty with having any genuine content apart from its
particular applications. And this, again, is another instance of his narrowminded assumption that certain moral concepts lack content, and cannot
really serve as loci of rational argumentation.
To be sure, one of the strengths of the Prosserian approach to torts, evidenced in the decisions of the California Supreme Court in the 1960s and
'70s, is the willingness of judges who use this approach to engage in pragmatic adjustment of the law to new historical conditions and new questions. 320 But, as decades of constitutional decisions demonstrate, and as we
will see in MacPherson itself, instrumentalists do not have a monopoly on
pragmatic or critical reflection on the law.

319

See supra text accompanying notes 102-06 (describing the political argument for duty-

skepticism).
320See supra text accompanying notes 152-55 (describing the California Supreme Court's
adoption of the Holmes-Prosser model in Rowland v. Christian).
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IV. THE PLACE OF DUTY IN NEGLIGENCE LAW

Prosser's arguments against duty fail to establish the incoherence of
moral and relational conceptions of duty. Indeed, they provide, at most, reasons why a certain kind of utilitarian should not be attracted to those conceptions. The hostility towards duty in modem torts scholarship can now be
seen for what it is: an undefended commitment to empiricist and utilitarian
philosophies, masquerading as a conceptually necessary axiom. By demonstrating this much, we hope to have created a willingness on the part of the
reader to entertain the possibility of a non-reductive conception of duty.
Our remaining task is to start to make the positive case for retention of such
a concept as part of the tort of negligence. This we propose to accomplish
by two means. First, we will show that, to the extent MacPherson stands as
a progressive landmark, it is a testament not to the value of the HolmesProsser conception of negligence and its non-relational duty of care, but to a
relational conception of duty. Second, we will suggest ways in which relational duty can and ought to play a constructive role in negligence analysis.
A. The MoralofMacPhersonRevisited
1. MacPhersonand the Relational Conception of Duty
Let us retum to Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson. Recall that Prosser
and his intellectual heirs invoked that opinion as a standard bearer for the
duty-skeptical, policy-driven Holmes-Prosser model of negligence. Their
interpretation of MacPherson starts at a major disadvantage; for, as Posner
admits, nowhere in Cardozo's opinion does one find the language of universal duty, reasonableness, and policymaking.32 1 Instead, the opinion speaks
in terms of a substantive conception of duty quite similar to the notion of
relational duty that Holmes and Prosser found to be empty and misleading.
Thus, the opinion treats the duty question as the issue of the case: "the
a duty of due care
question to be determined is whether the defendant owed
322
purchaser."
immediate
the
but
anyone
and vigilance to
Further textual evidence against the Prosserian reconstruction is found
in the opinion's repeated retum to the issue of whether the defendant was
obligated to conduct itselfin a certain way. According to Prosser's account,
the issue in the case was the policy question as to whether negligent product
manufacturers should be required to compensate non-purchasers injured by
321 See POSNER, supra note 136, at 109 (noting that although it was Cardozo's "most im-

portant opinion," it was "modest ...in pretending to be restating rather than changing the
law" and "reticent... about the policy considerations relevant to the change it made").
322MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
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their products. For Cardozo, however, the resolution of that question turned
on the duty issue; the issue itself had meaning for him apart from the question of liability. Moreover, its meaning did not concern whether a manufacturer does, or should, have a duty to compensate such a plaintiff. The
questions, according to the court, were whether Buick had a "duty of vigiit bore an "obligation to inspect," 324 how great was the
lance," 323 whether325
"need of caution," and how "strict[ ],,326 was the duty to which Buick had
to conform its conduct. In its grandest passage, quoted earlier, Cardozo's
opinion announces that he and his brethren have "put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence
may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the
source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the
law.' 327 It would be hard to find a more emphatic announcement stating
that manufacturers owe a duty to conduct themselves so as to attend to the
safety of product users.
If we step back from the text of the opinion, we find another reason to
conclude that MacPherson is not rightly understood as embracing the
Holmes-Prosser model of negligence. MacPherson is, of course, one of
Cardozo's landmark tort opinions, and in an even more famous opinionPalsgraf-Cardozo explicitly rejected a universal conception of duty in
negligence law.328 The duty-skeptical interpretation of MacPherson thus
suffers from a second interpretive problem; it is altogether inconsistent with
Cardozo's other leading negligence decisions. Adhering to an antiHolmesian view, Palsgraf insists that negligence is a "relation[al]"
concept. 329 This was Cardozo's stated reason for denying liability,
'23 Id. at 1055.
324 id.

325 Id.
326 Id. ("Both by its relation to the work and by the nature of its business, [Buick] is

charged with a stricterduty." (emphasis added)).
327

Id. at 1053.

Palsgrafv. Long Island RR., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("What the plaintiff must
show is 'a wrong' to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right."); see also WEINRIB, supra note
23, at 159-64 (discussing how Palsgrafrejects the universalist conception of duty in negligence law); Zipursky, supra note 27, at 7-15 (analyzing Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion as revealing a relational conception of duty).
329 See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 101 ("Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation.").
Proponents of the standard view of MacPherson thus tend to find Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion
perplexing. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 45, at 126-27. Some seem content to surmise that, in
the years between MacPherson and Palsgraf,Cardozo came to recognize that MacPherson
had opened the door to potentially massive new levels of negligence liability, and that he employed the language of relational duty in Palsgrafas a belated attempt to limit that liability.
See id. Because these scholars have misread MacPherson,they are forced to posit a deep tension between Cardozo's two most famous tort opinions, and to resolve that tension by treating
Palsgrafas a piece of ad hoc policymaking which uses the language of relational duty as a
328
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notwithstanding the court's assumption that the railroad had caused Mrs.
Palsgraf harm by its unreasonable conduct toward the package-carrying passenger. Most famously in Palsgraf but consistently throughout his negligence jurisprudence, Cardozo insisted that the duty to act reasonably is not a
duty owed to the world at large, but a duty owed to the plaintiff in particular.330 This view is evident in Cardozo's language throughout MacPherson
itself. It is also the reason that he thought the key question in that case was
whether Buick owed a duty to MacPherson.
Third, and most importantly, our reading of MacPherson makes sense
of Cardozo's legal argument in a way that Prosserian readings cannot. Cardozo derived the manufacturer's duty to the consumer almost entirely from
case law, particularly the line of cases dealing with "inherently dangerous"
products. 331 To the Prosserian, who regards the duty issue as raising a policy question, this focus on precedent poses something of a mystery. Prosser
himself, as we have seen, assumed that Cardozo's doctrinal analysis was
devoted entirely to proving the negative proposition that there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between inherently-dangerous and notinherently-dangerous products. Cardozo's rejection of this distinction,
Prosser further reasoned, indicated that Cardozo believed that manufacturers
owe duties of care to anyone who might be injured by their products, and
hence evidenced his embrace of Holmes's duty to the world.332 In fact,
Cardozo's treatment of doctrine turns out to be far more subtle than Prosser
took it to be. This discovery should hardly come as a surprise. If Prosser's
reading were correct, it would be difficult to understand why MacPhersonis
regarded as an exemplar ofjudicial craft, rather than as a run-of-the-mill exercise in Realist law-skepticism.33 3
When Cardozo examined the precedents concerning inherently dangerous products, he saw that he could not limit the duty of care to manufactur-

rhetorical smokescreen. See Zipursky, supra note 27, at 12 (stressing that Cardozo should not
be viewed "as having a proximate cause view of the case"). Our analysis of MacPherson, by
contrast, permits a unified understanding of the two opinions.
330 See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (holding that an
accountant's liability to third-party investors for a negligent audit of a client cannot rest on the
duty of care owed to the client; rather it requires an independent duty owed to the investors);
Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that a defendant who
negligently imperils a third party owes a duty of care to a rescuer only because "[tihe wrong
that imperils life is a wrong [not only] to the imperilled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer").
331 See supranote 64 and accompanying text.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 126-28 (discussing Prosser's reading of MacPherson).

333 See DWORKIN, supra note 217, at 111-15 (holding out MacPherson as an exemplar of
legal analysis); LEVI, supranote 64, at 14-18 (same).
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ers of a special class of products whose purpose or normal function was to
injure and destroy. Even if one could articulate an adequate description of
that category, the courts clearly had not relied on any such notion. Indeed,
they had already extended the "inherently dangerous" label to coffee urns
and scaffolding. 334 Cardozo was thus compelled to reject any doctrinal distinction based solely on the purpose or function of the product in question.
But, in rejecting the idea that the law of duty tracks the nature of the product, he did not thereby simply abandon or ignore these precedents (as
Prosser's reading suggests). Rather, Cardozo offered an alternative interpretation of the cases, one that fit better and provided a more suitable justification for them.
In Cardozo's view, the "thing of danger" cases were not a haphazard
collection. Instead, they embodied the principle that a duty of care running
from a manufacturer to a non-privy will attach whenever (1) the nature of
the product alerts the manufacturer that, if it is negligently made and not
checked, it is likely to endanger physical safety; (2) the product, if it is negligently made and not checked, is likely to endanger the physical safety of
users not in privity with the manufacturer; and (3) the product will not be
checked for safety by anyone prior to its use by persons not in privity with
the manufacturer. Thus, according to Cardozo's reading of precedent, the
intrinsic dangerousness of a product was relevant to the duty inquiry insofar
as it tended to establish that the manufacturer would, or should, know that
the product posed a danger of physical harm to persons with whom the
manufacturer was not in privity. But, the dangerousness of a product was
not a necessary condition for the existence of such a duty between the
manufacturer and users not in privity with the manufacturer.
Within the inherently dangerous product cases, Cardozo found the
principle that, where the nature of the product provides notice that due care
in manufacture is necessary to avoid probable physical harm to a class of
persons who cannot be expected to inspect the product, a duty of care runs
to that class of persons, regardless of privity. As such, his reading of the
cases does not adopt Holmes's notion of the duty to the world. The obligation to take care described by Cardozo is not grounded in a general or generic duty to the public. Rather, it derives from a set of obligations, owed
by certain classes of defendants to certain classes of plaintiffs, that Cardozo
found implicit in the common law of torts, including the "thing of danger"
precedents.
334 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916) (referring to
Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 482 (1909), where the court held a manufacturer liable
for injuries resulting from an "explosion of a battery of steam-driven coffee urns" because the
appliance was one which was "liable to become dangerous in the course of ordinary usage").
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For Cardozo, then, the issue in MacPherson was exactly the issue he
posited: whether manufacturer attentiveness to possible dangers to product
users not in privity with it is conduct that it is obligated to undertake for
those users. From a modem perspective, the question may seem too trivial
to merit asking, but in Cardozo's day, it was not quite so easy. It is now part
of our ordinary social and moral understanding that businesses which manufacture and market products to consumers have certain responsibilities to
those consumers, and that those consumers have certain legitimate expectations of manufacturers. These sorts of expectations are built by the law itself in some measure. But, these expectations are not wholly products of the
law; the law reflects a developing understanding of that normative relationship. 335 As Cardozo himself recognized in his jurisprudential writings, judicial announcements of rights and duties often serve the role of crystallizing
33 6
norms that already have currency on certain shared social understandings.
In so doing, courts express, justify, and make enforceable these norms.
MacPherson was a groundbreaking case because it crystallized the
modem understanding of the responsibility of manufacturers to those who
use their products. The moral idea, embedded in negligence law, that actors
owe due care to others, applied in light of the evolving social understandings of the role of the manufacturer, enabled Cardozo to identify a legal duty
of due care running from manufacturers to certain product users. Yet, this
extension of the concept of duty was inchoate in the public culture of the
day, and it conflicted with both the privity rule of Winterbottom and the
more general notion, also extant at this time, that manufacturers owed duties
only to their privies.
Cardozo brought this tension to a head, and resolved it by making explicit and public a norm requiring manufacturers to be vigilant of the physical safety of product users, regardless of privity. He thus wrote: "We have
put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of the contract and
nothing else." 337 The expression of this norm was the recognition of a duty.

Moreover, in deciding to permit liability to turn on the breach of such a
duty, Cardozo transformed a social and moral norm into an enforceable le335See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1334-35 (discussing how the law often incorporates
social norms and societal expectations); Zipursky, supra note 27, at 92 (discussing how the
law is based upon "moral, political, and social considerations" and actively reinforces and encourages treatment of others in line with these moral and social norms).
336See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1334-42 (discussing how laws often reinforce
social norms); see also CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 104 (1987)
("The legal claim for sexual harassment made the events of sexual harassment illegitimate
socially as well as legally for the fast time.").
337MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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gal norm. This, it appears, is what Cardozo had in mind when he wrote:
of the obligation where it ought to be. We have
"We have put the source 338
put its source in the law."
2. MacPherson,Foreseeability, and the Universality of Duty
In previous Sections, we provided a historical account demonstrating
how modem tort scholars have come to treat duty-skepticism as obvious or
inevitable. 339 This account should itself help to explain the reason that
MacPherson is persistently misread as a Holmesian opinion: it is all but
unthinkable to modem tort scholars that a universally applauded, "progressive" decision by a great judge such as Cardozo could have derived from
any other approach. By employing the constitutional law analogy to explain
34
why the duty-skepticism position is neither obvious nor irresistible, 0 we
next sought to establish the viability, in principle, of a non-Holmesian, relational conception of duty and, by implication, a non-Holmesian reading of
MacPherson. Finally, in the preceding sub-Section, we marshalled substantial evidence to show that MacPherson and other leading Cardozo opinions
are, in fact, best read as endorsing a relational conception of duty, and cannot be understood as emblematic of Holmesian duty-skepticism. Now, to
complete the case for our reading we must address two common confusions
that MacPherson seems to have engendered, one concerning the place of
foreseeability in duty analysis, and the other concerning what we will call
the universalityof duty.
a. ForeseeabilityandDuty
MacPhersonis sometimes thought to have held that the duty element of
Mr. MacPherson's case was satisfied once the court found his injuries were
foreseeable to the defendant. More generally, this interpretation proceeds,
Cardozo thought that duty is based on reasonable foreseeability. Thus, as
in Palsgraf,if Cardozo concluded that the plaintiff's injury was unforeseeable, then he found no duty. By contrast, if he concluded that the injury was
foreseeable, as in MacPherson,then he found a duty.
It is important to see that this interpretation of MacPherson,and of Cardozo's negligence jurisprudence generally, is just another way of asserting
that Cardozo endorsed the Holmes-Prosser approach. According to this
"foreseeability account," the negligence cause of action still requires only
338id.
339See supra Part I.B

and notes 75-124 (discussing academic analysis of the duty element

of negligence).
340 See supra Part III and notes 262-320 (reconsidering duty-skepticism).
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that the defendant cause injury by acting unreasonably (toward anybody).
Foreseeability is then employed in place of a multi-factor balancing test as
the criterion for determining whether to grant the defendant a policy-based
immunity from liability. The employment of foreseeability to set the limit
on liability may be justified either by instrumental concerns about unmanageable levels of litigation or excessive damages, or by concerns about the
fairness of imposing liability for remote harms. But, either way, duty is
conceived of non-relationally, with foreseeability serving as an externally
driven cap on liability for negligence.
As an account of MacPherson,the foreseeability variant on the HolmesProsser model fails on several grounds. First, Cardozo's opinion does not
limit liability to foreseeable harms. Indeed, it explicitly rejects the notion
that duty turns on mere foreseeability, emphasizing instead that the imposition of a duty requires a much higher degree of awareness of potential
harm. 34 1 More broadly, as our previous discussion of the case makes clear,
the defendant's awareness of potential harm to the plaintiff was but one aspect of the court's analysis and holding. Cardozo further required that the
defendant have reason to know its product would be dangerous if negligently made (and that it would not be inspected prior to use). Whether a
manufacturer has a duty to a consumer under MacPherson will therefore
hinge in part on product-type, and will only apply to those products that are
known to be dangerous if negligently made, even if the plaintiff's productrelated injury was within the range of reasonable foresight. Perhaps most
if
strikingly, the duty articulated by Cardozo applies only when the product,342
negligently made, is "reasonablycertain to place life and limb in peril.,
The foreseeability account, by contrast, suggests that all foreseeable harm to
a plaintiff should be actionable, and that a plaintiff should not be limited to
claims for injuries to life and limb, let alone "reasonably certain" instances
of such injury.
The foreseeability account we have described also fails because it blurs
the distinction between treating the foreseeability of a plaintiffs injury as a
necessary condition for the existence of a duty and treating it as a sufficient
condition. While Palsgrafdoes treat reasonable foreseeability as a necessary condition, 343 neither Palsgrafnor MacPherson treats reasonable fore341See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053.

If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of
contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.... There must be knowledge of a danger,not merely possible, but probable.
Id. (emphasis added).
342 Id. (emphasis added).
343See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that a plaintiff
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seeability as a sufficient condition. 3 " If the foreseeability account is intended to preserve the idea that duty is non-relational, then the foreseeability
account must maintain that breach, causation, and injury are, in some sense,
enough for a negligence action, and that the addition of a foreseeability test
for duty is merely a policy-driven check on liability. This, however, would
require treating foreseeability345as a sufficient condition for duty, which it
plainly is not in MacPherson.
As indicated above, the foreseeability account also claims to wield the
support of Palsgraf. In fact, however, it entirely misses the point of that
case. To be sure, reasonable foreseeability does figure prominently in Palsgraf,but not as a part of a non-relational account of duty. On the contrary,
as many scholars have grudgingly appreciated, and as one of us has recently
can only be understood as indemonstrated, Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion
346
voking a relational conception of duty.
Palsgraf,in fact, contained two duty issues: one obvious and one subtle. The obvious issue was whether the railroad owed a duty of care to its
"might claim to be protected against unintentional invasion [of her bodily security] by conduct
involving in the thought of reasonable men an unreasonable hazard that such invasion would
ensue. These, from the point of view of the law, were the bounds of her immunity").
344 Palsgrafdenies a right of action to the plaintiff, of course, and contains no dicta stating that reasonable foreseeability suffices for liability. See id. The insufficiency of foreseeability in MacPhersonis discussed supra at notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
345 Those who believe that MacPhersontreats foreseeability as a sufficient condition for
duty may claim support in the following passage: "If he is negligent, where danger is to be
foreseen, a liability will follow." MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. This statement, however,
appears only after Cardozo has taken great care to describe the various limitations on the
manufacturer's duty of care that we have just discussed. In fact, it is part of an argument for
setting further limits on the duty of care owed by component part manufacturers:
[I]t is possible that even knowledge of the danger and of the use will not always be
enough.... We are dealing now with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers. If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow. We
are not required at this time to say that it is legitimate to go back of the manufacturer
of the finished product and hold the manufacturers of the component parts. To make
their negligence a cause of imminent danger, an independent cause must often intervene; the manufacturer of the finished product must also fail in his duty of inspection. It may be that, in those circumstances, the negligence of the earlier members of
the series is too remote to constitute, as to the ultimate user, an actionable wrong.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Given this context, it seems clear that the word "he"
in the sentence in question is a shorthand reference to the type of manufacturer on which Cardozo has already placed a duty of care, that is, the manufacturer that knows, or should know,
that its product poses a serious threat of physical harm to ultimate users and will not be inspected prior to use.
346 See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 100 ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation."); Zipursky, supra note 27, at 7-15 (interpreting Palsgraf
to assert that foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is required in order to make a breach of a
duty negligent relative to that plaintiff).
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customer, Mrs. Palsgraf. Clearly, the railroad did owe a duty of care to its
customer, and there was no need for any discussion of reasonable foreseeability in order to establish this conclusion. Instead, Cardozo invoked foreseeability to deal with the question of breach as a standard for setting the
outer boundary on the level of precaution that the railroad was obligated to
take.347 If it were the case, he reasoned, that the only harm Mrs. Palsgraf
suffered was unforeseeable to the conductors who pushed the packagecarrying passenger, then the court would have to conclude, as a matter of
law, that any duty owed by the railroad to Mrs. Palsgraf was not breached.
And, that is precisely what Cardozo did conclude. But, this conclusion, in
turn, gave rise to the subtle duty question in the case: namely, the question
of why it should matter that the railroad did not breach its duty to Mrs. Palsgraf, given that the railroad was already presumed to have breached the duty
of care it owed to the other passenger. As both Cardozo and Andrews fully
recognized, this question posed quite starkly the issue of whether duty
should be viewed relationally or non-relationally; that is, whether Mrs. Palsgraf should be permitted to borrow the railroad's negligence toward another,
differently-situated passenger to satisfy the missing breach element of her
own cause of action. As we have seen, Cardozo endorsed the relational account, while Andrews opted for the non-relational view. Again, reasonable
foreseeability had no bearing on Cardozo's resolution of this duty issue.
At bottom, the foreseeability account fundamentally misconceives the
role that foreseeability plays in MacPherson. In MacPherson,foreseeability
is not intended as a policy-driven or fairness-based limitation on the harms
for which a wrongdoer may be held liable. To read the opinion this way is
to convert what Cardozo regarded as a duty question concerning conduct
and obligation into a proximate cause question concerning the extent of liability. For Cardozo, the foreseeability of harm to a class of persons goes to
the question of whether certain conduct is owed to those persons, not to
whether certain liabilities are appropriately borne by defendants. Thus,
when discussing why the privity rule did not apply to actions based on mislabeled poisons, Cardozo wrote: "A poison, falsely labeled, is likely to injure any one who gets it. Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a
duty to avoid the injury.' 348 The manufacturer's awareness that a certain
class of persons will be endangered if it sends out a mislabeled poison-the
high likelihood of this danger to non-privies-is a ground for saying that the
defendant is obligated to those persons to take due care to label the poison
147See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 100 (reasoning that, to ask defendants to take measures

against unforeseeable harms is to demand of them "extravagant" care, rather than ordinary,
reasonable care).
348 MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (emphasis added).
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correctly. Foreseeability, in other words, is conceived in MacPherson as
part of a relational conception of duty, rather than an external check on liability.
b. UniversalityandDuty
The other major objection to our reading, one closely related to the
foreseeability argument just raised, concerns the scope of duty as it is conceived in MacPherson. This objection is rooted in an inference that many
have been tempted to draw from MacPherson's rejection of the notion that
duty depends on contract. If one extends beyond the literal terms of this
negative holding, and reads MacPhersonto say that the existence of a duty
does not depend on contract or status, then we seem to have a basis for
treating it as a case that declares that the duty of due care is universalHolmes's duty to all the world.
This objection rests upon an understandable, but serious, confusion in
the logic of duty. Suppose we assume, for purposes of argument, that nineteenth-century negligence law stated that each person's duties of due care
ran only to a limited set of persons with respect to whom he or she stood in
a pre-established, socially-recognized relationship: doctor to patient, innkeeper to guest, manufacturer to customer-in-privity, carrier to passenger,
and so on. 349 This view has two components. One component is the idea
that duties run to persons or classes of persons-that they are in this analytic
sense relational, rather than non-relational or simple. The second component is that these relational duties of due care run only to persons with
whom one has a pre-existing, socially-structured relationship that fits into
one of a limited set of forms. The first idea might be called "the Relationality Thesis"; the second might be called "the Special-Relationship Thesis."
Now consider the assertion that a person's duty of care is universal.
This can be understood in two ways: as a denial of the Relationality Thesis,
or as a denial of the Special-Relationship Thesis. The former-which was
the view of Holmes, Prosser, and Andrews in Palsgraf3 0 --entails that the
duty of due care is a general duty of acting reasonably. But, this cannot be
51
Cardozo's view; as we have seen, he explicitly rejected it in Palsgraf.
Understood as a denial of the Special-Relationship Thesis, however, the
349 This was not actually the state of the law in the nineteenth century or earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56 (providing examples of duties of care owed to strangers).
350 See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Due care is a duty imposed

on each one of us to protect society, . . . not to protect A, B, or C alone."); supra text accompanying notes 85-90 (discussing Holmes's and Prosser's accounts of duty).
"' See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 100 (defining one's duty to another as arising from his relation to the other).
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avocation of universal duty entails only that one may have duties to take
care not to harm others, even if one's relationship to those persons does not
fit into one of the traditional categories with respect to which courts have
announced such duties. More generally, it suggests that one may have duties of care to each other person in society, even to strangers. But, duties of
due care, even according to this view, are still relational; they still involve
obligations to particular persons or classes of persons to take care not to injure them. Thus, for example, a person who does not fall within the class of
persons to whom the defendant owes a duty of care cannot recover for her
injuries, even if those injuries are caused by the defendant's breach of duty
to others.352

Cardozo's rejection of the privity requirement, and his use of foreseeability in his MacPherson opinion, indicate that he rejected the SpecialRelationship Thesis. This does not entail, however, that he rejected the Relationality Thesis. There is thus a limited sense in which scholars like
Prosser, White, and Posner are correct in thinking of MacPherson as a universal duty case.353 Because it denies that legal duties of care can only exist
where there is a preexisting relationship between defendant and plaintiff,
Cardozo's opinion can be described as endorsing a universal duty of care in
the second sense mentioned above. Unfortunately, this description tends to
promote confusion between the two different senses of "universal" duty.
And this confusion explains why Prosserians are baffled when they come to
Palsgraf,in which Cardozo explicitly rejects the idea of a duty to the world.
Cardozo did believe that duties of due care sometimes ran between persons
not in a pre-existing business or personal relationship with one another, and
he was a universalist in this sense. But, he also believed that duties were
relational-that they ran to persons or classes of persons-and he was an
anti-universalist in that sense.
It might help to amplify this point by considering how Cardozo would
have responded if confronted with a suit against an auto manufacturer
brought by a pedestrian or some other bystander who suffered a foreseeable
injury as a result of the manufacturer's negligence. 354 If one assumes that it
352 See infra text accompanying notes 379-86 (discussing a situation in which a plaintiff
cannot recover for harm caused by a defendant's negligence towards others).
353 See supratext accompanying notes 126-37 (discussing these scholars' interpretation of
MacPherson).
354 Cardozo's court appears never to have directly confronted the issue of bystander recovery in negligence actions for product-related injuries, although the ability of such plaintiffs
to recover is perhaps implicit in the holding of earlier cases. See, e.g., Torgesen v. Schultz, 84
N.E. 956, 957 (N.Y. 1908) (holding that a bottler/vendor of carbonated water owes a duty of.
care to a domestic servant employed by the purchaser, who was injured when the defendant's

bottle exploded as the servant positioned it in the purchaser's home). With the adoption in
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is in the spirit of MacPherson to permit a cause of action by this bystander,355 does it not follow that Cardozo conceived of duty nonrelationally? For the reasons just articulated, the answer is "no." The logic
of MacPherson might well imply the existence of a duty to that bystander,
and therefore, a cause of action. But, this would be because certain bystanders fall within a class of persons to whom vigilance of life and limb is a
duty, which duty was breached. The absence of a pre-existing relationship
would not by itself negate the existence of a duty of care owed by the manufacturer to the bystander. Rather, it would indicate that if there was a duty,
it would be a duty of the sort that strangers owe to other strangers, and
might well be narrower in scope or less demanding than the duty the manufacturer owes to those with whom it has pre-existing relationships. Thus,
even if we assume that MacPherson entails the imposition of liability on
manufacturers to bystanders who suffer foreseeable injuries as a result of the
manufacturer's negligence, that assumption does not undercut our claim that
Cardozo's account of duty is relational.3 56 To put the point more generally:
1973 of strict products liability, the Court of Appeals explicitly extended liability for productrelated injuries to bystanders. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29 (N.Y.
1973) ("We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury and damages.. . ." (emphasis added)).
355 See Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921) (holding that a defendant owes a duty of care to a bystander who attempts to rescue a third-party injured by the defendant's negligence).
356 Cardozo's notion of relational duty can also be brought into focus by contrasting
MacPherson with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), another
seminal product-injury case with which it is often paired, and sometimes confused. In Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court, following MacPherson, rejected the auto manufacturer's argument that Mrs. Henningsen's cause of action for injuries-which sounded in warranty rather than negligence-was barred by the absence of privity. See id. at 83. Also
following MacPherson,the Court reasoned that the privity limitation was harsh and illogical
in an age when cars were marketed almost exclusively through dealers. See id. However,
when Henningsen invoked modem conditions, it did so in part as a reason to look behind the
formalities of the transaction in order to treat the manufacturer and ultimate purchaser as
standing in a contractual relationship within which the dealer served as a mere intermediary.
Thus, it rejected the manufacturer's lack-of-privity argument, in part, because it found that, for
all practical purposes, there was a contractual relationship between the manufacturer and the
consumer. See id.
In MacPherson, Cardozo faced similar facts, and shared the sense that, given modem
commercial realities, it was absurd to suppose that the car dealer was the only one who could
pursue a negligence action against the manufacturer. Yet, his goal was not to expand the
realm of duty by extending the law of contract. Quite the opposite, he denied that contract
determined duty. His court, he insisted, had "put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard
life and limb ... grows out of contract and nothing else." 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
Clearly, for Cardozo, putting the duty of care "in the law," id., meant recognizing duties of
care between parties to a contract, between persons in a more informal relationship, such as
manufacturer-user, and between strangers with no pre-existing relationship at all. See id.
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one need not embrace Holmes's notion of a duty to the world in order to
conclude that strangers owe one another duties of care. Conversely, the fact
that strangers do owe each other duties of care is no reason to believe that
negligence law is appropriately reduced to a generic, non-relational directive
instructing actors to avoid acting unreasonably.
One might ask what point is served by describing Cardozo's approach
as articulating a relational theory of duty, given that the theory treats even
strangers as having "relationships." The short answer is that, from a relational view, the question of liability to the plaintiff does not turn on whether
liability is morally permissible or socially desirable, but rather turns on
whether defendant's conduct breached an obligation to the plaintiff. Hence,
in both MacPherson and Palsgraf Cardozo held that the critical question
was not (as Holmes and Prosser would suppose) whether the imposition of
liability made for good policy or was fair, but whether the defendant was
obligated to use ordinary care to protect the physical well-being of the
plaintiff, and whether the negligent conduct alleged by the plaintiff was a
breach of that duty. This "short answer" in fact contains several distinct
ideas which will be explained in the next section: that duty is to be understood deontologically, not consequentially; that standing is to be understood
relationally, not instrumentally; and that the concept of duty in negligence is
relationship-sensitive, rather than generic. For the moment, our point is
simply that, as a conceptual matter, a relational, but universalistic, conception of duty is in important ways different from a non-relational conception.
3. The Moral of MacPhersonand the Lesson of Lochner

We have argued in this Section that MacPherson must be read to embrace a relational conception of duty. If we are correct, then the reasons that
MacPhersonwas rightly decided and Winterbottom wrongly decided are not
the reasons offered by the Prosserian. The privity requirement was not, as
Prosser argued, simply an ill-advised policy limitation on liability, although
perhaps it was that.357 The deeper problem was its assumption that the du357 Recall that Prosser took Winterbottom to be driven by the Barons' concern not to let

excessive tort liability retard industrial growth. See supra text accompanying note 115 (discussing the Barons' concern that "a flood of costly litigation... [would have] crushing liability on nascent industry"). This reading is anachronistic, in part because it assumes that the
Barons thought that the judiciary ought to decide individual tort cases by fashioning ad hoc,
policy-based limitations on liability. In fact, as the Barons seem to have viewed the case, they
had two choices: treat negligence as the now-familiar four element tort, with the understanding that the duty issue would be determined by narrowly construed precedent, or treat negligence as the Holmes-Prosser tort, but without the Prosserian policy backstop. Thus, when the
Barons deployed their floodgates arguments, they did so as a basis for rejecting the HolmesProsser model on the ground that it generated the "outrageous" consequence that actors would
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ties of due care owed by manufacturers were fixed by contract. Contract
can support such duties, and often bears on their existence. But, the duty to
safeguard life and limb does not end with contract.
If we once again invoke the parallel between the histories of tort and
constitutional law and scholarship, it should now become apparent that, in
its essentials, the mistake of Winterbottom was the error of Lochner itself.
In both cases, the courts identified a normative concept--"duty" in the former, "right" in the latter-with a particular, narrow version of that concept
that corresponded with some of the central tenets of classical liberalism. In
fact, both of these particular conceptions expressed the same fundamental
principle: namely, the idea that one ordinarily is entitled to set the terms of
one's interactions with others as one wishes. The claim made by the plaintiff in Winterbottom-that there exist duties of care within the world of
commerce that do not derive from contractual undertakings-posed a fundamental challenge to this libertarian ideal, just as the maximum hours legislation in Lochner posed the same challenge from a somewhat different direction.
Holmesian constitutional scholars thought that, in order to reject
Lochner, they had to reject rights. As modem scholars have shown, they
were wrong. To shake free from Lochner, it was not necessary to abandon
the concept of rights altogether. Rather, rights had to be detached from laissez-faire ideology. In a similar fashion, Holmesian tort scholars have for
decades maintained that, to overcome Winterbottom's narrow conception of
duty, it is necessary to eliminate duty as a substantive component of negligence. To his credit, Cardozo recognized and avoided this mistake. The
moral of MacPherson thus resides in his astute insight that duty had to be
liberated from its narrow, contractual incarnation, not rejected outright.
B. Towarda RelationalConception of Duty
Our goals have been to depict the prevailing view of duty in negligence
law, to point out ways in which this view is both interpretively and prescriptively inadequate, and to suggest, by drawing a parallel with changes in
the notion of rights in constitutional theory, that we might do better to move
beyond skepticism to a theoretical framework that permits deployment of
be liable for any injuries traceable to their unreasonable conduct. In other words, it was in
large part because the Barons did not think it possible or appropriate to limit liability through
policy analysis that they rejected the Holmes-Prosser account of negligence and instead
adopted the traditional understanding of negligence built around relational duties of care.
Cardozo, we have argued, followed the Barons insofar as he saw no reason to reject the traditional understanding of the tort. Instead, he insisted on a broader, more flexible interpretation
of the duty concept.
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duty as a non-reductive normative notion. We have tried to highlight the
desirability of such a possibility by showing that even to make sense of what
Holmesians themselves hail as a great decision-MacPherson--onemust
employ a relational conception of duty. Additionally, in the Introduction,
we alluded to several standing problems in negligence law that are connected to the Prosserian construction of duty, including: the existence of
large bodies of common law for which the Holmes-Prosser model fails to
account; the confusion over the meaning of "foreseeability" and its place in
duty analysis; the unmanageability and instability of Prosserian policy
analysis; the perplexing place of the common law in a Prosserian world; and
the failure of Prosserian negligence to mesh with common sense in such a
way as to guide conduct. 358 The cumulative force of these arguments leads
us to conclude that the development of a non-instrumental notion of the duty
of care within negligence law is a topic that merits scholarly attention. In
what follows, we abstract from our account of MacPhersonand outline what
such a theory might look like and why it might meet some of the interpretive
view.3 59
and prescriptive shortcomings we attributed to the instrumentalist
1. Overview of the Relational Conception of Duty
As noted above, we are not the first to employ the term "relational duty"
in articulating a non-instrumental account of negligence law, and it is there360
When we use
fore especially important to say just what we mean by it.
the phrase "the relational conception of the duty of due care in negligence
law," or "the relational conception of duty," we intend to denote a conception that is relationalin its analytical structure, as opposed to non-relational;
a conception that is relationship-sensitive,as opposed to abstract and context-independent, and that is non-instrumentalin that it rejects a reductiveinstrumentalist account of "duty" in terms of the pros and cons of liability
rules, and takes seriously the idea that duty refers to a kind of obligation.
Each of these features will be explored below. Furthermore, we will suggest
that both the conceptual structure and, to a certain extent, the content of the
judgments about duty that are embedded in negligence law, reflect ordinary
moral judgments about duties owed to others. Finally, we emphasize that

358 See supra text accompanying notes 27-41 (outlining limitations of Prosserian analysis).

359 For a more detailed exploration of how our relational concept of duty illuminates a
particular area of negligence law, see Zipursky, supra note 160, analyzing legal malpractice
doctrine.
360 See supra note 146 (noting that Coleman and Weinrib have discussed relational conceptions of duty).
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our conception of duty is embedded in the "duty" element within negligence
law, as opposed to the duty of repair.
Let us also be clear on what sort of account we aim to be offering. In
the first instance, we offer a descriptive or interpretive account of the conception of the duty of due care as it is found in the common law of negligence. We argue that what we call the "relational conception of duty" better explains the form, content, and pattern of normative reasons given within
duty doctrine than Prosser's conception, or instrumentalist views more generally, and that it better explains the rules and principles we actually have.
We believe our account also has normative implications. Our interpretive claims, conjoined with a norm to the effect that judges normally have a
prima facie obligation to apply the common law in a manner that is faithful
to the conceptions and principles embedded in it, provides support for the
claim that judges should employ a relational conception of duty in negligence law. Additionally, there are many things to be said on behalf of the
relational conception of duty in negligence law in its own right. Thus, we
shall argue that the law stands a better chance of remaining stable, manageable and predictable under the relational conception than under a Prosserian
conception; that a law incorporating a relational conception more effectively
and more efficiently guides human conduct; that a relational conception
better preserves respect for the law; that a relational conception better integrates law into a variety of personal, professional and institutional settings;
and that a relational conception is more consistent with the traditional role
of the judiciary in negligence law. None of this presupposes or purports to
show that the relational conception of duty is itself true as a moral matter;
rather, it suggests that various desiderata for selecting possible models of
negligence law from a normative point of view are best satisfied by the relational conception.
Some readers will probably want to know the answer to a further question: whether these claims about duty are true, or, more modestly, whether
they are the best justified answers to moral questions about what our duties
really are. This Article is not principally devoted to such questions, because
we believe results of substantial importance can be reached without answering them. But, we do not deny that we think a relational conception of
duty has significant plausibility as a moral matter, even standing apart from
the law. More importantly, we harbor no illusions that first-order moral
questions about duty can, or should, be finessed entirely within any legal
theory that attempts to rehabilitate a moral concept within the law and to revitalize the use of such a concept. At the very least, if the relational conception of duty is obviously morally wrong, no appeal to stare decisis and
institutional functionality ought to save it. But, in defining, explaining, and
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displaying the relational conception, we show that it exceeds in plausibility
the low threshold that is necessary for our descriptive and functional superiority arguments to retain their force.
a. RelationalityandRelationships
Our conception of duty is relational. The duties of care on which negligence actions are predicated are duties to persons or classes of persons.
One is obligated to take a certain level of care to ensure that certain injuries
do not befall those persons or classes of persons. The duty question in a
negligence case is whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to use
a particular level of care to avoid the sort of injury the plaintiff suffered.
The breach question is the question of whether, assuming there was a duty
to the plaintiff to use that level of care, the defendant did use the appropriate
level of care. In typical personal injury cases, it is so clear that there is a
duty of reasonable care from the defendant to the plaintiff that the duty
question recedes and breach is simply the failure to take ordinary care to
avoid injuring the plaintiff. But, in cases where the existence of such a duty
from the defendant to the plaintiff is controversial-such as MacPhersonthe duty question361is both formally and, as a matter of practice, prior to the
breach question.
As our discussion of both MacPhersonand Palsgrafillustrates, a plaintiffs right to recover damages for an injury caused by defendant's negligence exists only if the defendant breached a duty of due care owed to the
plaintiff. Hence, the relational nature of duty is not merely relevant to the
question of when negligent conduct is an actionable tort; it is also relevant
to the question of who is entitled to bring an action based on the defendant's
negligent conduct. In this respect, the conception of duty embedded in the
law of negligence accompanies a particular sort of standing requirement, as
has been analyzed in detail elsewhere. 362 Our negligence law does not give
Note that the relational conception of duty is not offered as a fill theory of the primary
duty of conduct in negligence law, but rather of the "duty" element within that primary duty.
If "primary duty" in negligence law is taken to refer to the duty, a breach of which will trigger
a right of action by a plaintiff against a defendant, then the primary duty must be one in which
a breach includes the causing of injury. Hence, it is plausible to view the primary duty of
negligence law as a complex duty of a particular form: a duty not to injure another person by
failing to stay within the duty of care one owes her or him. See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra
note 44. Although one of us (Zipursky) has in fact argued for just this analysis, and it is consistent with the views offered here, it is not essential to the view offered in this Article. We
raise the issues in order to (1) call attention to the need to integrate a theory of the duty of due
care into a general account that explains what triggers a right of action; (2) suggest that such
an integration is possible; and (3) give an example of such an integration.
362 See Zipursky, supra note 27, at 27-40 (arguing, as a doctrinal matter, that negligence
law contains implicit but pervasive standing requirements).
361
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a plaintiff a right of action against anyone who injured him, but only against
a defendant who breached a duty not to injure him.363 A right of action is
not merely compensation for those hurt; it is an avenue of recourse for those
to whom duties have been breached, against those who breached the duties.3 4
In addition to its relational nature, our conception of duty is characterized by what might be called relationship-sensitivity. The existence and
content of the duties of care one person owes to another are dependent, in
part, on the nature of the relationship between those persons. 36' Determining whether Buick owed MacPherson a duty to be vigilant to avoid physical
injury required a determination of the duties within a manufacturerconsumer relationship. Likewise, for example, the scope of a physician's
duties of care to another person depends, in part, on whether that person is
366
that physician's patient. Similarly, the scope of a landowner's duty to another depends, in part, on the relationship between the landowner and the
plaintiff.367 The nature of the relationship between defendant and plaintiff
also is relevant when determining whether a defendant must take affirmative
368
plaintiff from being injured, or whether a defendant
3 69
acts
plaintiff aa duty to avoid causing emotional or economic harm.
owestoa prevent
See id. (explaining the circumstances under which third parties may recover for negligence on the part of the defendant).
364 See id. at 70-93 (arguing that the corrective justice theory of tort law cannot account
for tort law's standing requirement).
365 See generally Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 189 (1997) (arguing that the scope and content of moral duties and special responsibilities to others are relationship-sensitive).
366 See, e.g., Clarke v. Hoek, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a
defendant physician monitoring other physicians performing surgery on the plaintiff did not
have a physician's duty of care to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was in no sense his patient); Wemer v. Vamer, Stafford & Seaman, P.A., 659 So. 2d 1308, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a physician who negligently failed to inform a patient of the potential effects of a medication on the patient's driving did not breach a duty to the motorist rear-ended
by the patient). Our claim is not that physicians have duties only to their patients, but rather
that the scope and content of the duties they owe to others depends upon whether those others
are their patients. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal.
1976) (in bank) (holding that when a therapist recognizes or should recognize that a patient
presents risks of serious danger to identifiable persons, then the therapist has a duty to wam
those persons). Tarasoff,discussed infra at text accompanying note 412, is so striking because it purports to carve out a niche of duty owed by psychiatrists to non-patients.
367 See infra text accompanying notes 394-97 (discussing the rules for invitees, licensees,
and trespassers in landowner liability law).
368 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315-20 (1965) (articulating special relationships that warrant exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to protect persons
against harm from third parties).
369 See Zipursky, supra note 27, at 28-32 (outlining negligence law in the area of economic and emotional harm).
363
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While our negligence law certainly recognizes some duties of care running
from one stranger to another, stranger-stranger is a particular category of
relationship. Indeed, it is the category in which our duties of care are generally least demanding.
The relationship-sensitivity of duty in negligence has been closely followed by courts applying and extending the law of duty in their daily
work,370 but it has not been adequately recognized by scholars or by courts
in their more theoretical moments. For example, while Professor Weinrib,
like the courts in Heaven v. Pender371and Donoghue v. Stevenson,372 has
recognized the relational nature of the duty of due care, he explicitly treats
373
this as a matter to be understood in quite abstract and universal terms.
This leaves Weinrib hard-pressed to explain, among other things, the contours of our doctrine of nonfeasance and misfeasance, because he implicitly
elevates the non-actionability of nonfeasance in stranger-stranger cases into
an essential feature of negligence law. 374 Similar interpretive problems appear to beset Weinrib with regard to emotional and economic harm: for
him, a certain type of harm either is sufficiently important to justify constricting another's liberty in a scheme of reciprocal and equal liberty and security, or it is not.375 Yet, our actual negligence law does not offer a uniform answer on liability for emotional and economic harm; whether there is
a duty to take care to avoid imposing such harms is dependent on the rela376
In this way, we argue, a relationshiptionship between the parties.
sensitive notion of duty better accounts for both the structure and content of
our negligence law.
b. Priorities,Relationships,andDuties
Can a relational conception of duty be given a rational reconstruction
within an intelligible framework of moral principle? We begin with the
mundane observation that being a moral person involves, in part, constrain-

370 See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the importance of relationships in evaluating the existence of a duty).
371 11 Q.B. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
372 1932 App. Cas. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.)

37 See WEINRM, supra note 23, at 125 (discussing the importance of the unity of the
plaintiff-defendant relationship in negligence law).
374 See id. at 153 ("[F]or the plaintiff's injury to be actionable, it must be the consequence
not of mere failure to act but of the defendant's risk creation.").
375 See id. at 134 ("m[To recover in tort, the plaintiff's injury must be to something, such
as personal integrity or a proprietary entitlement, that ranks as the embodiment of a right.").
376See infra text accompanying notes 382-83 (discussing the standing rule in the context
of pure economic harm).
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377
ing one's conduct in light of certain aspects of the well-being of others.
Having a sense of duty is critical to being a moral person because it involves
a recognition of the importance of acting in light of others' well-being. The
existence of duties of care to others-a parent's duty to his child, or a physician's duty to her patients---causes individuals to focus on certain aspects of
the well-being of others. This enables individuals to prioritize certain aspects of their conduct. It also enables them to sustain and develop an internalized normative pull towards a certain set of actions. This is the feeling of
being obligated in certain ways to those others-a parent's internal orientation to fulfill his duties to his child, or a physician's recognition of the necessity of doing what her patients' well-being requires. Societies possess
many practices and institutions that have the effect of inculcating certain social norms that simultaneously implant or sustain in members a recognition
and feeling of certain duties to others. Some of these norms are relatively
definite-the duty not to kill others-applicable to each against each. Other
norms are only applicable in more narrow contexts and are more openended in content, for example, a lawyer's duty to represent her clients' interests zealously.
Duties of care are a subset of relational duties more generally. They are
relatively open-ended duties that take a wide variety of shapes and forms
depending on context and relationship. Because we recognize a wide range
of duties of care in our society, each of us prioritizes certain needs of others
and certain required courses of conduct in some manner, and each of us is
motivated by this sort of pull to action. Duties of care enable us as actors to
select courses of conduct for ourselves that are consistent with important aspects of others' well-being. They also enable us to sustain friendships, family relations, professional relationships, business contacts, employment relationships, and so on. That is not only because we could not remain in such
settings if we failed to conform our conduct to the relevant norms-though
that is largely true. It is, more deeply, because the creation of these relationships goes hand-in-hand with the cultivation of an internalized motivation
and disposition to focus on another's interests.
The foregoing suggests that, were there unlimited duties of due care,378a
sense of duty would no longer be capable of playing a prioritizing role.
377 See JOSEPH RAz, Duties of Well-Being, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS
IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 1, 1-28 (1994) (advancing a theory of duties that

connects those duties to individual well-being).
378 As this sentence indicates, the foregoing account of duty is certainly illuminated, in
part, by considerations that are arguably characterizable as "consequentialist," notwithstanding the generally deontological and anti-instrumentalist bent of our position. However, to recognize that the value of the concept of duty and a sense of duty are explicable, in part, by consequentialist thinking is hardly to concede that net consequences are the sole moral measure of
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The very notion of prioritizing certain interests of others carries with it the
implication of a limitation on what is given high priority. Moreover, were
duties not varied by reference to kinds of relationships, certain forms of relationships and social relations would not even be possible.379 The twists
and turns of the duties that are accepted within everyday morality reflect the
twists and turns of an ordinary citizen's sense of duty. It is essential to the
roles played by the sense of duty that they have these limitations and variegations.
2. Relational Duty in the Common Law of Negligence
In a broad range of negligence cases, courts focus specifically on
whether a defendant who was concededly negligent in some respect
breached a duty of care to the plaintiff. Palsgrafis the most famous such
case, but it is the tip of the iceberg.380 For example, in UltramaresCorp. v.
Touche381 and in a spate of accountant malpractice cases where it is assumed
that the defendant accountant was negligent, the question is whether nonclients who are injured may recover. The courts' analyses of these cases turn
on whether the defendant had a duty of due care, not just to his client, but to
the nonclient plaintiff as well. In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flin 82
and in pure economic harm cases more generally, the defendant has acted
negligently but the plaintiff's ability to recover for losses occasioned by that
negligence is unclear. 383 Courts resolve the issue by deciding whether the
defendant breached any duty running to the plaintiff. A currently unsettled
issue, exemplified by the Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision in Doe v.
actions, duties, and policies. And, more pertinently, it is hardly to recognize that the concept
of duty in the law should be understood instrumentally.
379 According to Raz:
Some activities and relationships cannot be specified except by reference to duties
(or rights) .... Some activities and relationships which cannot be specified except
by reference to duties are intrinsically good. Friendship is such a case in which the
two properties coincide. Friendships ought to be cultivated for their own sake. They
are intrinsically valuable. At the same time the relations between friends, the relationship which constitutes friendship, cannot be specified except by reference to the
duties of friendship. When this is the case the justifying good is internally related to
the duty. The duty is (an element of) a good in itself.
RAZ, supra note 377, at 41.
380 See Zipursky, supra note 27, at 16, 27-40 (discussing cases in which recovery is denied due to the lack of a breach of duty to the plaintiff by the defendant).
31l 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.) (holding that the plaintiff could not
recover economic loss from the defendant accountant due to lack of privity).
382 275 U.S. 303, 308 (1927) (holding that recovery of pure economic injury may only be
had where the defendant breaches a duty to the plaintiff to avoid economic injury).
383 See Zipursky, supra note 27, at 30-32 (detailing the substantive standing rule in the
context of cases of pure economic injury).
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McKay,384 concerns whether a psychotherapist whose patient accuses her
parent of childhood sexual abuse is liable for the emotional harm the parent
suffers. Again, courts in cases like McKay make the issue turn on whether
the defendant therapist had a duty to the parent to take care not to cause him
3 85
emotional harm; the McKay court decided such a duty did not exist.
Cases like Ultramares, Robins Dry Dock, and McKay make little sense
within a Prosserian framework, which does not permit analysis in terms of
duties of conduct running to particular persons. The pattern of rules and exceptions declared by courts is more intelligible within a relational conception of duty.
The idea of prioritization can first help explain the general rule that
there is no duty to take care to avoid causing another emotional or economic
harm.386 Our duties to take reasonable care not to cause physical injury or
property damage to others are quite burdensome. There is a great deal about
which to be careful, and the burden increases with the number of activities
in which one is involved. At this stage in the development of our shared
conception of duty, and in the development of the law, these are duties of
care each person owes to every other person. They are universal duties in
the relational but unrestricted sense. To add to these duties other general
duties to take care to avoid causing emotional and economic injuries would
be enormously burdensome. Indeed, it would arguably be so burdensome
that it would undercut the capacity of the sense of duty to prioritize and to
focus.
Conversely, however, there are certain relationships in which there is a
duty to avoid emotional harm. Thus, for example, in Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, the Supreme Court of Maine recognized the
widely held rule that a funeral home or mortician has a duty to take care not
to impose emotional harm on the decedent's loved ones by mishandling the
corpse. 387 This duty is obviously consistent with the recognition that duty is
"' No. 83094, 1998 Il. LEXIS 913 (June 18, 1998). For a discussion of a case factually
similar to McKay, see Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A DangerousDirection:
Legal Intervention in SexualAbuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 555-56 (1996),
concluding that third-party recovery in a case involving an adult survivor of abuse is unsound
because it "might well close off a promising avenue (therapy for sexual abuse survivors) for
resolving a key social problem and at the same time strengthen an abusive (and patriarchal)
aspect of our social structure."
...See McKay, 1998 Ill. LEXIS 913, at *15 (holding that "the defendant therapist owed a
duty of care to her patient only, and not to nonpatient third parties").
386 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 54, at 359-66 (noting that the failure to take
precautions against emotional harm is generally not actionable). Failure to take precautions
against economic harm is generally not actionable either. See id. § 129, at 978.
317 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987) (extending from the mortician cases an imposition of duty
on the hospital to avoid emotionally harming a deceased's relative by mishandling a corpse).
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a prioritizing notion; indeed, it is just this sort of harm upon which we expect and want a mortician to be focused. Likewise, an accountant obviously
has a duty to take reasonable care to avoid economic harm to his client: that
388
More generis exactly what we want the accountant to be prioritizing.
why special
explains
of
duty
notion
relational
ally, our context-sensitive,
relationships affect the contours of negligence. The relationship between
defendant and plaintiff actually can be used to explain why we expect defendants to take precautions against certain kinds of harm to a plaintiff, not
simply why defendants must pay if they do not take precautions.
Second, the contours of duty doctrine often reflect a feel for the place of
duty in a relationship or an institutional structure. A clear example is the
attorney's duty to a client.389 The duty of due care to a client embraces far
more care, for far more and greater kinds of harm, than many other sorts of
duties. 390 This is, in part, because the relevant professional institutions and
social structures cultivate and value a particular kind of lawyer-client relation. To combine this with the point about prioritizing, a lawyer's sense of
duty to the client not only involves a very high level of care regarding a
wide range of interests, but also a prioritizing of the client's interests above
the interests of others. And hence, we should not be surprised that when the
law gets to the question of what duties of care the lawyer owes to nonclients, the law offers a rather thin set of duties, particularly where recognition
to clients. 39 1
of such duties would threaten to conflict with the duties owed
392
In Goodman v. Kennedy, for example, the court held that an attorney's
negligent conduct leading up to a transaction does not normally give rise to
liability to adverse parties in the transaction, because there is no duty of due
care to those persons. Conversely, courts have had little trouble imposing a
393
duty of care to plaintiffs in cases like Lucas v. Hamm, where the defen388 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 129, at 1001 (explaining that cases for liability turn "on a special relationship or an assumption of responsibility by the negligent
promissor, and equally on the presence of a narrow and particular class of potential plaintiffs").

389See Zipursky, supra note 160 (applying the relational conception of duty to explain

legal malpractice doctrine).
390See generally 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF

LAWYERING § 1:101, at 1 (2d ed. Supp. 1998) (identifying four categories of duties owed by

lawyers to clients).
391
See generally 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 390, §§ 4:100-4.4:105, at 707-764.4
(detailing the relationship of lawyers with third parties in contexts other than litigation).
392556 P.2d 737, 743 (Cal. 1976) ("The present defendant had no relationship to plaintiffs
that would give rise to his owing plaintiffs any duty of care in advising his clients that they
could sell the stock without adverse consequences.").
393364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) ("ITihe main purpose of the testator in making his
agreement with the attorney is to benefit the persons named in his will and this intent can be
effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney, only by giving the beneficiaries a right of
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dant negligently drafted a will, and plaintiffs (the intended beneficiaries of
the testator) were unable to inherit because of the negligence. Though privity is missing, the imposition of a duty to intended beneficiaries is consistent
with, and perhaps demanded by, an adequate contextual understanding of
the relationships among the attorneys, clients, and intended beneficiaries.
The significance of relationships is also reflected in the three-fold distinction among invitees, licensees, and trespassers in the traditional law of
landowner liability. 394 Although a contract or undertaking is not a necessary
condition for duty, each does normally give rise to a range of duties of care.
It follows that those who invite others to their land for business purposes
have substantial duties of care to those persons, and in particular, have substantial duties to take care that their premises are safe. Conversely, as a
general matter, the law recognizes almost no duties of care extending from
landowners to trespassers. 395 This policy embodies the intuitive idea that
one is not obligated to watch out for the interests of those who enter one's
land against one's right. An extreme case is the widespread conviction that
burglars shall not be permitted to recover in negligence from those whose
homes they were burgling. 396 Between the trespasser and the invitee is perhaps the most frequent guest, the licensee. Because the licensee comes with
permission, the owner cannot wash his hands of all duties. However, because the relationship among the parties is that of equals, neither of whom
benefit from the other's presence, a middle level of duty
enjoys a material
7
controls.

39

A relational conception of duty, when understood in connection with
the idea of prioritization, may also help to explain the reason that negligence
law draws a distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. 398 Duties to
refrain from misfeasance do not threaten to subsume all of one's decisions.

").
action ....
394See, e.g., Carter v. Kinney, 896 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo. 1995) (defining and enumerating the duties owed to invitees, licensees, and trespassers).
395See, e.g., Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056, 1062 (R.I. 1994)
(holding that landowners do not have a duty to save trespassing motorcyclists). The famous
"attractive nuisance" exception to this rule for certain child trespassers is set forth in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965), stating the various conditions which will
make a possessor of land liable for "physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by
an artificial condition upon the land."
396 See supra note 39 (discussing California's enactment of legislation establishing that
landowners do not owe a duty of care to burglars injured by negligently maintained premises).
391See, e.g., Carter,896 S.W.2d at 928 (stating that "the possessor owes a licensee a duty
to make safe dangers of which the possessor is aware").
399See, e.g., Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Minn. 1993) (holding that boat
owners have no affirmative duty to prevent harm to passengers with whom they have no special relationship).
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By contrast, were there a duty of due care under the law to prevent harm,
one would be pervasively burdened with a duty to prevent a variety of
harms. Not only would such a requirement sit poorly with common sensewhich treats most affirmative acts to strangers as supererogatory, not
obligatory39 9-it would not mesh with a tenable conception of duty. Social,
institutional, professional, and contractual relationships, however, often expand the duty of care by sweeping in affirmative acts, just as they often expand it to include the obligation to be vigilant to avoid causing emotional or
economic harm. We suspect that such expansions are, again, for a combination of reasons. The capacity of duty to prioritize is consistent with a
broader duty within these more selective settings. Moreover, the psychological role of a sense of duty as part of the maintenance of a relationship or
an institutional structure explains why, in certain relationships, one is not
merely responsible for non-harm, but is also responsible for a certain aspect
of the betterment of another's condition.
Hence, we find courts deciding that there is a duty of affirmative aid in
cases like Farwell v. Keaton,40 0 where the plaintiff and the defendant were
social companions carousing together, but that there is no affirmative duty,
in cases like Harperv. Herman,4 0 1 where a defendant who had no prior relationship to the plaintiff was held to have no duty to warn the adult plaintiff
of the risk of diving into shallow water.
The lack of duty to rescue strangers in emergencies is a notoriously
controversial area of the common law,40 2 and our model explains why. The
general rule of nonliability for nonfeasance matches our socially shared
sense of duty; it makes sense from the point of view which prioritizes a certain subset of the acts one owes to others. However, when individuals are
confronted with emergencies-such as the person who happens upon a
drowning child 4 3-- our common sense moral intuitions tell us that there is a
duty to rescue, even if in most jurisdictions, negligence law does not. The
399 Cf. Epstein, supra note 23, at 201 ("[T]he distinction is taken between that conduct

which is required and that which, so to speak, is beyond the call of duty.").
0o 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (holding that the defendant had a duty to aid his
social companion, who was in distress).
40' 499 N.W.2d at 474-75 (finding no special relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant when the plaintiff is a guest on the defendant's boat).
402 See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that because the defendant had not placed the plaintiff in a dangerous position, the defendant had no duty to rescue the plaintiff, who was drowning before him). CompareEpstein, supra note 23, at 189-204
(discussing the reasons that tort law should not impose liability for failure to rescue), with
Weinrib, supra note 147, at 251 (arguing that tort law should impose liability for failure to

perform easy rescue in emergencies).
403See Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (finding no duty
to save a drowning child).
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identification of emergencies as a special category in which affirmative duties of aid apply, notwithstanding the stranger-stranger relationship, makes
sense within the relational conception of duty we have sketched. A category
of "emergency," in which another person's physical well-being is immediately and urgently dependent upon one's action, is itself a salient moral notion that can play a significant prioritizing role. However, a category of
"emergency" does not threaten to swamp each of us with pressing responsibilities, thereby undermining the capacity of the sense of duty to prioritize.
The puzzle is then to explain why the common law rejects a general duty of
aid in emergencies. The most convincing answer is that, within the area of
affirmative aid, the law of duty insists on brighter lines than we find in the
conventionalmorality of duty. The rule of nonliability for failure to rescue
in emergencies thus combines a potentially defensible general nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction with a strong preference against exceptions.
This distinction prevents the law from recognizing a widespread moral conviction that emergencies warrant an exception to the ordinary rule that one
has no affirmative duties to protect others, absent special relationships. 0 4
Finally, a relational conception of duty may also help to clarify the role
of the much abused term "foreseeability" in the tort of negligence, and the
related issue of how to allocate the roles of judge and jury in negligence
law.40 5 Initially, the foreseeability of the harm that the plaintiff suffered at
the hands of the defendant is relevant to the question of breach, because
whether ordinary care entails taking precautions against particular injuries in
specific circumstances turns, in part, on how foreseeable those injuries are
to the defendant. And, foreseeability is also relevant to the determination of
proximate cause, because unforeseeability of injury to a plaintiff is an important, albeit not exclusive, ground for arguing that injuries or damages are
too remote to warrant imposition of liability on the defendant-even if the
defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff. Both breach and proximate cause
are jury issues; 4° 6 yet, courts have held that foreseeability is also relevant to
4
duty,4 °7 which is usually regarded as a question of law for the court. 08
404 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraintsin Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901,
930-40 (1982) (arguing that the common law's failure to impose liability on the basis of a
Weinribian duty of easy rescue in emergencies is attributable to process and manageability
considerations). In other words, while it may be that pragmatic considerations provide the
best explanation as to why courts have not imposed liability for failure to rescue, a substantive, non-reductive account of duty is needed to explain the following: why the law draws a
sharp misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in the first place; why there is no general duty to
rescue; and why the category of "emergencies" seems to be a plausible candidate for being
treated as an exception to the general rule.
405 See supra text accompanying notes 38, 163-65 (discussing differing views on how
foreseeability is relevant to duty, breach, and proximate cause).
406 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, § 45, at 321 (stating that if "reasonable per-
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Under the relational conception of duty, foreseeability can be relevant
in at least two ways that implicate a substantive role for the court, not just
the jury. First, as indicated above, a plaintiff has standing to bring a cause
of action only if the defendant breached a duty owed to her. Thus, while the
question, "Was the harm suffered by the plaintiff of a sort reasonably foreseeable to the defendant?" may be an issue for the jury, the broader issue,
"Does the plaintiff's cause of action requirethat the plaintiff's injuries were
of a sort reasonably foreseeable to the defendant?" is an issue of law. That
there is such a requirement built into the relational conception of duty is a
matter of law, and is enforced by the court. This is the role that foreseeability plays in Cardozo's Palsgrafopinion.
Second, under the conception of duty we have been advocating, courts
face a threshold question as to whether members of the class of persons to
which the defendant belongs owe a duty to members of the class of persons
to which the plaintiff belongs, to take care to avoid a certain kind of harm.
If the answer is "yes," then the breach question arises. Accordingly, the
foreseeability of the particular plaintiffs injury to the defendant is relevant
to the factual issue of whether the duty so interpreted has been breached.
But, foreseeability is also relevant to the threshold question itself. Recall
that according to our conception of duty, there is both a prioritizing aspect
of duty and a relationship-constructing aspect of duty. If one has a duty of
care to another, that other person figures (or should figure) in one's deliberation in a certain way.40 9 Because the possibility of duty serving a prioritizing role is compromised by casting the duty net too wide, the question
arises as to which types of persons are obligated to be vigilant to avoid
causing certain types of harm to certain others. The ease or difficulty for
persons in the defendant's category to anticipate those harms is relevant to
whether it makes sense for such persons to be said to have a duty to be
vigilant against causing them. Hence, as in cases such as MacPherson,the
decision that certain defendants are particularly well-situated to foresee the
sort of harm that befell the plaintiff is not only relevant to whether there was

sons might differ, the issue of 'proximate cause' is submitted to the jury").
40'See id. § 54, at 359 n.24 (listing foreseeability among the factors balanced by courts
when determining the existence of duty).
408 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (citing cases which hold that duty is a question of law for the court, but that foreseeability, which is a question of fact for the jury, has a
determinative effect on the issue of duty).
409See Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (appeal taken from Scot.)
(holding that there is a duty owed to persons "so closely and directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my
mind to the acts or omissions which are called into question" (emphasis added)).
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a breach. It is also relevant to whether a category of defendant may properly be declared to owe a duty of due care to a category of plaintiff. Foreseeability, as it bears on the latter question, is a question for the court, not
411
the jury.
The role of foreseeability in duty analysis can be seen in the context of
4 12 in which
Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California,
the California Supreme Court held that psychotherapists have a duty to those whom
they could, through reasonable diligence, identify as being at risk of serious
injury from an attack by the psychotherapist's patient. The difficult decision
in the case was whether the therapist's superior, but not-wholly-reliable,
ability to foresee injury to certain third persons justifies a conclusion that
therapists have a general duty to be vigilant of harm to those persons, notwithstanding the therapists' potentially conflicting duties to their own patients. Without taking sides for or against Tarasoff,a relational conception
of duty permits us to understand why the issue of foreseeability-that is,
how well a defendant is situated to foresee the type of harm that was realized-is sometimes a distinctive issue in duty analysis.
3. Duty and Institutional Competence
These are the beginnings of our suggestions about how a relational theory of duty in negligence law might be used to lend coherence to the common law of negligence, where an instrumental theory clearly failed to do so.
But, the second cluster of criticisms we proffered were prescriptive ones:
that the instrumentalist standard tends to be unmanageable; that there may
be no obvious reason that courts rather than legislatures should be lawmaking if the instrumental account is right; that the instrumental account sits
poorly with common sense; and that it lacks the capacity to guide conduct.4 13 We believe that a non-instrumentalist notion of duty along the lines
suggested above will help to solve these problems.
We are suggesting that courts take the question of duty in negligence
law at face value, rather than reducing it to a blunderbuss policy question.
410 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc) ("When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.").
411 The reasons as to why genuine duty questions (as opposed to breach questions misleadingly cast as duty questions) ought to be decided by the court is addressed infra in the text
accompanying notes 415-22.
412 551 P.2d at 340 (identifying a therapist's duty "to take one or more of various steps"
when determining "that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another").
4 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (setting forth both instrumentalist
and
non-instrumentalist criticisms of the Holmes-Presser model of negligence law).
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Consider, for example, the duty to rescue doctrine as typified by Farwellv.
Keaton.414 Taken at face value, the question "Does one friend owe another
a duty to use reasonable care to provide medical attention when one is suffering from an acute injury in the presence of the other?" is perhaps difficult, but not unmanageable. Answering this question does not involve predicting a huge array of policy implications, or balancing a wide range of
incommensurable considerations. It involves probing whether, given our
common law's general unwillingness to articulate a duty of affirmative aid
among strangers, and given its willingness to find such a duty in a range of
formal "special" relationships structured by educational or professional institutions, the relationship between teenage friends carousing together
should be deemed to support a duty of care broad enough to require reasonable efforts to provide medical assistance. 415 The answer involves extending these categories and articulating a principle embedded in the law. But,
there is no reason to expect an unusual level of instability, unpredictability,
or concealment of values in answering such a question, and hence there is
no reason to treat it as suffering from the vices of unmanageability.
Similarly, there is no reason to think that the relational understanding of
the duty question is better designed for legislatures than for courts. For,
while norms are always being constructed and revised, in some sense it is
misleading to regard the resolution of the duty question as a simple act of
policymaking. Rather, concepts already in the law are being stretched in
one direction or another, as litigants ask the courts whether the conception
of duty inherent in the law should be understood to reach their cases. The
interpretation of concepts embedded in the law, and their application to future cases, is quintessentially a judicial, not a legislative, activity-even
though this interpretation may itself involve evaluative thinking, and even
though it will certainly have policy implications.
Furthermore, one would expect the relational understanding of duty to
sit well with common sense regarding duty. The relational conception accomplishes this by taking as its base the socially shared understandings of
duty that are already embedded in the law, and seeking to advance the law
by interpreting the content of duty in a manner that is sensitive to the development of social norms. While the Prosserian account sometimes purports
to leave room for sensitivity to social norms, this openness is fundamentally
N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976) (holding that a defendant owed an affirmative duty to
aid his social companion, who was in medical distress).
415 The Farwell court, in fact, held that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff on the
ground that the defendant and the plaintiff "were companions on a social venture. Implicit in
such a common undertaking is the understanding that one will render assistance to the other
when he is in peril if he can do so without endangering himself." Id.at 222.
414 240
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at odds with the instrumental orientation of that approach. By contrast, the
relational conception of duty gives our common sense understanding of duty
a central place in the law of negligence.
Finally, we expressed concern that, by shifting to a notion of reasonableness as opposed to duty, and by advocating a broad policymaking approach to the contours of liability, scholars, judges, and citizens have begun
to dissociate the idea of tort law from the notion that the law carries intrinsic
motivational force. 4 16 The consequence, we speculated, was that society
must increasingly come to rely on tort law's application and sanctions in order for the law to have any action-guiding force. If "duty" no longer means
something one ought to feel bound to do, and if society wants individual
conduct to be affected, then society must ratchet up the enforcement level,
the penalty level, or both.
The relational conception of duty attempts to retain a mesh between our
ordinary sense of what we owe others, and our sense of what the tort law requires of us. The law itself can bolster social and moral norms, and conversely, social and moral norms can bolster compliance with the law. To
the extent that people can understand their legal duties to one another by fitting them into their moral, social, and professional frameworks, the law can
be more easily internalized. Moreover, the individual sense of duty we feel
in morality, if applied to our legal norms, is capable of significant actionguiding potential, quite apart from probabilistic speculations about the likelihood of liability.
The instrumentalist conception of duty, in its attempt to reach analytic
clarity and to control liability, divided the concept of duty into two components: a non-relational conduct component, which required simple reasonableness, and an all-encompassing liability component, which looked to the
overall consequences of a scheme of liability-imposition. Ironically, instrumentalists failed to see that a relational conception of duty may be better
able to do both jobs. At the level of conduct, it permits a more selective set
of norms that have a greater psychological grip than non-relational reasonableness, and that are mutually reinforcing with social and professional
norms. The law is thus more easily internalized, guides citizens more reliably and with less enforcement, and commands greater respect.417 Moreover,
416

For a discussion of the sense in which the norms of tort law have action-guiding force,

see Zipursky, supra note 27, at 57-58, discussing various views of how the law guides conduct. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961) (describing the role of law
in guiding private action); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and EnforcementRules: A Better
View of the Cathedral,83 VA. L. REV. 837, 858-63 (1997) (observing that law-abiding citizens treat legal rules as guidance rules, not simply as enforcement rules).
417 Cf Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 468-88 (1997) (arguing that a just-deserts-based system better retains moral credibility
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because the standard of conduct does not open up potential liability as
widely as does mere reasonableness, it reduces the need for the court to
make a wide range of apparently ad hoc decisions at the level of liability, for
which they may be poorly qualified. In this manner, a relational conception
4188
of duty preempts many unmanageable, ill-considered policy judgments.
The fundamental rule determining liability is that if the plaintiff's injury
stems from the defendant's breach of a duty of due care owed to the plaintiff, then the defendant will be liable to the plaintiff. The reach of such a
rule is not nearly so ominous when we understand our duties in the more
controlled and systematic manner offered by a relational conception of duty.
4. Constitutional and Common Law: A Final Comparison
We have argued that the development of constitutional law and theory
provides us with reasons to re-examine tort law. In fact, until now, we have
understated our case in certain respects. The argument for a nonreductive
conception of duty in tort law is stronger than the comparable argument in
constitutional law. In constitutional law-particularly in the area of substantive due process-courts that take a rights-based approach may feel
anxiety at the dearth of text and accompanying "legislative" history to support the identification of allegedly fundamental rights.4 19 Yet, if the Constitution is the law, then there are legitimate concerns over whether the
judge is merely fabricating a right. Second, by permitting judges to make
sensitive calls on the moral question of the rights individuals possess, judicial review causes a shift of power from legislative bodies to courts, and, in
some cases, from the states to the federal government.42 0 There are, then,
and better meshes with community norms than a direct utility-based system, and therefore, is
more effective at guiding conduct).
418 We should be clear at this point that we believe that there are certain classes of negligence cases in which policy is appropriately invoked to limit liability: for example, suits traditionally governed by immunity principles or suits that threaten to interfere substantially with
the performance by public or quasi-public actors of important governmental functions. See,
e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 860-61 (N.Y. 1968) (refusing for policy reasons to hold police liable for failing to protect plaintiff from violent ex-suitor); cf Aaron D.
Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practicein the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 52735 (1982) (arguing that judges do, and should, use policy analysis to limit liability in certain
difficult design defect cases). Our point is that instrumentalists have erred in arguing that the
concept of duty in negligence law involves only policy analysis, and thus, courts have been
forced to rely far too heavily on policy reasoning, which cannot bear the weight that they have
put on it.
419 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 234, at 43-72.
420 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOuNDATIONS 13-16 (1991) (arguing against aggressive judicial review of rights because "it is the People who are the source
of rights"); BORK, supra note 222, at 159 (arguing that overaggressive rights reasoning by the
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interpretive, separation of powers, and federalism problems that stem from
rights-based accounts of the Constitution. Each of the rights theories we
mentioned consists, in part, of an effort to retain a robust conception of
rights while accommodating these concerns. It is not our business here to
comment on the relative successes or failures of such projects. It is sufficient to point out that, while some cede more than others, there is a shared
recognition that the project of facilitating rights discourse is rendered more
delicate because of the need to remain consistent with an unchanging and
carefully worded text, on the one hand, and the historically measured role of
the federal courts, as compared with federal and state political branches, on
the other.
The relational conception of duty in tort law does not face either of
these problems. First, the common law of torts has no single document that
is, itself, the key legal authority for the entire area. Rather, it depends upon
an accretion of decided cases within the law. The authority of the principles
underlying the law comes from its status as the common law, not from a
particular text or from a judge's own initial evaluation of those principles.
Similarly, the constitutional issues of separation of powers and federalism
do not surface here. Indeed, they cut in favor of the analysis we are adopting. The judiciary has traditionally handled duty questions, and has traditionally been recognized to have the prerogative to do so. Text and separation of powers-two fundamental problems facing rights-based accounts of
the Constitution-pose no obstacles to judicial duty-analysis in tort law.
While the tort conception of duty is less problematic than the constitutional conception of rights in these respects, there are nevertheless important
similarities between them. The deontological conception of rights in con42
stitutional theory, as articulated most prominently by Ronald Dworkin, 1
envisions a separation between two sorts of reasons bearing on government
action. On the one hand, a multitude of moral, social, and economic factors

judiciary threatens federalist values).
421 See DWORKIN, supranote 217, at 81-149, 184-205 (providing an analysis of propositions about legal rights). We rely here on Dworkin's theory of rights to provide an analogue
to our account of duty. In this respect, our argument provides the mirror image of his famous
invocation of MacPhersonto explain and justify his theories of constitutional rights and judicial review. See id. at 111-15. Dworkin has thus employed MacPhersonas part of a general
jurisprudential argument against instrumentalist and utilitarian accounts of law. He has also
devoted attention to torts. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 248, at 276-313 (arguing that a
theory of law-as-integrity better justifies the common law of torts than economic theories);
Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1997) (analyzing market-share
liability). Nevertheless, we do not discern in his work an engagement with Cardozo's understanding of the substantive law of negligence, nor a critique of the standard Holmes-Prosser
account of torts. We make this observation not to criticize Dworkin, but merely to note the
different foci of our respective analyses.
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must be weighed (and sometimes traded) against one another. On the other
hand, there is a series of principles that frame the permissible scope of these
broader policy choices. 422 We understand these framing principles as vesting political rights in members of the political community. By this we
mean, in part, that certain precious individual interests should not be interfered with by the government in its usual policy-making choices.! 23 Legal
theorists have been captivated by this model of rights.
The rights theorist must explain what warrants treating certain principles as framing principles and what interests are sufficiently precious to deserve such treatment. Some answers to these questions have achieved widespread recognition. Courts, it is often said, are fit to decide what is in this
privileged class because their judgment is independent of the actors who are
most prone to invade these interests. The courts' place in our overall institutional structure permits an impressive kind of enforcement of this boundary, because their decisions are typically enduring, rather than fleeting, and
their change is incremental rather than rapid-advantages where the role of
There is ample evidence that
principles is, in part, the provision of stability. 424
the Framers envisioned courts serving this role.
The concept of duty serves an analogous role in everyday individual decisionmaking. An individual has many decisions to make about many aspects of his or her life, including moral, financial, political, employment,
family, and community decisions. These decisions are pluralistic, heterogeneous, and often, to a significant degree, consequentialist. Yet there is a
separate sort of reason that affects our decisions about how to act-reasons
pertaining to our duties towards others. In some ways, these reasons frame
our decisions about how to act in daily life. Phenomenologically, the sense
of a duty to another is a sense of being bound to another, recognizing an intense, often unquestioned, normative pressure to act or to refrain from acting
a certain way in light of the duties one owes to others. As discussed earlier,
the sense of duty contains a sense of the prioritization of the action to which
one has a duty. 425 It also contains a sense of a line that one does not cross.
Our political system has selected the courts and the common law of
torts to reflect a substantial component of our ordinary convictions about
422 See DWORKIN, supra note 217, at 184-205, 190-97 (discussing constitutional rights in
the context of broader principles, such as the idea that citizens have certain fundamental moral
rights against their government).
423 See id. at 190 ("United States citizens are supposed to have certain fundamental rights
against their Government, certain moral rights made into legal rights by the Constitution.").
We do not mean to suggest that Dworkin believes that rights are merely strong interests.
424 See id. at 142 ("Chief Justice Marshall recognized [that] ... the Supreme Court in the
end, must have the power to declare statutes void that offend the Constitution.").
425See supratext accompanying notes 378-79.
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duty. Having seen the constitutional story, this should not be surprising.
The common law provides a point outside of the individual's own preferences that serves as a sort of check on one's ordinary decisions. More generally, it permits the sense of duty to serve as a line, or a framing point, that
is not to be crossed. In fact, the courts' power simply underlines the sense
of the enforceability of the boundaries and the sense of the bindingness of
the duty. Further, the common law's inertia as to duties ensures a kind of
stability in the framework, even if what is inside the framework should be
is change, it is ordinarily incremental in a
changing. Even where there 426
manner that permits continuity.
Thus, both in constitutional law and in torts, the judiciary serves to delineate and to enforce a certain normative boundary, a boundary within
which other normative decisions are made. In the constitutional case, the
decisions are made by governmental bodies, and in the case of torts, the decisions are made by individuals and corporate entities. If this system is to
function smoothly, the boundaries must remain enforceable, relatively stable
and possible to grasp. Given their power, given the doctrine of stare decisis,
and given their ability to reason in a manner that builds upon accessible everyday convictions, our courts have the capacity to do this job in both cases,
if they permit themselves to engage in such reasoning.
Yet, the very advantages of duty-based reasoning in the courts are also
its greatest hazards. For with progress-economic, industrial, political, social, scientific, and moral--comes a sense that our usual normative reasoning has been improperly bounded. However, we have planted these concepts with the judiciary precisely because of its capacity to produce
relatively stable and enduring decisions. We have also internalized these
concepts in a manner that exerts a sort of normative pressure which does not
easily enter the mix of everyday practical reasoning about means and ends.
In short, our institutional structures and our psychological concepts give
rights and duties a staying power that is valuable, because they insulate certain sorts of interests and needs from the reach of everyday practical reasoning. Yet, while this insulation and staying power are invaluable in a daythe long term, because it
to-day sense, they may become shortcomings, over
427
boundaries.
our
change
to
necessary
is sometimes
Winterbottom, like Lochner, is a case of ossified boundaries. When
such cases present themselves, it is tempting to resist the idea of normative
boundaries altogether, and to try to remake the law within a flat conceptual
structure, like utilitarianism, that takes in all considerations at one time.
Goldberg, supranote 43, at 1364-65 (discussing Cardozo's incrementalism).
See id. at 1353 ("[Jjudges tend to lose a sense of the law as the expression of an ongoing community life.").
426 See
427

1846

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 146:1733

What Cardozo showed us in MacPherson is that there is another option.
Where social and moral progress reveal that our legal boundaries are drawn
in the wrong places, courts may penetrate to the principles underlying our
boundaries and construct new boundaries. Just as the rejection of Lochner
should be understood as the rejection of an ossified conception of rights, but
not a rejection of rights altogether, so the moral of MacPhersonmust be understood as a rejection of an archaic conception of duty, but not as a rejection of duty itself.
CONCLUSION
It is dogma among torts scholars that, as Prosser put it, duty is merely
shorthand for a laundry list of policy factors bearing on whether liability
should be permitted or barred in some class of cases. MacPherson is used
as an emblem for this dogma because it eliminated the privity rule, which
was the most notorious duty limitation in negligence law. In place of
thinking about duty, scholars have told modem courts they must think about
all the different results that may flow from opening and closing the floodgates of litigation in various degrees. Many courts, like those of California,
have listened to the scholars and altered their negligence law so that reasonableness is the general standard of conduct and duty is simply a liabilitymanagement tool. Those jurisdictions that have left their duty law intact
have done so apologetically, as if the honest course of action would be to
follow Prosser and California.
Our aim has been to challenge this dogma. Duty, as the word itself
suggests, is a non-instrumental concept. Yet, modem American tort law has
been the object of a constant assault by thinkers, such as Holmes, Prosser,
Rabin, and Posner, who recoil from the use of such concepts. In other areas
of the academy, and in the courts, reductive instrumental thinking is no
longer treated as gospel. Rights-based reasoning and duty-based reasoning
are now recognized as playing a legitimate, and often essential role, within
the law, and their philosophical credentials are at least equal to those of the
utilitarian thinking which has dominated tort law for so many decades.
Such concepts, it is true, can be captive to regressive regimes, and were so
captive in the heyday of laissez-faire thinking. But, as constitutional scholars have shown in their reinterpretation of the Lochner era, the error of the
laissez-faire courts lay in their assumptions about the content of rights and
duties and about their static nature-not in the concepts of rights and duties
themselves.
Ironically, MacPherson itself turns out to be an embodiment of a noninstrumental, relational conception of duty. The court ordered the manufacturer to pay compensation precisely because it understood the manufac-
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turer-user relationship to be one that imposed a duty on the manufacturer to
be vigilant of harm it might cause the user. The MacPherson court then
read that duty into the law itself. Far from rejecting the concept of duty,
MacPherson embraces duty, yet insists on a flexible, moral interpretation of
the content of the concept.
A relational conception of the duty of due care should now be recognized as an option in negligence theory. Its deployment does not require abstract moral philosophy, but simply careful interpretation of the concepts of
duty already present in the tort law. Unlike constitutional law, we need not
be defensive about text because the relevant authority is the entire common
law of negligence, which abounds with moral notions of duty. Nor should
separation of powers or federalist concerns precipitate hesitation: the contours of tort law are traditionally the domain of the judiciary. For all of
these reasons, the authority of courts to engage in deontological reasoning in
tort law leaves an open field.
What does such a conception promise? We have only begun to formulate a wishful answer to this question. We hope to make headway on longstanding problems in the organization and interpretation of the common law
of duty by candidly recognizing a connection between the nature of plaintiff-defendant relationships and the content of duties owed. By explaining
how the contours of our relationship-based duties provide intelligible guidance for the contours of liability, we hope to diminish reliance upon multifactor analyses that are unmanageable, unprincipled, and unpredictable. By
recognizing that legal duties are a kind of obligation to others, we hope to
keep alive the idea that the law binds not simply by the threat of liability,
but by the force of duty.
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